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ABSTRACT
High School Principals’ Perceptions of Their Effectiveness in Leading District Initiated
High School Reform: An Analysis of High School Principals Previously Engaged in
High School Reform in an Urban Texas School District. (May 2012)
Carlos Humberto Rios, B.A., Texas A&M University;
M.S., Texas A&M University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Linda Skrla
Current research has described a changed central office perspective that not only
includes campus principals as part of the district’s leadership team, but also focuses on
developing principals’ instructional abilities with the purpose of supporting school
reform. However, to date, research has not provided examples of a successful
relationship between campus principals as a collective group and the district (central
office) leadership team attempting to implement district-wide high school reform.
This study was conducted in order to examine the perceptions of high school
principals (in an urban school district in Texas) toward district-wide initiated high school
reform. Methods used for data collection included semi-structured interviews, review of
available artifacts, and case profile development. Questions derived from the
researcher’s review of the literature and ongoing professional interest were the basis for
dialogue during the semi-structured interviews. All interviews were recorded,
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transcribed, and unitized. The data were further organized into categories and
subcategories.
The analysis of principals’ perceptions provided insight and helped develop an
understanding of obstacles that high school principals perceive in implementing district-
led high school reform. This study has concluded that the district goals and mission do
not define the daily operations of a campus. Instead, the district goals and mission are
often reprioritized because principals are insecure, believe they have a better
understanding of the local context than does the central office, and are oftentimes
frustrated by the central office’s political machinations.
Recommendations include suggestions on how to eliminate these obstacles,
improve the ability of principals to implement district-led high school reform, and how
to suggest actions for the improvement of the high school reform process at the central
office level.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Education scholars, business leaders, and public school educators increasingly
argue that the size of the modern high school is a major obstacle to safe, efficient, and
productive schools. Because of this research-based criticism, school district leaders
across the United States have sought to redesign their large high schools into smaller
schools. Redesign efforts have been increasing, encouraged and supported by prominent
philanthropist organizations including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
Carnegie Corporation, and the Open Society Foundation. The advocacy for school
redesign has been further spurred by the need to demonstrate increased student
achievement in standardized test scores as required by state and federal legislation
(Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Antrop-Gonzalez, 2006; Cuban, 2005, 2007; Neild & Balfanz,
2006; Oxley & Kassissieh, 2008; Raynor, 2006).
The advocates present many reasons in support of high school redesign. A few of
the reasons include:
1. Bringing intimacy and safety to large, unsafe, impersonal schools.
2. Providing a more relevant curriculum that will make high school graduates
instant contributors to the organization that employs them.
3. Preparing students for a rigorous post high school education (Cohen, 2001;
Cuban, 2010; Salinas & Reidel, 2007).
___________
This record of study follows the style of Educational Administration Quarterly.
2The driving force of the dialogue surrounding high school reform and redesign
does not include an impetus rooted in local desire to reduce achievement gaps between
minority and non-minority groups, improve graduation rates, or better prepare local
graduates for college success. More often than not, the impetus is a collection of
unrelated desires expressed by legislators, practitioners, business professionals, and civic
leaders. Many conferences, workshops, seminars, consultants, and some professional
literature have addressed the issue of high school reform as a major element of high
stakes and high standards issues (Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Vander Ark, 2002). For
example, Cohen (2001) explained that standards-based accountability as an impetus for
reform is usually driven by outside agents such as legislators. However, other
researchers such as Anagnostopoulos (2003) found that improving standardized test
results often drive the urgency for high school redesign plans. Cuban (2005, 2007) and
Cohen (2001) both indicated that reform as an effort to meet standards based
accountability is usually encouraged in a complimentary way by business and civic
leaders. However, Cohen (2001) and Hochreiter (2007) stressed that reform is most
effective when it is openly entered into by the most common community stakeholders,
which are often comprised primarily of teachers, administrators, students, and parents.
The debate surrounding high school reform has been rich in participation but
limited in results. This fact is most obvious when considering the academic achievement
of the economically disadvantaged and minority students. Therefore, this study sought to
expand on the high school reform debate by analyzing the obstacles experienced by
practitioners implementing reform.
3Framing the debate is Cuban (2010) who indicated that at one end of the
spectrum, school reform is driven by those who believe that changing merely the size of
a school makes a major difference in student learning. The other end of the school
reform debate spectrum is driven by business leaders and legislators who believe
accountability will improve student learning significantly. Researchers
(Anagnostopoulos & Rutledge, 2007; Cohen, 2001; Cuban, 2010; Darling-Hammond,
1997) outside of the direct high school redesign/reform debate warn that regardless of
the strategies used to support reform, improving the instructional practices of the
teachers in the classroom is the most important key to ultimately increasing student
learning.
It must be stated that the high school principal, who was the focus of this study,
is often referred to by researchers as the instructional leader in the campus organization
(Cohen, 2001; Marks & Nance, 2007). As the instructional leader, the principal is
ultimately responsible for all instructional and non-academic management aspects of a
high school. However, principals are often distracted from their instructional and
supervisory leadership roles by those who also have a role to play in the leadership of
the campus organization. Marks and Nance (2007) elaborate on these internal and
external factors affecting principals in their instructional and supervisory leadership.
Internally, principals deal with professional teaching staffs. This aforementioned fact is
constantly complicated by external forces. For example, Marks and Nance (2007)
pointed out that “Externally, multiple accountability contexts – states, school districts,
4local boards, school councils, and parent associations – have the ability to support or
constrain the influence of school principals” (p. 4).
More recent literature does not dismiss the existence of internal and external
distractions to the school principal’s focus on instructional leadership. However, this
research does offer the perspective that school districts should be viewed as internal
partners in school reform.
Rorrer, Skrla, and Scheurich (2008) clearly put forth the idea that research in
educational reform has all but dismissed the impact of the school district as a collective
unit in educational reform. They propose a “theory of districts as institutional actors in
systemic educational reform, including reform that results in increasing achievement and
advancing equity” (p. 308). Furthermore, Marzano and Waters’ (2009) meta-analysis of
school district leadership also found a statistically significant correlation between district
leadership and student achievement.
A careful consideration of the previously mentioned research topics showed that
the problem posited by a reform agenda encouraged by outside agents (federal and state
government) and mandated by official and unofficial authority (superintendents,
business leaders, and civic leaders) is a lack of clarity on what leadership role, within the
context of reform and school district influence, the high school principal should occupy.
Since principals are without question the instructional leaders of their schools, a clear
defining of a principal’s role is crucial in order to help understand how to transform a
comprehensive high school into a place where students will rededicate themselves to
academic achievement.
5This study was designed to address the lack of deep and practical understanding
of high school reform implementation. The study also analyzed how individuals who
served as high school principals in a selected urban district that experienced a district-led
redesign perceived their leadership role in that initiative. Moreover, the research
demonstrated the complex and central relationship of the principal to high school
redesign reform efforts initiated and led by the central office level administrators of the
district. The research was important and original because of recent published literature
that points to similar deficits in the scholarship of school redesign. For example, the
absence of coordination in the aims of the proponents of outside-in and inside-out reform
creates what Firestone and Shipps (2003) labeled a “systemic dilemma.” This dilemma
“may reduce, if not completely frustrate, the influence of school principals. Moreover,
local policy actors may advance other agendas that could deflect the principal’s ability to
exercise influence in the ways that they best see fit” (Marks & Nance, 2007, p. 4). The
aforementioned published research also showed that “most principals’ training has not
prepared them to interpret policy or to process and reconcile conflicting policy
initiatives” (Marks & Nance, 2007, p. 9). This study, coupled with the available
published research regarding the context of the problem, furthers the knowledge base in
the area of campus based-central office led school redesign reform.
Statement of Problem
Because of the availability of millions of dollars of support from government
agencies and philanthropic foundations for the creation of new small schools, the
transforming of large high schools through the schools-within-a-school model, or for
6creating school communities within larger schools, districts have increasingly attempted
to redesign their aging high schools into smaller schools (Allen & Steinberg, 2004;
Barber & Mourshed, 2007; Feldman, Lopez, & Simon, 2006; Vander Ark, 2002). There
is a significant amount of advocacy literature (Cohen, 2001; Darling-Hammond, 1997;
Fine & Powell, 2001; Lawrence et al., 2002; Lee & Smith, 1994; Meier, 1995; Poplin &
Weeres, 1992; Raywid, 1998, 1999; Vander Ark, 2002; Wasley et al., 2000; Wasley &
Lear, 2001) that reports success stories of small school reform. The success stories often
cited decreased discipline problems, increased sense of belonging, intimacy, and higher
achievement levels within a more relevant and rigorous curriculum. Testimonials of
students who attended these schools were abundant. However, this literature focused on
the lived experiences of students who had chosen to attend small schools and lacked case
studies of comprehensive high schools that had successfully implemented district-led
reform for all students.
Current research (Honig, Copland, Rainey, Lorton, & Newton, 2010) has
described a changed central office perspective that focuses on developing principal
instructional abilities with the purpose of supporting school reform. However, no
research to date provides examples of a successful relationship between campus
principals as a collective group and the district (central office) leadership team
attempting to implement high school reform. Earlier researchers were blunter when
stating that
Districts’ dismal track record in carrying out or sustaining school reform leads
some policymakers and reformers to conclude that while the district is part of the
reform problem it should not be part of the solution. Major school reform
initiatives such as the Coalition of Essential Schools, the Annenberg Challenge,
7and Goals 2000 cut districts out of the action in the view that central office
incompetence was incurable and that school reforms were bound to fail at the
district door. (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2003, p. 5)
Research by Barber and Mourshed (2007) also indicated that “despite substantial
increases in spending and many well-intentioned reform efforts, performance in a large
number of school systems has barely improved in decades” (p. 10). High school reform
is not only complicated, it is also terribly illusive in larger urban school district reform
efforts. In 2008, the Chancellor of New York City schools observed:
We don’t have … an entire urban school district – one that’s predominantly made
up of minority kids, with lots of English-language learners and lots of poverty –
that really works, that works in a way that people say, “OK, I want to replicate
that district.” To get there, you’re going to need a combination of circumstance
and individuals…Despite our progress, we haven’t achieved yet in New York …
a school district that people from other cities can come to and say: “This works.”
(Cuban, 2010, p. 16)
Rorrer et al. (2008) and Marzano and Waters (2009) conducted studies involving
district leadership and presented the campus principal as part of, or as an extension to,
the district’s administrative team. Rorrer et al. (2008) believed that principals
“collectively serve as a network and critical link to uniting the district and the schools in
ways to both develop and implement solutions to identified problems” (p. 311). Marzano
and Waters (2009) added that “it is the larger system – the district – that establishes the
common work of schools within the district, and it is the common work that becomes the
glue holding the district together” (p. 90).
In an effort to foster better understanding of each individual’s role within school
improvement efforts, Rorrer et al. (2008) proposed a “different conceptualization of the
district: an organized collective constituted by the superintendent; the board; the central
8office-level administration; and principals, who collectively serve as critical links
between the district and the school for developing and implementing solutions to
identified problems” (p. 333). Marzano and Waters (2009) also described the critical role
of the campus principal in the success of the district. Introducing a concept known as
defined autonomy, Marzano and Waters (2009) explained that the “superintendent
expects building principals and all other administrators in the district to lead within the
boundaries defined by the district goals” (p. 8). This approach to campus leadership
requires that principals carry out their leadership tasks not simply with the success of the
school in mind but also guiding the success of the school via a path that implements
district goals.
Based on the previously mentioned literature review, it is obvious that further
research is needed to understand the complexities of this relationship between the district
administration and the principal. Further research is especially needed to better
understand how principals perceive themselves and the obstacles they face in this role. It
appears that in the midst of all the excitement to implement reform and/or redesign high
schools, few researchers have placed value in researching the understanding that high
school principals have of their role within the school district to implement reform.
Finally, there is a lack of research that clearly identifies the skills that campus leaders
need to successfully balance a district reform agenda with campus obstacles and carry
out successful high school reform as a district-led initiative.
Because of the limited success of high school reform, teachers, students, and
parents begin to question the need for reform and even doubt the abilities of the principal
9and district to lead reform efforts. It is not fully known by researchers and practitioners
what obstacles to a successful principal and district relationship must be overcome to
make high school reform successful. Understanding the experiences of in-service and
out-of-service high school principals within the context of district-led high school
redesign has the potential to dramatically improve future district-led reform efforts.
Understanding the everyday experiences of high school principals engaged in district-led
high school redesign must occur first in order to increase the benefits gained from future
district-led reform.
Purpose of Study
This study focused on high school principals from an urban school district in
Texas that engaged in district-wide high school reform. The objective of the study was to
develop an understanding of high school principals’ perceptions of and attitudes toward
district-led high school reform. This study did not intend to make generalizations
regarding the limitations of high school redesign. It did, however, intend to generate
deep campus level understanding of the obstacles that high school principals may
perceive in implementing district-led high school reform. The information gained from
this study will be used to offer suggestions for improving the ability of principals to
implement district-led high school reform within the context of campus level efforts. The
study also addressed the main obstacles encountered in high school reform and practical
ways to eliminate these obstacles. Finally, the study provided immediate
recommendations for the improvement of the high school reform process at the district
level.
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Research Questions
Themes throughout the literature of high school reform, such as student
achievement, academic rigor, academic relevance, campus governance, and teacher
professionalism were used as the basis for inquiry and analysis to answer two inter-
related primary questions.
1. How do principals perceive their relationship to the district leadership team
as they attempted to initiate action to secure the changes in teacher behavior
that promotes rigorous and meaningful instructional practice within the
context of district-led high school reform efforts?
2. What are the aforementioned principals’ attitudes toward the obstacles
experienced when attempting to improve teacher behavior as they push
district-led high school reform efforts?
Methodology
Site and Participant Selection
The school district that provided the setting for the district initiated high school
reform research employs 11 comprehensive high school principals. Although at different
performance levels, all of these high school principals were directed to redesign their
schools. Five high schools, with historically low achievement and serving predominantly
high minority and high poverty students, were directed to engage in immediate and full
scale redesign efforts. Two other schools, serving students from different but balanced
levels of ethnic and economic diversity, were directed to engage in high school redesign
but were given latitude as to the level of implementation. Finally, four schools who
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served a primarily affluent population with pockets of at-risk students were directed to
engage in high school redesign but only had mandates to show evidence of improved
teaching practices. The researcher of this study was the principal at Central High School
during the first three years of the district’s redesign efforts. However, the researcher did
not participate as a respondent. Instead the principal who succeeded the researcher was
the respondent for this study.
Five principals were asked to participate in the study and all five first
experienced high school reform in the district that is the setting for this study. Three of
the five principals were male: two Hispanic American and one African American. The
remaining two participants were female. Both of the female participants were Hispanic
American. The campus administrative experience of the participants ranged from 4-16
years. One of the principals was in her second assignment as a campus principal and has
been an assistant principal at various campuses within the same district. Of the five
principals:
1. Only one remains as an in-service principal within the school district that is
the setting for this study.
2. The second remaining principal has moved to a different school district and
continues to serve as a high school principal.
3. The third principal accepted a lateral position within the district and then left
the district in the final year of this study.
4. The fourth principal has been promoted to a central office position at another
district.
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5. The fifth principal has retired.
Data Collection
Each of the five participants readily agreed to participate in this study. Prior to
the collection of any data, a face-to-face meeting was held with each participant who
received and signed a participant consent form. The signed consent forms are in the
possession of and the custodial responsibility of the researcher.
In order to gain further insight into the relevant issues, each of the five
participants completed audio-recorded interviews. Throughout the course of this study,
the researcher communicated with the participants via e-mail and telephone. Following
review and classification of the transcribed interviews, five case profiles were prepared.
A cross-case analysis was conducted to formulate the final findings of the study.
According to Lincoln and Guba (as cited in Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993),
the case study methodology raises the reader’s level of understanding and the focus of
the study. Additionally, following the methodology of Lincoln and Guba (as cited in
Erlandson et al., 1993) provides for the following advantages:
 The case study is better suited for emic inquiry (a reconstruction of the
respondent’s constructions);
 The case study builds the reader’s tacit knowledge by presenting holistic and
lifelike descriptions that allow the reader to experience the context
vicariously;
 The case study, more than the conventional report, allows for the
demonstration of the interplay between inquirer and respondents;
 The case study provides the “thick description” necessary for judgments of
transferability between the sending and receiving contexts;
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 The case study provides a grounded assessment of context by communicating
contextual information that is grounded in the particular setting being studied.
(p. 164)
This study was designed and conducted by a novice researcher with a high
degree of experience in the field of education and school leadership. Methods used for
data collection were semi-structured interviews and case studies. The questions used
during the initial interview consisted of the following:
1. Describe instances when you made the teachers aware of decisions being
made at the district level regarding non-negotiable goals for district-wide
reform?
2. Describe the responses teachers gave, formally and informally, about their
concerns regarding the non-negotiable goals for district-wide reform?
3. Describe methods and instances when teachers were led to develop ideals and
beliefs surrounding the implementation of high school redesign?
4. How did you ensure that ideals and beliefs developed by the teachers
regarding high school redesign were supportive of the district level goals for
district-wide reform?
5. Describe the systems or routines that the campus level leadership
implemented to ensure that redesign efforts could be accomplished?
6. How did the systems or routines implemented incorporate the latest research
and theory on high school redesign?
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7. Describe your level of knowledge regarding high school redesign as it relates
to your ability to coach teachers and inform them about how implementing
high school redesign will improve their daily lives?
8. What feedback do you believe the principals as a whole provided the central
office regarding the implementation of high school redesign and how do you
believe the district altered its course regarding the implementation of high
school redesign from that feedback?
9. Describe instances when you felt the responsibility to continue to advocate
for district-led reform in spite of teachers focusing on the negative aspects of
high school redesign?
All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded in accordance with valid
educational research guidelines (Erlandson et al., 1993). The names of the participants
were not divulged. Instead pseudonyms were used for the participants and the schools
that provide the setting for this study. All information obtained via these interviews was
reviewed utilizing member checks with the participants (Erlandson et al., 1993).
Data Analysis
Qualitative descriptive data retrieved from the interactive interviews during each
stage of the research (case study development and cross-case analysis) were analyzed
and interpreted according to the principles outlined in Doing Naturalistic Inquiry: A
Guide to Methods (Erlandson et al., 1993). The data collected from the interviews were
unitized on an Excel worksheet by placing smaller bits of stand-alone data in individual
cells. Unitizing the data helped the researcher begin to identify emerging categories.
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During the review process, additional categories emerged and data were attributed to
different categories or included in more than one category according to a consistent
process.
After the data were unitized and categorized, resulting data were again divided
by respondent. The process used to identify general themes was used again to identify
themes within the respondent interviews. The researcher identified group themes before
identifying individual themes in order to prevent one respondent from dominating the
formation of the themes.
In order to ensure that the information provided by the respondents was
accurately recorded and interpreted by the researcher, member checks and peer review
methods, as outlined by Merriam (2002), for ensuring internal validity were employed.
The researcher and participants engaged in member checks throughout the data analysis
by discussing the tentative findings. Additionally, two individuals with expert
knowledge in the field of education were solicited to serve as members of peer
debriefing sessions. Each member added richness to the context description, served as
additional sources of information, and highlighted the existence of gaps in the research.
These suggestions provided guidance for improving the overall design of the research.
The researcher established trustworthiness by employing journaling and
triangulation methods also discussed by Merriam (2002). In Chapter III of this study, the
researcher provides detailed descriptions of how data were collected, how categories
were derived, and how decisions were made throughout the inquiry. The researcher
maintained a research journal where reflections, questions, and emerging solutions to
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research obstacles were recorded. Finally, the Campus Improvement Plan endorsed by
the schools’ site councils and submitted to the district, Academic Excellence Indicator
System (AEIS) reports published by the Texas Education Agency (TEA), artifacts
provided by the participants, and various participants’ accounts were used to triangulate
findings with information gathered during the interviews.
Significance of Study
The study focused on the experiences of in-service and out-of-service high
school principals who engaged in or are currently engaged in an urban district initiated
high school reform. School districts across the country are increasingly looking to high
school reform as a way of improving the performance of their districts as a whole. It is
important, therefore, to ensure that the individuals tasked with carrying out the reform
efforts at the campus level are prepared and well equipped to transform their schools.
Although school districts often hire consultants to render technical assistance to
the redesign process, it is the high school principal who must implement, in concert with
his/her leadership team, the reform process based on a clear understanding of what the
district goals are and what the campus can and cannot do. While much attention has been
given to the reasons for reform and the models that potentially guide reform, very little
attention, if any, has been given to the relationship between district leadership and
campus leadership. It is this top-down/down-up leadership interaction and relationship
that advances or hinders the improvement of classroom practices within the context of
high school reform.
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This study was intended to discover what could be learned from the experiences
of in-service and out-of-service principals who had been engaged or are currently
engaged in an urban high school redesign process. The added knowledge base derived
from this study will provide practical recommendations for principals and others
engaged in the high school redesign process.
Chapter Summary
The reduction of the size of the high school as a type of reform is endorsed by
prominent organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Vander Ark,
2002). However, this type of high school reform, as well as other reforms, has not been a
strong enough catalyst to spur increased student achievement (Barber & Mourshed,
2007; Cuban, 2010). Obstacles to increased student achievement, within the context of
school reform, include the school leader’s limited instructional skills (Honig et al.,
2010); internal and external distractions (Marks & Nance, 2007); and the educational
system’s failure to embrace the district as an institutional actor (Rorrer et al., 2008).
By exploring the lived experiences of five high school principals who had
implemented high school reform, this study intended to provide insight into the
perception high school principals have of their role within a reform agenda driven by a
central office organization. Finally, this study intended to identify the principal
leadership skills needed when balancing the management of a district-led reform agenda
amid campus level distractions from internal and external forces.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
While numerous and drastically different reform efforts have been attempted
throughout the history of American public schools, school reform has not been
capricious. Over the decades, school reform has been the primary vehicle by which
policymakers have sought to continuously transform the social and economic role of the
United States population. Over the decades, the purpose of this policy-driven
transformation has been to create, enhance, or sustain an internationally competitive
United States. Moreover, the policy-driven transformation consistently reflects the
policymakers (who are mostly U.S. society’s elite) paradigm–meritocracy (Salinas &
Reidel, 2007). Because of this fact, the following chapter first presents an historical
discussion of American school reform movements before delving into a review of the
literature that describes the context and current need for reform.
The Legacy of Big Business in the American School Reform Movements
Throughout much of U.S. history (beginning in the mid-19th century), elementary
schools and particularly high schools have continuously been used as agents to help
promote changes desired by policy elites. For example, in the late-1800s, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs used boarding schools in an attempt to “civilize” Native Americans.
These schools sought to acculturate Native Americans by replacing their traditional
clothing and forbidding them to speak their languages. In the early-1900s, urban schools
were tasked with ensuring that non-White Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP) immigrants
from European countries (mainly Italian, Irish, and Polish immigrants) were acculturated
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into a modern, urban, and fast-paced American way of life (Whitman, 2008). When the
Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, national politicians charged schools with
promoting math and science mastery to increase the number of American engineers
needed to sustain the U.S. defense superiority (Howes, 2002). The aforementioned are
generational examples of American societal transformation facilitated through public
school reform. The next section discusses and presents a description of the perceived
need for efficiency that helped transform the one-room schoolhouse into a large urban
school program that includes increasingly complex management systems.
The Transformation of the American High School
By the early 1900s, schooling in the United States was becoming almost
universal. Tyack (1974) informed that “Attendance in high schools increased during that
period from 202,963 to 1,645,171, an increase of 711 percent while the total population
increased only 68 percent” (p. 183). The Progressive reformers of the era wanted to
ensure that the growing school systems conformed to a corporate model of efficiency.
To this end, they were supported by education professors such as Strayer, Judd, and
Cubberley who were training superintendents at Columbia University, the University of
Chicago, and Stanford University (Tyack, 1974).
In 1916, Cubberley (as quoted in Ross, 2008) summed up the scientific
management thoughts of Progressive reformers who demanded efficiency in the
educational system and ultimately in the new American industrial society:
Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw products (children) are to
be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life. The
specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of the twentieth century
civilization, and it is the business of the school to build its pupils to the
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continuous measurement of production to see if it is according to specifications,
the elimination of waste in manufacture, and a large variety in the output. (p. 7)
Folly (2007) clearly showed that the perceived purpose of a high school
education in the United States has undergone various intentionally changed historical
stages since the one-room school house era. Over the course of the last half of the 19th
century, what was once an education reserved for the privileged and semi-privileged,
became the primary means to produce skilled workers necessary to sustain the Industrial
Revolution and assimilate large immigrant populations who possessed little or no
industrial/urban background.
Darling-Hammond (1997) described in detail how “the image of a moving
conveyor belt on which students were placed while teachers performed a pre-determined
series of operations on them was a powerful metaphor for order and efficiency” (p. 38).
Darling-Hammond, Alexander, and Price (2002) also stressed that this management
system concept continues to exist today in public education and that it presents often
insurmountable obstacles to reformers who seek to create an educational system where
teachers are able to practice their craft. The management system concept also creates
obstacles for providing students with a rigorous and relevant curriculum.
According to Darling-Hammond (1997), the emergence of the industrial era’s
large urban schools also necessitated a management system with planning departments
to design tasks, managers to monitor those tasks, and the support staff that tracked
ensuing paperwork. Moreover, Lutz (1990) wrote that the management practices that
accompanied the larger system included:
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standardized tests as measures of teaching efficiency; score cards for school
buildings; cost analysis of instruction; questioning of small class size as useful to
instruction; [and] use of terms such as school plan, effective products, investment
per pupil, cost per pupil recitation, platoon school, and education balance sheet.
(p. 116)
The increasing manifestation of the industrial-urban-scientific management processes
and their functions in public education is conclusive evidence of the symbiotic
relationship that bonded policy elites and educational reformers at the dawn of Modern
America.
Since the 1950s, secondary education reform has been impacted and directed by
legislation that has promoted accountability measures via standardized tests. Salinas and
Reidel (2007) argued that
Nowhere is this more apparent in a contemporary context than in the educational
accountability reform in Texas and in the national institutionalization of this
reform agenda in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as reauthorized in
the form of No Child Left Behind (NCLB). (p. 42)
Furthermore, Cuban (2010) maintained that “the application of business-crafted
solutions to public schools has become so thoroughly embedded in policymakers’
thinking about improving schools that these policies are taken for granted and often seen
as common sense” (p. 23).
In order to extend the discussion of the influence exerted by policymaker elites
on school reform, the next section of this chapter reviews the relevant discussions related
to the national reform agenda. At the center of the discussions are the emergence of
high-stakes exams and the effect of these exams on the American public school students’
development.
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Legislative Educational Reform
By the 1950s, the focus of education reform, and most importantly secondary
education reform, shifted in an attempt to address apparent science and math gaps
between the United States and economic rivals (Cuban, 2010). The shift saw increased
involvement by business leaders and was directed through federal legislation such as the
National Education Defense Act of 1958 and the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (Cuban, 2010).
The study of the most recent era of reform is divided into three waves by Marks
and Nance (2007). The first wave of recent school reform was initiated with the
publication of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform in 1983 by the
National Commission on Excellence in Education. As described by education scholars
the “Reforms included increasing high school graduation requirements, particularly in
math and science; instituting statewide testing programs; offering more Advanced
Placement (AP) courses; promoting the use of technology in the classroom; and
instituting new teacher evaluation programs” (Tirrozzi & Uro, 1997, p. 241). While this
first wave of recent reform was characterized by increased state and federal activity, the
reform did not cause conflict or frustration because local school districts were also active
participants in creating the policy that facilitated the changes (Marks & Nance, 2007).
The second wave of recent reform came in the late 1980s and continued through
the 1990s. This recent reform stage stressed “a newly conceptualized view” (Marks &
Nance, 2007, p. 8). The principal was now expected to lead a localized and participatory
decision-making process in order to achieve heightened student performance outcomes
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outlined in the first wave of reform. The heightened student performance outcomes were
codified into six national education goals at the 1989 Charlottesville Education Summit
convened by President George Bush and the nation’s governors. The governors and state
level advocates were led by then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton (Tirrozzi & Uro, 1997;
Phelps & Addonizio, 2006).
Marks and Nance (2007) believed the third and current wave of recent reform,
which began in the 1990s, reflected deep frustration with the limited gains recorded in
top-down efforts of the first wave and bottom-up efforts of the second wave. The initial
stages of this wave of reform were facilitated by funds provided through legislation such
as the Goals 2000 Act (signed into law on March 31, 1994) and the reauthorization of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), also known as the Improving
America’s Schools Act (IASA) of 1994 (Tirrozzi & Uro, 1997).
Increasing concern about accountability within U.S. core institutions impacted
the dynamics of the most profound changes. For example, some scholars have pointed
out that “Driving the system in the third wave is accountability for results, with states
ranking, classifying, and sometimes sanctioning districts on their performance” (Marks
& Nance, 2007, p. 8). This wave of reform sought also to improve the different
components of the school system (curriculum and performance standards, professional
development, policies, and programs affecting schools) by integrating and coordinating
their existence and interaction (Marks & Nance, 2007). Tirrozzi and Uro (1997) pointed
to the expansion of the six national goals established at the 1989 Charlottesville
Education Summit into eight goals enacted as the Goals 2000 Act as evidence of the
24
serious efforts to include and integrate different educational components to facilitate
change.
Sustaining the reform efforts and standards based accountability into the 21st
century was the reauthorization of the ESEA. The reauthorization is known more
generally as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 (Phelps & Addonizio, 2006;
Raynor, 2006). Standards-based accountability intends to achieve academic success for
all students, especially those from historically disadvantaged groups, by employing
scientific management principles. The approach is based on the belief that real and
consistently applied efficiency produces performance. As part of this, reform effort
mandated by NCLB states have developed accountability systems that provide various
sanctions intended to place schools on a fast track to improve student achievement as
measured by test scores (Anagnostopoulos, 2003; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, & Diaz,
2004; Salinas & Reidel, 2007).
Barber and Mourshed (2007) have indicated that the available evidence suggests
that the various reform efforts employed through state and federal legislation (structural
reforms, decentralization of powers, smaller schools, increased autonomy, and increased
accountability) have not delivered the improved student outcomes desired. Literature
reviews by Nelson, Leffler and Hansen (2009) suggested that the lack of success has in
large part been shaped by the complex political and organizational contexts in which
legislators work. Referring specifically to this lack of coordination, Nelson et al. (2009)
said:
In general they are constrained by short time frames in which to deal with
complex issues; the need to respond to constituents and keep election promises;
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the power of decisions left to the hierarchy and ideology of their parties; and the
lack of institutional memory in states with term limits. (p. 9)
The overall limited success of legislative reform has been chronicled in various
scholarly articles, as have the negative effects of the same reform. The next section
reviews the particular effects that legislative reform has had on schools, particularly
urban schools.
Effects of Legislative Educational Reform
Cohen (2001) echoed the sentiments of numerous educational researchers who
believed that the continued use of standards-based accountability for schools and school
systems is a necessary component for reforming the American high school. Cohen’s
research supports the belief that high-stakes testing for high school graduation, if done
the right way, has the potential for generating enough pressure on school systems and
schools to produce action for improvement where little or no action may have occurred
before. On the other extreme, Raynor (2006) maintained that “NCLB has also fueled an
unhealthy emphasis on standardized testing as the primary benchmark of progress and
has set into motion a complete reliance on statistics to determine how well a school or
district is doing” (p. 52). Woolworth (2007) added that the standards-based
accountability policies in education driving testing and test preparation, overly scripted
curricula, and intensive teacher regulation, have reduced the schooling process to the
lowest common denominator; the mere acquisition of competency-based skills. Not
surprisingly, Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge (2007) found that “principals in sanctioned
high schools succeeded in enacting school and classroom change to the extent that they
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were able to mobilize teachers’ cooperation around schemas of school failure and
improvement that enhanced their instructional authority” (p. 1294).
Recent studies indicate that standards-based accountability, and the sanctioning
policies that accompany the accountability system, compel principals and teachers to
alter school and classroom practices in ways that target resources toward efforts to
improve school-wide test scores. This means that principals take resources from those
students who need them most and place them where immediate impact in terms of
increased student achievement outcomes can be realized (Anagnostopoulos & Rutledge,
2007). Carnoy (2005) also indicated other school principal practices that have a
cumulative negative effect on high school progress and graduation rates. Carnoy pointed
out that
According to this argument, the negative effect occurs in part because high
school administrators are more likely to hold lower-performing students in the 9th
grade so that they will not take the exit test in 10th or 11th grade until they have
had special test preparation classes. (p. 20)
Exaggerating the problem is the fact that even if the allocating and reallocating
actions of the principals could potentially increase the outcomes expected in the
standards-based reform movement, the actions of the teachers have not complimented
the principals’ actions. Many teachers continue to use the same instructional practices
used when they themselves were taught (Anagnostopoulos & Rutledge, 2007; Cohen,
2001; Cuban, 2010; Darling-Hammond, 1997).
While the discourse on standards-based accountability and high-stakes testing is
healthy, the effect it has had on the school principal and the teachers is often unhealthy
for the success of students. An often-cited study by Carnoy (2005) found evidence of a
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negative relationship between accountability and progress rates for Black and Hispanic
students. Lopez (2003), using what is called Critical Race Theory, argued that the
accountability policies are more concerned with tangible and identifiable outcomes and
simply ignore the challenges of equity, race, class, and gender. This theory is part of the
framing of the chapter’s next section, which examines the urban school setting that now
serves almost entirely students of color with consistently limited resources.
The effect of big business in education can be observed both in the increased
scope of the educational system and in the bureaucratic systems that have evolved in
districts. Arguably, the growth of the educational system has failed to ensure that schools
serving economically disadvantaged students, particularly those in urban schools, keep
pace with other more affluent schools. The next section discusses the current need for
reform in the urban educational setting.
Urban Schools and the Need for Reform
Researchers have examined the urban school setting when attempting to
understand the current state of affairs and thereby prescribe remediation techniques.
Woolworth (2007), for example, believed that “deindustrialization, white flight, and the
political isolation of low-income communities of color, the withdrawal of federal and
state investment from job development, infrastructural improvement, health care, and
affordable housing have contributed to the plight of urban schools” (p. 284).
Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge (2007) and Cuban (2010) believed that all of these same
elements have combined to render the urban high school as the almost exclusive
provider of education to low-income, minority, and special-needs teenagers.
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The currently well-documented poor performance of the urban high school, when
seen in its totality, cannot be simply understood in terms of the present socio-economic
plight. Because of this fact, some researchers have sought to understand the plight of the
urban high school by framing a clearer historical context and perspective.
McKenzie and Scheurich (2004) may not disagree with what has contributed to
the plight of urban schools, but their research indicated the extreme view that the current
urban school dilemma, can be traced to
slavery and Jim Crow, the Japanese internment camps, the genocide of the
Native Americans, the theft of the Latino lands in the Southwest, the exclusion
from schooling of many groups not considered legitimate citizens at the time, the
violence toward unions, the exclusion of those with disabilities from public
education, the denial of women’s participation in democracy, and the
instrumental pedagogy and curriculum of the 1940s and 1950s that was intended
to prepare ‘good’ workers. (p. 438)
The emerging nuanced historical perspective of the plight of the urban schools widens
the scope of understanding and describes a systemic disregard of historically
underrepresented groups. This context for reform is therefore not only generational
within families and communities but historically cyclical among all non-WASP student
groups.
The Context for Reform
Whether reformers agree that the current state of affairs in the urban school has
its origins in the historical context as provided by McKenzie and Scheurich (2004), or
whether they agree with Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge (2007), Woolworth (2007), and
Cuban (2010) in that economic factors have contributed to the plight of the urban
schools, all school reformers must still accept and address the wide range of current
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inequities faced by students in urban schools. Stated more elaborately, McKenzie and
Scheurich (2004) found that
Children of color and those living in poverty are performing at lower
achievement levels than their white counterparts, are overrepresented in special
education and lower level classes, are dropping out of school in higher numbers,
frequently have teachers who do not believe they can learn or are actively
negative in their attitude toward these students, are underrepresented in gifted
and talented classes, are oftentimes educated in schools with fewer resources and
the least experienced teachers, and are more likely to be suspended or expelled.
(p. 438)
Verdugo (2010) provided that 61% of urban schools contained freshman classes whose
students had less than a 50% chance of graduating from high school. Furthermore,
research has established that lower self-esteem, behavioral problems, decreased
participation in the whole school program, and low academic achievement are results of
poor instruction (prevalent in urban schools) and combine to increase the likelihood of
students dropping out of school (Oakes, 2005).
Accordingly, academic deficiencies are not only rooted in underdeveloped skills
of students, but also further perpetuated by a deficit thinking model in those charged
with leading their improvement. The concerns over academic deficiencies articulated
above constitute only part of the plight of the urban school. For example, other needs
such as safety in the urban school are more frequently articulated and addressed by
policymakers and practitioners.
Fine and Powell (2001) explained that anonymity, invisibility, uniforms, metal
detectors, fights, and a concentration on safety and order usually take precedence in
urban schools over personalization and academic achievement. Although the attention
brought to impoverished schools and neighborhoods has facilitated some progress in
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urban settings, maintaining progress is extremely difficult due to a steady flow of
immigrants. The social dynamics of these immigrant groups continually reconstitute the
often complex cultural policies of race, class, power, and identity in the neighborhoods
supplying the urban schools’ student population (Woolworth, 2007).
The remainder of this section will describe one particular reform movement –
smaller schools – that seeks to improve the academic achievement of students enrolled in
the larger urban schools primarily by decreasing the size of the school. Some researchers
believe that merely the size of a school make it impossible for teachers to focus on
instructional improvements. Cohen (2001) stressed that small high schools have a more
appropriate student load for teachers and that the simpler daily operations inherent in
small schools create conditions for success because they facilitate more personal
relationships between adults and students. Additionally, small schools provide more
student-centered instruction, active learning, greater collegiality, and shared
accountability among teachers. Addressing the obvious paradox, one scholar has said:
Ironically, those kids who need the kind of personalized attention that
characterizes small schools usually end up in big schools. Urban high school
students, who are disproportionately poor and of a minority sub-group, are 25
percent more likely than their non-urban counterparts to attend schools of more
than 900 students. (Wolk, 2002, p. 35)
Extending on Wolk’s contributions, Verdugo (2010) also addressed the effects of
school size on academic achievement by stating:
Structural features appear to be linked to lower academic attainment. First, there
is the issue of school size: the greater the school size, the greater the likelihood of
lower achievement, especially large schools that are also low socioeconomic
schools. A second structural feature that has a significant impact on achievement
concerns large, urban, low-income schools, where the academic achievement of
students is considerably lower. (p. 189)
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After considering the vast inequities that combine to create the plight of the
urban schools and hinder academic achievement, two researchers concluded that
For these urban high schools reform efforts to succeed, however, they will need
to be of sufficient intensity to address the educational challenges that result from
the concentration of large numbers of students with multiple risk factors for
school failure in neighborhood high schools. (Neild & Balfanz, 2006, p. 124)
If considered in isolation, practitioners may focus on the academic deficiencies
expressed by Verdugo (2010), the safety concerns expressed by Fine and Powell (2001),
and/or the school size concerns expressed by Cohen (2001), Wolk (2002), and Verdugo
(2010). However, these concerns do not exist in isolation. They have been systematically
perpetuated by a historic disregard for minority groups (McKenzie & Scheurich, 2004).
Obstacles to Implementing Successful Reform
Even if reform efforts meet Neild and Balfanz’s (2006) intensity standard, the
success of reform is still dependent on the school organization’s ability to overcome
organizational and systemic obstacles, as well as those obstacles created by well-
intentioned legislative efforts. The following section addresses obstacles that must be
managed if a school organization will be able to successfully implement effective
reform.
Researchers have studied cases where accountability systems have had an
adverse effect on schools serving low-performing students by making them even less
able to retain teachers – especially effective teachers (Anagnostopoulos & Rutledge,
2007; Weiner & Hall, 2004). As required by NCLB, state, district, and school report
cards publicize information about student achievement disaggregated by race and
ethnicity, as well as low-income status, limited English proficiency status, and other
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factors (Weiner & Hall, 2004). This public accountability system serves those employed
in affluent schools well but deters experienced teachers from serving disadvantaged
students for fear of being identified as failing (Clotfelter et al., 2004). Therefore, it is
important to note that these statistics are not only applicable to isolated cases. Across the
United States, a third of the secondary courses taught in high-poverty schools are taught
by a teacher lacking a major or a minor in that field, while low-poverty schools enjoy
approximately 80% qualified teacher staff levels (Weiner & Hall, 2004). Additionally,
this same policy promotes hiring teachers who may have content knowledge but lack the
skills necessary to provide disadvantaged high school students reading support across
curriculum areas (Neild & Balfanz, 2006).
Research by Nelson et al. (2009) has indicated numerous other factors that can
frustrate reform efforts:
1. Continually shifting district and state priorities and policies;
2. Pressure from local and state systems and parents to do “something” quickly;
3. Turnover in leadership;
4. A lack of administrative support;
5. Compartmentalized departments with limited mechanisms for
communication and collaboration;
6. Entrenched mind-sets and beliefs incompatible with reform efforts;
7. Fear of reprisals when trying out new strategies and distrust of new data and
how they might be used;
8. Negative community perceptions. (p. 9)
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Fullan (1993) theorized that implementing reform in public education is
particularly difficult because education by its very design and nature is a conservative
enterprise highly resistant to change. Additionally, the continuous, disjointed, and
unsuccessful change efforts have “resulted in a system that tends to retain, rather
than challenge the status quo” (p. 3). Elmore and Burney (1997) added that the
“story of educational reform in the United States is, for the most part, a story of
nervous movement from one fad to another with little enduring effect on teaching
practice” (p. 32).
Implementing Reform
As school reform efforts evolved throughout time and by legislation, the school
principal, the district leadership team, and the larger community consisting of parents
and community leaders have been at the center of implementing reform efforts. The
following section considers three important agents of school reform (the principal, the
district level leadership, and the larger school community). The section also explores the
complexities of the respective roles of the aforementioned as they pertain to the larger
school system.
Principalship
Crow, Hausman, and Scribner (2002) stressed that principals are the pivotal point
of all school reform efforts. Research by Marks and Printy (2003) emphasized that
instructional leadership should be the central focus of the principal. Blase and Blase
(2000) showed that regular components of instructional leadership consist of the
principal spending many hours promoting improved instruction by observing teachers
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and providing feedback in a manner that is engaging and causes them to be reflective
and move towards improvement.
David Spence, President of the Southern Region Education Board (as cited in
Gray, Fry, Bottoms, & O’Neil, 2007) echoed the belief of most educational researchers
by stating:
School success critically begins with the school principal who – day in and day
out – has prime responsibility for ensuring that all students meet challenging
grade level and college and career readiness standards. More often than not, the
principal’s leadership skill determines whether a school becomes a dynamic
learning organization or a failed experience. (p. 5)
A recent dissertation by Hardoin (2009) also found that principals create conditions for
organizational learning. The research also showed that through their acts of instructional
leadership, principals are able to sustain academic achievement.
While many researchers have described the importance of the principal’s
leadership role to the success of the school campus, still others, though not disagreeing,
also point to obstacles encountered by the campus principal. McNeil (2005) indicated
that the principal is held accountable for producing improved scores on state tests while
only being able to provide teachers with limited classroom resources and their schools
with limited collections in the library. In addition, the principal is often unable to do
anything about the fact that the school has an overall work environment that is
sometimes dangerous. Despite the aforementioned obstacles, “States view principals as
central agents of change in the system for improving school performance” (Marks &
Nance, 2007, p. 8). Complicating this fact is that states hold them ultimately accountable
for the success or failure of the school without regard to the challenges of equity, race,
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class, or gender (Salinas & Reidel, 2007). Furthermore, principals are held accountable
for implementing true models to effect successful change, while simultaneously
managing input from a diverse group of stakeholders (teachers, teacher unions, and
parents) who may be suspicious and generally opposed to new ideas, but necessary
participants in the successful adoption process (Folly, 2007).
Finally, principals are tasked with managing the state and federal accountability
programs on their campus. Under NCLB, if schools do not meet their state’s Adequate
Yearly Progress (AYP) goals as measured by gains in student test scores, they face
increasingly punitive actions that can culminate in school restructuring and state
takeover, potentially leading to job loss for teachers and principals (Anagnostopoulos &
Rutledge, 2007; Robelen, 2002). Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge (2007) also indicate
that “several studies have documented how principals alter school improvement and
professional development agendas, reallocate managerial task and programs, and
increase oversight of teacher work to comply with school sanctioning policies” (p.
1263). The principal’s role of leadership becomes increasingly challenging when placed
in the context of an urban setting. Neild and Balfanz (2006) believed that there is an
“extreme concentration of educational need in urban schools and that these schools are
often overlooked by policymakers, school reform programs, and even district personnel
when considering redesign initiatives” (p. 123).
The effect of the school principal on the success or failure of a school has almost
entirely dominated exigent research. However, some recent research has explored and
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shed light on the school district’s ability to effect school reform. This next section
discusses the effect of the school district as a catalyst for school reform.
District Level Leadership
The role that district level leadership should play in implementing reform is
advocated from two opposing points. Darling-Hammond and Friedlaender (2008),
McLaughlin and Talbert (2003), and Elmore (1993) pointed to research that supports the
notion that schools should be freed from the bureaucratic structures that doom school
reform to failure. However, researchers like Nelson et al. (2009) indicated that “school
district leaders play an especially important role in the impact of school improvement
initiatives. Their interpretations of policy and the commitment level of support for
reform affect how principals and teachers understand reform initiatives” (p. 7).
In their research, Darling-Hammond and Friedlaender (2008) discounted the
need for district-led reform at the neediest urban school in favor of emphasizing the
lived experiences of students who have chosen to attend small schools. In stark
contradiction of Darling-Hammond and Friedlaender’s (2008) notion that school should
be freed from bureaucratic structures, Rorrer et al. (2008) explained the reality of the
existence of a larger educational system (the school district) that needs to provide
flexibility to the schools while simultaneously increasing their accountability for
success. Research by Honig et al. (2010) supported this notion and indicated that
Decades of experience and research show that when central office staff do not
exercise central leadership in teaching and learning improvement efforts, such
initiatives at best produce improvements at a small handful of schools but hardly
district-wide or in a sustainable way. (p. 1)
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Rorrer et al. (2008) believed that the school districts have four essential roles in
educational reform:
1. Providing instructional leadership;
2. Reorienting the organization;
3. Establishing policy coherence;
4. Maintaining an equity focus.
In order to provide instructional leadership, the school district should seek to
generate will and build capacity. Specifically, Rorrer et al. (2008) commented that
From research on districts to date, then, we can conclude that district
instructional leadership build capacity by coordinating and aligning work of
others through communication, planning, and collaboration; monitoring goals,
instruction, and efforts to improve instruction, including increasing data
accessibility, availability, and transparency and accountability; and acquiring and
targeting support for instruction, including securing human and fiscal resources.
(p. 318)
Honig et al. (2010) further studied three urban districts’ central office
organizations (Atlanta Public Schools, The Empowerment Schools Organization in the
New York City Department of Education, and the Oakland Unified School District) and
determined five distinct central office transformational practices that clearly improved
the teaching and learning practices in schools. The transformational practices are:
1. Engagement with school principals in learning-focused partnerships to
deepen principals’ instructional leadership or their ability to support teaching
and learning improvement at their schools.
2. Direct, intentional support to the central office – principal partnerships.
3. Reorganization and restructuring of each central office unit to support
teaching and learning improvement.
4. Stewardship of the overall central office transformation process.
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5. Use of evidence throughout the central office to support continual
improvement of these lines of work. (p. 3)
Research by Elmore and Burney (1997) indicated similar findings. While
studying district-led initiatives in New York City’s Community School District 2 under
the leadership of then Superintendent Tony Alvarado, Elmore and Burney (1997)
discovered a strategy of district reform that had elements of decentralization and
centralization:
On the decentralization side, the strategy has a heavy focus on school-site
decision-making related to specific decisions about which teachers will receive
training and support, which content areas will receive attention and which
consultants will be employed over a specific period, and on orchestrating
professional networks around specific school issues. On the centralization side,
the strategy places major responsibility with central staff for deciding which
instructional areas will receive priority attention, on maintaining the focus on
these areas, on forming and maintaining relationships with consultants who
deliver training and support in these priority areas, and on keeping school-site
decisions focused on district wide priorities. (p. 28)
The second essential goal for districts outlined by Rorrer et al. (2008) has to do
with reorienting the organization. In this capacity, districts “define organizational
structures and processes and alter district culture to align with their educational reform
goals” (p. 318). Earlier research by McLaughlin and Talbert (2003) indicated that
Reforming districts develop and sustain shared reform goals and focused efforts
through system-wide planning processes. They bring together people from all
levels and parts of the district system to deliberate over reform goals and
outcomes, to share knowledge of successful practices, and design strategies for
change. (p. 12)
However, Honig et al. (2010) reflected on the failed efforts by the San Diego School
District in the 1990s to reorganize and restructure their central office and warned that
“high-performance depends not only on formal structures but also fundamentally on the
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practice of people—how central office administrators understand and go about their
work day-to-day in leading for teaching and learning improvement” (p. 2).
Establishing policy coherence is the third essential goal districts must meet if
they are to be successful in reform (Rorrer et al., 2008). Districts wishing to be
successful in this venture must be mindful that “district leadership should mold policies
into district-specific derivatives, which represent an amalgam of external policy and
internal goals and strategies” (p. 323). According to Nelson et al. (2009), the district
staff has relations with professional organizations who understand local needs and can
therefore assist in mediating between policy and local needs. Spillane (1994, 1998,
2000) also explained that instructional policy and reform initiatives are implemented by
campus principals and teachers according to how district administrators interpret these
policies.
Rorrer et al. (2008) indicated that the fourth essential role for districts in reform
is “maintaining an equity focus” (p. 328). To effectively promote an equity focus,
districts must be able to own past inequity, and disclose, through data, current inequities.
Earlier research by McLaughlin and Talbert (2003) supported the importance of
maintaining an equity focus. According to McLaughlin and Talbert “the equity agenda
for school reform sits squarely on the district’s plate. Just about everything a district
does could be assumed by another agent or agency – except monitoring and managing
equity of student resources and outcomes across schools” (p. 5).
School principals and the central office of a school district, acting as local agents,
negotiate how school reform is prioritized and implemented. However, the larger local
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communities often promote and often demand the implementation of reform. This next
section explores the impact of the local school community on the implementation of
reform.
School Community
Parents expect that the schools serving their children are a psychological and
physical danger-free zone that consistently and continuously guards the psychological,
social, and moral safety that is conducive to high levels of learning (Bloom, 1995).
Accordingly, principals deal with pressure that can sometimes deter reform efforts
ranging from the community, parents, politicians, business leaders, teachers, students,
and educational researchers. These pressures are either directly given from teaching staff
or indirectly from parent associations, site-base management councils, politicians, and
business leaders (Darling-Hammond, 1997; Marks & Nance, 2007).
Politicians and business leaders contend that high school graduates lack the basic
skills needed to be successful in the workplace and the academic skills to help them
succeed in rigorous college work (Cohen, 2001; Weiner & Hall, 2004). Teachers believe
that they are the instructional experts but are often subordinated to the policies and
whims of administrators (oftentimes outside of the school) who are disconnected from
the student needs and detached from the learning setting (Darling-Hammond, 1997;
Poplin & Weeres, 1992). Students say that schools are too large, not caring, and even
boring (Cohen, 2001; Darling-Hammond, 1997). On the other side of the reform
discussion are the fundamentalists. Darling-Hammond (2007) described this group as
those who cherish traditions and believe that if schools would just go back to the basics,
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all would be well. Adding to this continuum are those who insist that schools are failing
and that standards should be raised. However, when discussing standards,
fundamentalists usually refer to discipline and core subjects. Darling-Hammond (2007)
added that these groups are not “mean spirited, they just can’t see beyond a stagnant and
tremendously large organization” (p. 14). However, it would appear that the strongest
influence on education comes from the proponents of academic accountability. For more
than two decades, efforts to improve American schools have centered on standards-
based reform (Cuban, 2007).
The larger school community continues to argue for a reformed educational
system, while the local school organization (principal and central office) attempts to
negotiate how school reform is implemented. However, the models for reform are often
arrived at by researchers and consultants who attempt to reflect on the agendas of the
entire school community. The next section explores the small schools movement as a
hybrid type of educational reform.
Arguments for High School Redesign
Darling-Hammond and Friedlaender (2008) stated that “attaining substantially
different results in our schools will require more than just teachers trying harder within
traditional bureaucratic constraints. Such a shift typically requires new organizational
structures” (p. 14). Darling-Hammond and Friedlaender (2008) extended that when
schools are freed from the bureaucratic structures of the larger educational system, they
are able to provide highly personalized instruction, a strong advisory system, and a
college bound curriculum with high academic support. Additionally, they are able to
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encourage their students to become engaged in social justice and civic engagement. In
addition to this “Equally, important, these schools engage students in intellectually
stimulating, relevant, and personalized learning that empowers them to contribute to
their communities and learn throughout their lives” (Darling-Hammond & Friedlaender,
2008, p. 15).
The rhetoric espoused by researchers such as Poplin and Weeres (1992)
promoted the implementation of smaller schools and eventually supported legislation
that gave way to the small schools movement. The next section reviews a brief history of
the small schools movement, a more in depth review of the need for small schools, and a
clear description of what constitutes a small school.
Small Schools Movement
The large schools that began to emerge in the 1950s served their purpose through
the end of the century. However, as the turn of the century approached, the “percentage
of secondary schools enrolling more than 1,000 students grew from 7 to 25 percent”
(Wolk, 2002, p. 3). Partly because of this fact, many started to question the wisdom of
large schools. Cohen (2001) suggested that growing empirical evidence proved “that
small high schools generally have higher achievement levels, higher graduation and
lower dropout rates, and are safer than larger high schools” (p. 5).
Starting in 1985, urban school districts (e.g., those in New York City,
Philadelphia, and Chicago) began to reorganize their large schools into smaller units in
the form of schools-within-schools, charter schools, or a ‘house system’ such as the ones
in New York City. By the year 2000, the small schools’ movement had not only spread
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across the country (Atlanta, Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Nashville),
but had also become a national reform movement (Oxley & Kassissieh, 2008).
Beginning with the Clinton Administration and continuing through today, the U.S.
Department of Education has provided millions of dollars to develop and scale up school
reform models with small unit size as a required feature (Kilby, 2006; Oxley &
Kassissieh, 2008). “Beginning in 1999, the U.S. Department of Education launched the
Small Learning Community (SLC) Program to support schools with more than 1,000
students to implement small learning community structures” (Oxley & Kassissieh, 2008,
p. 200). SLCs were created with the purpose of promoting service learning, goal setting,
character education, team building, and friendship among those who otherwise might not
have bonded (Kilby, 2006).
This SLC federal venture, however, has given way to a more elaborate reform
movement, known to many as the small schools movement. Oxley and Kassissieh (2008)
are encouraged by the commitment of school districts to support this venture but warn
that the small schools movement has only been “driven by the failure of the former to
achieve complete implementation within a reasonable period of time” (p. 201).
As the small schools movement gained momentum, so did the research that
supported the movement. Next, a review of research that developed from the movement
and how it continues to provide intellectual support for the small schools movement is
discussed.
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The Need for Small Schools
The research of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (as cited in Feldman et
al., 2006), supported the creation of new small autonomous schools and offers five
reasons why large comprehensive high schools fall short in meeting the needs of all
students:
1. Incoherence: High schools offer a dizzying array of disconnected courses
with little guidance;
2. Isolation: Many teachers see more than 150 students daily. Both teachers and
students have little adult contact;
3. Anonymity: High schools have doubled in size in the last generation,
resulting in overcrowding and reduced student and teacher interaction;
4. Low expectations: Only one of the four to six tracks in most high schools
prepares students for college;
5. Inertia: High schools are slow to change due to large and isolated staffs,
restrictive state and district policies and employment agreements, over-
precise higher education entrance requirements, and an array of interest
groups dictating much of school policy. (p. 7)
In contrast to the recommendations of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
“many of today’s high schools have enrollments of 2,000, 3,000, even 4,000 students
and most high school teachers face 125 to 150 students every day and work in virtual
isolation from other adults” (Vander Ark, 2002, p. 1). Darling-Hammond (1997) agreed
that secondary school teachers work directly with 150 students or more per day and
because of that fact find it impossible to know individual students or families in a
manner that is conducive to learning. Sizer (1997) concurred with Darling-Hammond
and noted that in his visits to large high schools teachers usually have loads of over 120
or 130 students, a fact that prevents them from having any real conversations. More
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importantly Sizer advised that the large classloads prevent teachers from providing
students with constructive feedback on how to improve their academic work.
Cohen’s (2001) research informed readers that cities tend to have the largest
concentrations of poverty, the most ethnically and linguistically diverse student
populations, and many large impersonal high schools with high dropout rates and low
achievement. Addressing this reality directly, other researchers maintained that
The poorer and, in some cities, the more African American the student body, the
larger the school, the greater the percent of long-term substitutes, uncertified
teachers, teachers teaching out of their certification areas, teachers who have
been dismissed from one school and “bumped” to another. (Fine & Powell, 2001,
p. 46)
Lee and Smith (1994) agreed that minority students, particularly those who are
economically disadvantaged, do not do as well in larger schools. Economically
disadvantaged students are usually stratified with lower achieving students and are
enrolled in less rigorous courses. Over time, this differentiation increases the educational
difference between groups of students (Lee & Smith, 1994).
In an effort to educate the educational community to understand that creating
small schools was simply not enough, researchers such as Darling-Hammond and
Feldman listed the components that an effective small school should contain. The next
section describes what constitutes a successful small school.
Small Schools Defined
Linda Darling-Hammond and Jay Feldman conducted extensive research that
advocated for small schools. Moreover, their research defines what a small school
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should look like. Feldman et al. (2006) defined a comprehensive small school design as
having the following characteristics:
1. Autonomous governance, budgets, structures, and staffing;
2. Flexible use of resources;
3. Distributed leadership;
4. Open access and choice for students;
5. Identification of and release time for principal in first year of implementation;
6. Professional development that clearly links changes in teaching practice to
improved student achievement;
7. A clearly defined system of central office support of small school design and
implementation;
8. A curriculum clearly aligned with state standards and focused on helping
students use their minds well;
9. Nontraditional scheduling that promotes deep student learning and
meaningful relationships with teachers;
10. Clearly demonstrated use of technology and advanced communications
resources;
11. Clearly stated benchmarks for improved student achievement;
12. Performance assessment for students;
13. Authentic community engagement that connects with and influences official
decisions;
14. Clear community involvement in the daily life of the school;
15. Individual teacher advisors for each student;
16. Maximum population of four hundred students. (p. 21)
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If applied in the context of school reform, and specifically high school redesign,
the 15 characteristics such as autonomous budgeting, time for planning, community
involvement, relationships between teachers and adults, and small targeted populations
described by Feldman et al. (2006) should create a climate that will combat the problems
(incoherence, isolation, anonymity, low expectations, and inertia) that according to the
research of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation permeate the American educational
system.
Darling-Hammond et al. (2002) provided 10 design features of small schools that
encompass organizational structures, relationships, and instructional practices. Many
think that if employed in earnest, the 10 design features will result in increased parent
involvement, increased student achievement, and a more democratic school overall. The
10 design features include:
1. Personalization: Personalization is achieved when class sizes have between
20 and 25 students and teachers have significantly reduced pupil loads of no
more than 40 to 80. To increase the personalization aspect, teachers should
teach students in blocks of time longer than the traditional 50 minute blocks.
2. Continuous Relationships: Continuous relationships are often realized when
teachers stay with the same students over multiple years through “looping.”
Sustained relationships foster improved motivation, maximize engagement in
meaningful teaching and learning, and minimize the “getting to know you”
phase that teachers experience every year.
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3. High Standards and Performance-Based Assessment: Assessments reflect
what the school wants the student to know and be able to do by the time they
graduate. Evidence of the attainment of the knowledge is based on
meaningful review of student work (portfolios and demonstrations) via
discussion and analysis.
4. Authentic Curriculum: Authentic curriculum helps schools avoid the trap of
superficial content coverage. They provide intellectually challenging work
that will prepare the students for independent work and a successful college
experience.
5. Adaptive Pedagogy: Adaptive pedagogy takes into account individual student
differences and recognizes that students have different pathways and
approaches to learning. Multiple instructional strategies range from whole
class lecture and independent work to guided inquiry, small group work, and
internet research.
6. Multicultural and Anti-Racist Teaching: Multicultural and anti-racist teaching
promotes an individual context within each student so that their cross-cultural
experiences can be understood. All students need opportunities to see their
own experiences reflected in the life and work of the school and to learn
about other individuals, cultures, and communities.
7. Knowledgeable and Skilled Teachers: Knowledgeable and skilled teachers
are a strong determinant of student achievement. To be highly effective,
teachers must not only possess the knowledge, but also the requisite skills to
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create and deliver meaningful learning to their students. Successful schools
recruit well prepared teachers, facilitate their development, and work to retain
them.
8. Collaborative Planning and Professional Development: Collaborative
planning and professional development provide a process for the developing,
sharing, and reflecting on the implementation of new ideas as well as
ensuring the overall development of knowledgeable and skilled teachers.
Furthermore, this process provides for the development of a coherent
curriculum and builds a campus-wide culture of high professional
expectations.
9. Family and Community Connections: Family and community connections
recognize that schools do not operate in isolation. Instead, schools forge
connections with the students’ families and greater community in a way that
support and enhance student learning.
10. Democratic Decision-Making: Democratic decision-making is achieved when
students, teachers, and parents are engaged in a shared decision-making
process about critical school issues. Democratic decision-making can
promote the community’s coherence around the entire school program and
lead to positive outcomes that further support all of the design features.
Chapter Summary
Understanding the American educational system from a historical perspective
clearly shows an ever-changing perspective of the scope and need for public education.
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The need for an education has ranged from acculturation to an American way of life, to
providing for an industrial workforce, to providing for the national defense needs of
America, and to sustaining national quality of life levels. Moreover, the historical
perspective shows how the trends that molded the policy and practices that shaped our
educational system are really a perspective of a select few – business and policy elites.
Unfortunately, many Americans, particularly the poor and ethnic minority
children who primarily reside in urban cities and attend large urban schools, have in
large part not been able to fully enjoy the benefits of a public education as evidenced by
high dropout rates and high economic marginalization rates. This concentration of
unsuccessful participants in our urban school systems has caused many well-intentioned
reformers to look for methods of improving our schools, particularly high schools.
A growing body of research continues to show that in spite of legislative agendas
intended to not leave any child behind and the millions of dollars spent from government
agencies and philanthropic organizations in support of the reform efforts, these reform
efforts have been at best minimally successful and at worst detrimental to their own
cause.
In an attempt to understand and improve school reform efforts, research has
continuously pointed to the primacy of the principal’s role, as well as the importance of
incorporating the community at large, in all reform efforts. However, the most recent
research has also established the district leadership team as having a vital role in leading
and implementing school reform.
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As of late, the largest reform that has attempted to create increased student
achievement at the high school level is the small schools movement. The remaining
chapters of this study will seek to further understand, provide insight, and elaborate on
practical methods for improving the school reform process by exploring the small
schools movement in the context of a Texas urban school setting.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODS
To further elaborate on the purpose of this study, this chapter presents a detailed
description of the research questions. After describing the research questions, the
methods used during the course of the study are outlined, with particular attention given
to the procedures utilized in obtaining and processing the data employed to answer the
questions. Finally, this chapter aims at establishing the researcher’s credibility by
elaborating on the extensive process used to arrive at the findings.
Statement of Problem
The majority of the practitioners attempting to reform unsuccessful urban schools
receive guidance from the scholarly community and financial support from philanthropic
organizations. The research produced to guide the school reform process has ranged
from monographs that encourage districts to build the instructional skills of principals
(Honig et al., 2010) to research that describes processes where the central office
organization is excluded from the reform (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2003). There are,
however, some researchers who encourage the total inclusion of the central office
(Rorrer et al., 2008). The scholarly guidance and subsequent philanthropic support has
thus far resulted in less than complete urban school reform results (Barber & Mourshed,
2007).
The varying and often disjointed scholarly advice has not produced a reformed
large urban school system that can be held as a model for other large struggling districts
to follow (Cuban, 2010). Consequently, urban schools continue to struggle with high
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dropout rates, high course failure rates, and discipline problems (Oakes, 2005). Further
exasperating the urban school dilemma is the fact that students who attend the schools
are often taught by teachers who do not believe the students served have the aptitude
necessary for academic achievement (McKenzie & Scheurich, 2004).
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of the relationship
established between key central office personnel and the high school leadership team
during the development and implementation of district-led high school reform. During
the course of this study, the researcher developed a particular interest in determining if
the principals perceived autonomy from central office or interdependency between the
campus and the central office to be more relevant to the success of high school reform.
Additionally, this study sought to provide insight into the obstacles faced by principals
when attempting to implement district-led high school reform.
Because of the numerous failed attempts to reform comprehensive large urban
high schools throughout the United States, there is an urgency to provide insight into
mistakes in planning and implementing district-led high school reform. Because of the
qualitative nature of this study, the purpose of the research was not to generalize the
existence of the obstacles faced during implementation of reform, but rather to
acknowledge the potential existence of such obstacles in similar reform ventures.
Research Questions
The study was guided by the following research questions:
54
1. How do principals perceive their relationship to the district leadership team
as they attempted to initiate action to secure the changes in teacher behavior
that promotes rigorous and meaningful instructional practice within the
context of district-led high school reform efforts?
2. What are the aforementioned principals’ attitudes toward the obstacles
experienced when attempting to improve teacher behavior as they push
district-led high school reform efforts?
Participants and Site Selection
In June 2004, the school district that provided the setting for this study received
the findings from two independent audits they had requested from two different entities.
The audits enumerated the most prevalent deficiencies of each of the district’s 11
comprehensive high schools. The deficiencies included the following needs:
1. Give all students access to a rigorous academic core curriculum and a
focused area of in-depth study;
2. Improve transitions from middle grades to high school and from high school
to college and careers;
3. Improve the quality of instruction and raise classroom standards/
expectations;
4. Expand career/technical education offerings aligned to post-secondary
programs, industry standards and labor market demands, and enroll more
students in these programs;
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5. Create a strengthened education and career advisement program through a
teacher advisement system;
6. Strengthen the support system to help struggling students;
7. Develop strong building-level leadership teams involving principals, assistant
principals, and teacher leaders;
8. Redefine leadership roles;
9. Provide targeted support for English Language Learners and other students
with special needs;
10. Relieve tension at the school level resulting from attempting to accommodate
the unique needs of students while adhering to district policies and mandates;
11. Improve communication and relationships (Pecheone, Tytler, & Ross, 2006).
Based on the findings of the audits, the school district decided to implement
district-led high school redesign and formed three tiers for redesign. Tier I consisted of
the five lowest achieving high schools and these were tasked with implementing
immediate “wall-to-wall” high school redesign. Tier II was made up of two schools that
were considered average schools, when compared to other public schools, and had to
implement some form of redesign. However, the redesign did not have to be as drastic as
the Tier I schools. Tier III schools, which consisted of the four highest performing high
schools, only needed to show evidence that they were implementing strategies to close
the achievement gap within their own schools.
The five principals, whose schools were mandated to implement “wall-to-wall”
high school redesign, were asked to participate in the study. Three of the five principals
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were male: two Hispanic American and one African American. The remaining two
participants were female. Both female participants were Hispanic American.
The campus administrative experience of the participants ranged from 4-14
years. The first participant was in her first assignment as a campus principal but had
been an assistant principal at various campuses within the same district. Of the five
participants, participants one and two remain as in-service principals. However,
participant number two has taken a principal position in a suburban district. Participant
number three accepted a lateral position within the district before resigning. Participant
number four has been promoted to a central office position, and participant number five
has retired. All five participants in this study first experienced district-led high school
reform in the district that was the setting for this study.
Positionality
Insider’s View
In an effort to comply with the tenets of qualitative research, it was necessary to
disclose my positionality within the immediate context of this study. I served the school
district that provided the setting for this study for three consecutive years as one of the
high school principals leading the development of the high school redesign plans.
However, I did not participate in the implementation of the any of the redesign plans.
Additionally, I consider one of the participants in this study a very close friend and have
had extensive conversations with him concerning the day-to-day activities of the high
school redesign.
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My “insider” view has provided an open door from which to delve deeper into
the realities of my subjects. However, it has also created the potential to limit my
objectivity and influence the design and outcomes of this study.
Subjectivity
Heeding the advice of Patton (2002), I understand that my own experience,
within the district that provided the setting for this study, defined me as a researcher
operating from a “reality-oriented stance.” Also, I have come to accept that a research
design free of my values and preconceptions was nearly impossible to attain. Therefore,
I have heeded Patton’s advice and taken steps to mitigate the influence of my own values
and preconceptions by establishing an “audit trail” to verify the data collected (p. 93).
Reflexivity
To provide for reflexivity, Patton (2002) encouraged the qualitative researcher to
be “attentive to and conscious of the cultural, political, social, linguistic, and ideological
origins of one’s own perspective and voice as well as the perspective and voices of those
one interviews and those to whom one reports” (p. 65). Because my formation as a
public school administrator occurred substantially within the district that provided the
setting for this study, I was cognizant that the origins of my perspective in relation to this
study must be addressed.
To address and balance my own perspective with a realistic expression of what
was being studied, I sought to answer the following questions presented by Patton
(2002). It was my hope that the sincere efforts to answer these questions had established
legitimacy to the findings uncovered during the study.
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1. What do I know?
2. How do I know what I know?
3. What shapes and has shaped my perspective?
4. With what voice do I share my perspective?
5. What do I do with what I have found?
Data Collection Procedures
Each of the five participants were contacted in person during an administrators’
conference three months prior to the collection of data and formally asked for their
willingness to participate in the study. After a brief explanation of the process, each
participant agreed to participate in a semi-structured interview and be audio-recorded.
Each participant was also advised that additional contact in the form of telephone
conversations and e-mails, after the initial two-hour interview, would be necessary.
Participant numbers one and two selected their campus office as the location for
the interview; participant numbers three, four, and five chose the privacy of their home
as the location for the initial interview. With the exception of minor interruptions, each
participant was able to relate to the topic at hand and speak fluidly without the need of
the researcher to ask questions.
Because I had to travel approximately four hours to conduct the face-to-face
interview, all five interviews were conducted during the span of three consecutive days.
During the first day allocated for interviews, I only conducted the interview of
participant number three. On the following day, I was able to interview participant
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number five, followed by participant number two. Finally, on the third day, I interviewed
participant numbers one and four.
The time span allotted for interviews did not provide adequate time to transcribe
each interview prior to conducting the next interview. However, enough time between
interviews was available to discern the adequacy of the responses in relation to the
scripted questions provided in Chapter I. Each audio-recorded interview was reviewed
prior to the subsequent interviews and notes identifying gaps in the answers were
prepared. The use of the notes helped make each subsequent interview more complete
than the previous.
A transcript of each interview was provided to the respective respondent before
any analysis of the collected data was conducted. Each respondent was asked to verify
the accuracy of the transcription and provided an opportunity to delete or add any
comments they deemed necessary. Finally, the findings were compiled in a case study
format. As suggested by Erlandson et al. (1993), each respondent was provided a copy of
the case study and asked for feedback that might improve the presentation of the case
study. The sharing of the case study also provided a means to verify the accuracy of the
data.
Data Analysis
Unitizing Data
The data collected from the interviews were unitized on an Excel worksheet by
placing smaller bits of “stand alone” data on individual cells. Being an experienced user
of Excel software, the researcher was able to: (a) assign multiple codes to any bit of data,
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(b) attribute the data to the respondent, (c) sort the data using any type or combination of
identifiers such as respondent, category, sequence of statement, and (d) quantify the
frequency of each category.
Emergent Category Designation
Once the data were transcribed and unitized, the researcher aggregated the data
of all five participants and reviewed it with the purpose of developing general themes
within the responses. Transcribing the interviews and unitizing the transcribed
interviews was cumbersome and time intensive. However, the process allowed for the
emergence of general themes. After the general themes were developed, the unitized
data were attributed to a general theme. Continued analysis of the unitized data, within
the specified themes, helped the researcher begin to identify and finalize emerging
categories.
Once the unitized data were assigned the finalized category, the data were once
again separated by respondent and used to prepare a case study for each respondent.
Erlandson et al. (1993) recommended that the researcher “communicate a setting with its
complex interrelationships and multiple realities to the intended audience in a way that
enables and requires that audiences interact cognitively and emotionally with the setting”
(p. 163). Therefore, each case study contained (a) a description of the participant’s
background and how he or she came into the position of principal at a school undergoing
redesign; (b) a detailed historical perspective of the school that provided the setting for
the study; and most importantly, (c) each case study contained the findings discovered
during the analysis of the data, particularly as it related to the decisions made by the
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school principal regarding district-led reform. To allow for further analysis, each case
study was organized and presented in the same format.
Credibility
The researcher engaged the participants in member checks throughout the entire
process. Each participant received the transcripts from their interview, was asked to
review the transcript, and then provide written confirmation that the content of the
interview was accurate. Each participant submitted confirmation via email. The
transcripts and the participants’ communications confirming the accuracy of the
transcripts are in the sole custody of the researcher.
After the data were unitized and analyzed, the researcher organized case profiles
for each participant. The participants were once again asked to review their profiles and
make suggestions and corrections. The corrections were minimal and mainly included
clarifications for names of activities and other minor details. For example, one
participant insisted on his pseudonym being changed from Sean to Malcolm.
Finally, the findings were shared with all five participants, and each was asked to
provide suggestions and feedback. Two participants provided feedback. Their feedback
indicated agreement with the findings and did not offer suggestions for improvement.
The researcher held peer debriefing sessions with two individuals who had expert
knowledge in the field of education. The first individual was a higher education
administrator whose responsibility in that capacity included overseeing the curriculum
and instructional aspects of dual credit courses at 21 high schools in the southwest Texas
region. Furthermore, he oversaw all the assessment processes for the aforementioned
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institution of higher education. Additionally, he worked as a high school teacher, college
professor, and administrator for federally funded programs. The second individual who
participated in the peer debriefing sessions was a retired educator who had over 10 years
of distinguished high school principal experience in large high schools. This individual
currently serves as a technical assistance provider for high schools who have failed to
meet federal accountability standards.
Each peer read the entire study and offered suggestions that called for reflecting
further on the tone and content of study. The directed reflection focused especially on
areas that indicated a personal position rather than a researched-based position. Other
suggestions from the peer debriefing members included the addition of scholarly articles
that broadened the literature review. Finally, a significant contribution to the scope and
depth of the study was their near constant question: “What did you mean to say in this
paragraph/section?” The researcher’s further reflection upon this question allowed for a
clearer, richer, and more concise record of study.
Trustworthiness
Throughout the course of the five interviews, the respondents offered a wealth of
information. In order to maintain the trustworthiness of the interview information, the
researcher made entries into an electronic research journal that later reminded him to
further study or confirm statements made by the respondents. For example, the
respondents often made broad statements such as “our science scores plummeted” or
“our TAKS scores went through the roof.” Rather than interrupt the fluidity of the
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information provided, the researcher simply made a note to later clarify the actual
increase or decrease of student achievement scores as reflected on AEIS reports.
Entries in the research journal also served to remind the researcher to ask follow-
up questions of the respondents or to ask questions that served to triangulate information
provided by several respondents. This method provided significant assurance to the
researcher, especially when the information obtained seemed exaggerated or tainted by
personal opinions. For example, one respondent often described an outside consultant as
“unwilling or unable to deviate from their ‘canned program.’” Because of the
aforementioned descriptive statement, subsequent respondents were guided to discuss
interactions with the same consultant, thus allowing the researcher to weigh the
trustworthiness of the initial respondent’s statement.
The artifacts provided by the participants included program budgets, teacher
planning templates, community engagement PowerPoint presentations, and reports from
independent audits. Additionally, Campus Improvement Plans were obtained from the
campus websites. The artifacts provided significant guidance in formulating timelines of
campus activities, as well as greater understanding of the contributions that each outside
agent sought to provide. The audit reports provided by two independent agencies greatly
substantiated information provided by the respondents and contributed to formulating a
more nuanced understanding of the schools’ need for improvement.
Cross-Case Analysis
The findings of this study were derived by a process involving a cross-case
analysis. This process was previously used with a high degree of success by Duncan
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(2006). To successfully complete this task, the researcher reviewed the findings of each
emerging category across all five cases and coded similar experiences within each case.
Finally, the researcher verified these findings by combining the quotes used in each of
the emerging categories across all five cases.
Significance of the Study
In an effort to understand why high school reform has been an elusive venture,
the findings of this study provide deeper insight into the key but fragmented relationship
between outside agents (central office and consultants) and campus leadership. This
study determined that a chasm between the outside agents’ knowledge of improvement
methodologies and the campus principals’ perception of the relevance and/or timeliness
of these improvement efforts derailed the implementation and/or long-term sustainability
of improvement efforts. For example, the principals did not support teachers developing
engaging and relevant lessons, unless they incorporated learning expectations that were
part of the state’s assessed curriculum. Moreover, because the instructional coaching was
provided by outside agents unfamiliar with the state’s assessed curriculum, the principals
believed that the outside agents were either unwilling or unable to rearrange their
instructional coaching plans to support the immediate needs of the campuses.
This study further provides insight into the principals’ perception of the
leadership team’s skills required to implement and sustain an intense and broad reform
process. Although the principals recognized that the prescribed reform activities were in
the interest of students, the principals also warned that improvement activities could not
be implemented or sustained unless the instructional leadership of the staff
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(administrators and teachers) was first developed. For example, the principals described
the frustration of novice teachers that was rooted in their inability to present an outside
agent’s prescribed lessons, primarily because of the teachers’ inability to manage a
classroom. The principals also perceived that the instructional coaching of outside agents
should be balanced in a way that included classroom management with classroom
instruction.
Finally, this study provides insight into the moments of excellence that brought
about bright spots in the central office-campus principal relationship within the context
of high school reform. For example, this study documents and elaborates on the
coaching provided by certain central office administrators whom the principals
perceived as formative and of great benefit to the advancement of reform the initiatives.
Chapter Summary
The qualitative research methods employed in this study gave the researcher a
vehicle by which to navigate through the wealth of information provided by each
respondent. Each respondent’s contributions were carefully scrutinized for credibility
and trustworthiness as well as for potential sources that broadened the scope of the
investigation. The ability to cross reference each respondent’s contributions with other
respondent’s contributions not only validated the contributions but formulated a more
complete depiction of the principals’ lived experiences. It is the hope of this researcher
that the amalgamation of these lived experiences has added valid research to exigent
research within the scholarly community.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE PROFILES
During the 2003/2004 school year, the district’s superintendent had advised the
associate superintendent for high schools that there was growing concern in the
community about the lack of standards and lack of opportunity being afforded to the
economically disadvantaged high school students. In an effort to be transparent about the
realities of the economically disadvantaged students, the superintendent and associate
superintendent decided to contract with the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)
to conduct an audit of the district’s high school effectiveness. In a separate contract, the
school district also asked The University of Texas to conduct a similar but separate
audit.
The September 2004 SREB report indicated that there was a need to raise the
academic achievement of all students and to specifically close the achievement gap of
the district’s economically disadvantaged students. More specifically, the report
indicated that only 7 out of 10 economically disadvantaged students were graduating
from high school within four years, and only 5 out of 10 English Language Learners
were completing high school within the four-year time frame.
Moreover, the report indicated that significant disparities between district schools
also existed. Also, the Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), which reports the
results of the state’s mandated assessments and other academic indicators among the
state’s public schools, reported similar findings. According to the 2003/2004 AEIS
report (TEA, 2004) that was published the month following the SREB report (October
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2004), 5 out of 11 comprehensive schools within the district were significantly
underperforming the other 6 high schools. The five underperforming schools, listed by
the pseudonym name assigned to them for the purpose of this study, included Central
High School, East Central High School, Eastside High School, North Central High
School, and North Side High School. It is important to note that although the scores from
Eastside High School do not appear to be among the lowest scores in the district, they in
fact were low. However, the state assessment scores from the Language Arts and
Science Academy, which was housed at Eastside High School, were high enough to
mask the scores of the neighborhood kids.
Table 1 describes, by school, the percentage of students who met the state’s
mandated assessments standard during the 2003/2004 school year (TEA, 2004). Tier I
schools were the lowest performing high schools in the district. Tier II schools were the
second best performing group of high schools; and Tier III schools were the highest
performing group of high schools in the district.
The SREB report indicated that throughout the 2004/2005 school year, the 11
high school principals, led by the associate superintendent for high schools, began
discussing strategies to address the deficiencies noted in the independent audits.
However, it was becoming apparent to the superintendent and associate superintendent
that the deficiencies noted in the reports were too many to be addressed individually and
that they should consider implementing district-wide high school reform. It was then that
the principals were first introduced to the idea of high school redesign.
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Table 1. Student Achievement by High School Campus, 2003/2004
District State District Campus Af
Am
Hisp W Na
Am
As/PI Spec
Ed
Econ
Dis
LEP
Central 68 63 35 31 34 48 * 71 20 32 12
East Central 68 63 25 15 27 50 * * 11 24 7
Eastside 68 63 64 42 50 93 * 93 11 41 6
North Central 68 63 27 24 28 47 * * 7 27 12
North Side 68 63 32 30 27 55 * 51 13 30 9
Tier III - A 68 63 83 56 67 89 60 88 55 54 25
Tier III - B 68 63 70 42 47 84 83 94 36 37 29
Tier III - C 68 63 81 69 72 84 70 83 38 65 7
Tier III - D 68 63 68 44 48 83 * 92 41 40 9
Tier II - A 68 63 44 28 40 60 33 62 12 37 7
Tier II - B 68 63 45 31 35 62 * 64 12 36 11
*Indicates results are masked due to small numbers to protect student confidentiality.
Source. TEA (2004).
In June 2005, the associate superintendent for high schools took her 11
comprehensive high school principals on an administrative retreat to a central Texas
retreat center. The purpose of the administrative retreat was to continue to develop team
building among the high school principals and most importantly to discuss high school
redesign. The high school principals were encouraged to think “out of the box” and
through collaboration with their own communities, develop plans that would restructure
the existing high school. The idea that achieving increased academic standards with a
challenging population would bring national notoriety was heavily promoted. Principals
were being encouraged to become “cutting edge” administrators. While the plan was
vague, it seemed enticing enough for principals.
By the fall of 2005, the idea for high school redesign was made more enticing by
the awarding of a $1.5 million public engagement and planning grant by the Bill and
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Melinda Gates Foundation to the school district. Using this money throughout the
2005/2006 school year, the high schools developed significant redesign plans with the
hopes that the Gates Foundation would award an additional $16 million to implement
these plans (Pecheone et al., 2006). The Gates Foundation eventually awarded the
additional $16 million implementation grant.
In order to provide the guidance needed to develop the redesign plans, the
district’s superintendent contracted with the School Redesign Network (SRN) from
Stanford University and instructed SRN to provide the following.
1. Wall-to-wall redesign of the district’s 11 comprehensive high schools into
interdependent small learning communities (SLCs) or small schools.
2. Preliminary examination of the district central office to create an organization
that meets the implementation needs of the redesigned schools.
3. Creation of a portfolio of unique schools that offers parents, students,
teachers, and staff educational choice(s).
4. Development of an inclusive redesign process with a strong community
engagement component.
5. Creation of a multi-year redesign plan that is approved and adopted by the
Board of Trustees. (Pechone et al., 2006, p. 2)
The following sections present a case profile for each of the five Tier I high
school principals engaged in high school redesign. The principals participating in this
study, along with the schools they were assigned to, have been assigned pseudonyms and
are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2. Participant Pseudonyms
Participant Identification Principal Pseudonym High School Pseudonym
One Judy North Central High School
Two Margie East Central High School
Three Ronald Central High School
Four Michael North Side High School
Five Malcolm Eastside High School
Participant Number One – Judy
Judy is a Mexican American middle-aged female who is in her first assignment
as a high school principal. Prior to her current assignment, she claimed 11 years of
combined experience as a middle school assistant principal and a director of an English
language learner program. North Central High School, where Judy began her assignment
as high school principal, received an Academically Unacceptable state rating
immediately prior to Judy’s assignment. After a second and third similar rating, the
state’s accountability sanctions required that the school immediately begin reconstitution
procedures and school closure procedures. Additionally, North Central High School has
struggled with meeting the federal government’s accountability system (Adequately
Yearly Progress) as it relates to student achievement, carrying with it a handful of
sanctions.
The community that North Central High School serves had gone through various
transformations within the last 20 years. Thirty years ago, the neighborhood residents
and the students who attended the high school were predominantly White and middle
class. As the neighborhood became an inner city neighborhood, it experienced the
“White flight” that similar neighborhoods experienced throughout the nation. While the
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neighborhood continued to have a mixed racial resident population, the students had
increasingly become children of color, and primarily African American.
As a high school serving predominantly African American students, North
Central High School and its programs had provided engaging opportunities for students
and created a source of pride for the local community. The high school’s band program
distinguished itself as Southwest Athletic Conference (SWAC), a performance style
band. Also, highly celebrated were the athletic programs, accumulating several state
titles of their own.
Within the last 10 years, the ethnic makeup of the students had undergone
another transformation. This time, the majority of the students attending North Central
High School had shifted from being predominantly African American to being
predominantly Hispanic. The neighborhood, however, continued to have an established
and large African American population. The neighborhood’s African American
population had consistently been guided, at least politically, by a council of ministers
opposing any outward indication that the leadership roles within the immediate
community, and specifically the high school, are handed over to Hispanics.
Prior to Judy’s principal assignment, two other Hispanic principals were removed
from their positions in response to community pressure led by the same council of
ministers. They intended to remove Judy successfully from her new assignment. Judy
not only received visits to her office and letters from the council of ministers challenging
decisions she had made during her early weeks as principal, the letters were also sent to
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district offices, state agencies, and the local media. Judy recalled a reverend, whose
name remains anonymous in this report, “who was a big activist in this neighborhood.”
He and the ministers were upset because I was the wrong color to start out with
and then the wrong person. They marched themselves up here. They did not set
up any appointment. “We want to see you, and we want to see what is going on.”
Judy recalled one of the first letters sent to her from the council of ministers and
copied to the district office. The letter erroneously indicated she had demoted one of the
African American assistant principals. According to the letter, the assistant principal was
prevented from being the highest ranking assistant principal on the pecking order. Judy,
with a sense of relief and continued disbelief, recalled the time when she discussed the
letter with the assistant principal in question.
He had to laugh when he read it, because it said that I had moved him from, I
don’t know, he was fourth on the totem pole, well that’s his number of the radio.
Like when they use the radio around here they call Lobo 1, Lobo 2, Lobo 3, or
Lobo 4. Well, he was number 4, but that I had moved him down to that position,
and that I had moved his office.
On another occasion, the ministers called Judy to the council and said, “We don’t think
you are the right person young lady, and when your people came into this neighborhood,
it started to go down.”
Judy’s appointment as high school principal was a surprise; her assignment also
unwelcome by the entrenched employees, as well as to the African American
community. Upon her introduction as principal of North Central High School, Judy’s
first goal was to establish a sense of order against the wishes of some self-serving
employees and community members who in large part had taken over the school.
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Judy best described the support she found among the staff as “passive
aggressive.” While no one clearly came up to her and defied her leadership and
management, few people immediately rallied around her to improve the school. Judy
described her initial assessment of the employees with the following statement.
The classified personnel had kind of taken over this school because of a lack of
guidance. It was kind of a “survival of the fittest.” And they had been here the
longest, I can only imagine…. They were the only steady thing here and they
took control of situations.
As part of the district-led reform, each school had been able to hire additional
personnel. Of the additional personnel, the school improvement facilitator (SIF) was
perceived as having a high level of authority and influence because of their consistent
communication with central office. In the absence of a principal, the SIF had established
herself as a de facto principal and had been running the school. Judy recalls that
The school improvement facilitator was sabotaging everything because she had
been in charge of this school. If I would say something, then she would counter it
by saying “she’s not real, so don’t do that.” That was a war the whole first year
that I had with the SIF who had taken the job of principal and all the classified
that were like running the show.
In addition to responding to an overpowering community and a self-serving staff,
Judy was also tasked with implementing a high school redesign plan under the direction
of First-Things-First (FTF), a nationally known consultant group for high school reform.
At the time of Judy’s arrival, First-Things-First had been working with three of the five
high schools engaged in district-led reform. The impression Judy had about First-
Things-First was that they were more concerned with the structure of reform and had
done little to generate immediate results in relation to academic achievement.
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Now, there were some very serious conversations about us not being able to lift
FTF up from this campus because politically they were here. Now, what that
meant for whom, I don’t know. If we were to pull them out from here, then the
district would have to say, “Hey we were wrong in bringing FTF, and now that
we have spent all this money, we are going to have to pull them out.”
It was clear to Judy that FTF had established their presence within the district-led reform
process and that she would not be able to ignore their presence.
The following sections present the findings discovered during the analysis of the
data, particularly as it relates to the decisions made by Judy regarding district-led reform.
Through careful data analysis, Judy determined that while she saw a need for reform,
current reform practices were not the style of reform that the district leadership had
begun to implement years prior to her arrival as principal. Summarized in her own
words, Judy explained her decision to abandon the current district-led reform:
The thing with FTF was that, I think, I believe in a lot of the things that they
have, but if you are in an emergency, you can’t slap that on over ugly, and it was
really ugly underneath. It was like not fighting the infection, just like slapping
topical on it and not fighting what is underneath, and that’s what was happening.
The findings, which emerged during the analysis of the data, are separated into
categories: (a) the need to build capacity, (b) the need for focused leadership, (c) the
need for structure, (d) time as a limited resource, (e) absence of trust, and (f) positive
support.
To further support an understanding of the positive and negative effects that high
school redesign had on the campus during the high school redesign years (2004-2010), a
data table (Table 3) describing changes in the student achievement is provided. Because
the passing standards changed on the state assessment during the course of high school
redesign, a simple year-to-year passing rate comparison will not adequately describe the
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campus progressing or decreasing in their achievement levels. Therefore, the data are
presented in terms of changes in the achievement gaps between the campus achievement
level and that of the state and the campus group.
Table 3. Changes in Student Achievement Gaps Between North Central High School and
the State/Campus Group (2004-2010)
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State -41 -33 -39 -43 -45 -40 -23
Campus
Group -15 -8 -8 -15 -21 -17 -6
Source. TEA (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
Focused Instructional Leadership
Judy surmised that to lead the school toward productive and worthwhile
successes she would have to make sense of every distraction and dysfunction within the
school community. Simultaneously, she would have to provide instructional leadership
to a school that had not experienced any successful leadership within the previous three
administrations.
The instability in leadership over the three previous years, the district-led efforts
to redesign the high school, and the instructional interventions provided by the school
district’s support staff combined to create a disjointed and incoherent instructional plan.
Judy recalled that upon examining the school’s purchase orders, she discovered large
expenses made without any instructional purpose. Judy shared her experience:
Just for example, the School Improvement Facilitator that was here had also
taken over the school. She had taken every kid in the school to Six Flags, during
the school day, at the end of the year. Every single kid! No educational
connection. Not even a bother with the lesson plan, or even an attempt to justify.
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Just “get on the bus, we are going.” The whole school! She had also bought
everyone a jump drive for every student. Just money wasted on crazy stuff.
The instructional support staff at the district level was helpful. However,
according to Judy, it had not established itself as a credible and effective group. In her
opinion, the lack of standards and inability to produce academic results at her school had
consistently escalated under the “watch” of the district.
Judy’s consistent theme throughout the data analysis determined that Judy
believed in “instructional coaching.” Unfortunately, the executive director for high
school redesign and the associate high school superintendent were more interested in
having her produce reports and constantly made visits in her office, omitting personal
visits in the classroom to make determinations of what was lacking in the instructional
improvement plan. Therefore, Judy took a strong stance and did not allow anyone from
the district to manage any instructional improvement plans without first having complete
awareness of how these plans supported the work the campus was already doing. She
explained:
We didn’t need anyone from the district, because they were all going to come try
to help....We said, “No, no, no, no. You can’t come here unless you are totally
trained in how we want you to work with the teachers.” Well, it was like
breaking a horse, because they thought they had the answers and they were
coming. No, you don’t have the answers; otherwise, it wouldn’t have been in this
condition. So we made the district people come in and get trained, and that was
bad. I mean that was hard to do because they were the ones that knew it all….
And so we broke away from the district, and that was hard to do, but we didn’t
let them come in.
Distancing themselves from the district’s instructional processes and establishing
instructional autonomy required headstrong consistency on Judy’s behalf. However, the
77
effort to break free from central office paled in comparison to the effort required to break
away from the connection to First-Things-First.
According to the data analysis, Judy also believed in developing instructional
improvement plans and implementing interventions arrived through a locally developed
process. As she reflected on her experience with First-Things-First, Judy recalled how
aggressive and unwilling they were to deviate from the way they wanted things done.
They had great pathways, and communities, and it was kind of torture if you
were getting out. You had to write this 500 word essay. Well, kids here couldn’t
even write. Nobody had looked at the writing scores, but they could not write.
There was no data management.
First-Things-First and the office of high school redesign were operating under the
forgone conclusion the financial investment made by the district necessitated full scale
implementation and adherence to the model provided by First-Things-First. However, in
Judy’s assessment, First-Things-First was not the program required for the “emergency
room.” It was a program to implement once a school had become operational in its most
basic sense.
So, their systems are good, I think now, looking back at it, if you are a school
that just wants change and you are already functioning pretty well, it works just
fine. But, it wasn’t going to work to revive something here. I think that the
second year, they disappeared into the night half way.
With First-Things-First out of the way, an entity who she perceived as a
distraction, Judy was able to more clearly focus on the immediate needs of the campus.
One of the more pressing and immediate needs was the need to build capacity among the
teaching and administrative staff.
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The Need To Build Capacity
Upon arriving at the school, Judy turned her immediate attention toward
assessing the instructional capacity of the campus and determined its readiness to meet
the academic needs of the students during the upcoming year. This initial assessment
was crucial and immediately necessary because the Texas Education Agency (TEA) had
rated this campus as Academically Unacceptable the previous three years. An analysis of
the data determined that Judy saw an immediate need to build instructional capacity in
both her administrative team and her teaching staff.
In describing her administrative team, Judy recalled that the campus previously
reconstituted and the assistant principals from a leadership cohort were placed at the
campus. The assistant principals’ only prior experience was equal to a classroom
teacher. The collective group of assistant principals did not have the skill-set necessary
to provide instructional guidance or coaching to new teachers. Additionally, the
necessary, fast-paced and consistent long work hours of an assistant principal in an inner
city high school had completely escaped the team.
The assistant principals on the first day of school almost ran over the kids
leaving, and that was their normal thing…they left at 4:30 P.M. They couldn’t
stay because either they had a child, or whatever. Oh my gosh! We went through
the “come to Jesus” talk, like you are going to work here and not even have a
family for a while because this is bad and so you are going to have to do this,
that, and the other. And even at that, they are new, and they think, “Well, 4:30
PM is when teachers get off, that’s when we are getting off also.” I had to get rid
of, off of that original team….It really is not the same team, and all but two are
left. Two stayed, the rest were replaced with somebody because they could not
hang with the pace.
Judy found herself asking experienced in-service and out-of-service principals to
help provide mentoring for assistant principals who wanted to improve themselves and
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enable them to influence and create a better student and teacher learning environment at
school. She also had the assistant principals schedule meetings with their mentors after
normal school hours. Judy was happy to report that one of the assistant principals from
the original team had become an exceptional leader.
The abilities of the instructional staff were assessed and found that most of the
teachers were relatively new, determining that it was their limited instructional
experience that had quickly developed into fear of failure. The immediate need to impact
student academic growth necessitated an instructional framework that addressed the
student’s academic needs but was easy for teachers to implement.
We were going to keep it simple. First, we were going to align our instruction
based on the student’s needs. Next, we were going to do a backwards design.
Finally, we were going to do common formative assessments. That was just plain
and simple. We were going to get the data, align the instruction, and have check
points. That was it! But, the teachers had never been trained on that.
It was discovered during the implementation of the instructional framework that
some of the teachers would not support its implementation and were beginning to have a
negative and counter effect on the new teachers.
There was a big need to target teachers who did not want to contribute. That was
a killer because I had to document. Didn’t have help. It wasn’t “hey, we are
going to move so and so out.” It was a full fledge documentation we had to do
with everyone. It was a struggle, like pulling teeth, to move some people who
were not good for kids and not good teachers. That was the goal the first year.
After the first year of assessing and working to improve the instructional capacity
of the administrative team, Judy decided that the campus had established enough sense
of unity to bring in outside help. Because the school district is a large urban district, it
already employed enough staff members in the Curriculum and Instruction department
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who could easily provide assistance to Judy’s administrative and teaching staff.
Additionally, because of the district-led reform to redesign the high schools, First-
Things-First was also under contract, and they too were ready and willing to provide
assistance. However, because of Judy’s experience in the district, she was well aware
that the district’s instructional coaches based their coaching on an instructional
framework predetermined by the school district and would be unable to support the
‘Backwards Design” instructional framework model they had already put in place.
Judy also decided to place First-Things-First “on the sidelines,” because their
training and coaching favored a literacy initiative, which Judy felt would not have an
immediate impact on teachers. Judy discussed the need to associate herself with a critical
ally that would provide coaching to teachers based on their locally designed instructional
model. She found this critical ally in a professional development group named Quality
Teaching for English Learners (QTEL).
We needed to bring in QTEL, because QTEL doesn’t tell you what to teach, it
teaches you how to teach it. The “what to teach” we were responsible for it
ourselves. So, QTEL came in and trained everybody on the pedagogy, as much
of it took as was possible. It was a quick and fast. This is our second year with
QTEL and as best as we can do in a big school, and I say a big school, but it’s
not a big school. It’s big in that we are 43% mobile.
In addition to providing instructional development opportunities to her teaching
and administrative staff, Judy had the equally pressing and concurrent problem of
providing for the sound management of the school’s administrative programs.
The Need for Structure
Beyond the instructional needs of the campus, Judy was extremely concerned
with soundness of the management programs (operations, budget, safety and security)
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that were supposed to ensure the school was functional. After reviewing historical files,
Judy was able to determine that it had been approximately three years since the school
leadership had attempted to bring order and efficiency to the system.
I came here and it was a really, really, really, a dysfunctional school, more so that
I have ever seen in my entire life. There was no process for anything. When you
come into the school, there is normally a “this is the way that we do.” There was
not “this is the way that we do.”
The absence of order and the need for a systematic approach to managing the
school had resulted in the budget for supplies and materials being more than
$100,000.00 overdrawn. This budget, however, was overdrawn because of self-serving
classified employees who recognized the existence of an unlimited and unchecked way
of receiving more pay – overtime hours. According to Judy, the abuse of the unmanaged
systems extended beyond the classified personnel. She found teachers who had grown
accustomed to leaving the classroom during the instructional day, while students enjoyed
the free time afforded to them as a result of the teachers’ extended break.
I found out that the teachers would say, “Hey Carlos, I am going to the mall
today. I am going to take my class over to your class, and I am going to go to the
mall, and sometime this week, you pick a day and you can go.” That was like
crazy.
Judy also expressed how the absence of systems had led to the mismanagement
of the schools’ most basic legal duties. Throughout the interview, Judy recalled various
instances when school personnel had failed to maintain what should have been clear and
well-known procedures:
They had shredded all of the cumulative folders; I guess they emptied cabinets
that they needed, so they just shredded the cumulative folders or put them up
somewhere. People had graduated and had not met graduation standards. We had
to recover from that year.
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The lack of adherence to policies and procedures also presented an opportunity
for those immediately outside of the school to take advantage of the chaos that
consistently increased. Community members, primarily members who belong to
congregations led by members of the council of ministers, had keys to the school.
Also, numerous students enrolled in this school resided outside the school’s
attendance zone. Student addresses never verified enabled them to attend classes at a
campus that was not within their residential school zone. “This was the place to come, to
have a good time,” Judy says. “So, you left the school you were enrolled at, and claimed
that you were living wherever. Nobody checked it out. You just came in.”
Time as a Limited Resource
Developing an instructional framework, coaching teachers and administrators,
and defending the campus instructional plans to the different entities that exerted
governance over the school was constantly consuming the most limited of Judy’s
resources – time.
Before being able to move forward with any reform efforts, Judy had to first
make sense of the upper levels of district administration as well as the state-directed
improvement officers that, while established to support schools, collectively had the
potential to consume most of her time and stifle her efforts at leading academic
improvements. Provided below is a list of state officers and central office administrators
in the district’s organizational chart that fell below the Chief of Schools, but who Judy
was responsible for communicating and coordinating school improvement efforts.
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1. The Associate High School Superintendent – evaluated Judy’s overall
performance.
2. The executive director for high school redesign – directed the district’s high
school redesign efforts and controlled the $16,000,000 Gates Grant as well as
the annual $6,000,000 allotted by the state for college readiness.
3. The District’s Instructional Offices – directed the overall implementation of
the district’s curriculum and related staff development.
4. The Executive Principal – was an extension of the associate superintendent
for high schools and responsible for coaching and mentoring principals
assigned to focus schools.
5. Technical Assistance Provider (TAP) – an officer of the state’s School
Improvement Resource Center (SIRC) responsible for ensuring the school
and district had an improvement plan in place to meet the federal
government’s accountability standards as they related to student achievement.
6. External Campus Improvement Team Member – an officer of the Texas
Education Agency (TEA) responsible for ensuring the school and district had
an improvement plan in place to meet the state’s accountability standards as
they related to student achievement.
The officers listed had independent insight into organizational structures,
curriculum, and instructional methodologies that the campus should utilize for
improvement. With their expertise, Judy had the responsibility of coordinating, and
because of limited time, even prioritizing whose direction she should follow.
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As an administrator at her previous campus, Judy witnessed time ineffectively
consumed by district officials. Unfortunately, they were not listening to what
improvement efforts the campus engaged in, instead, only driven by a plan they wanted
to implement.
They were not listening. Had I…I had the pleasure and the horror of being at
East Central High School when Margie was the principal. And although I was
there, I was not living that. But what I saw was exasperation of trying to say this
is whatever, and nobody listening at the other end, and instead saying, “We are
going to come in with the plan.”
Considering that Judy already had a preconceived notion about the time and effort
required in fulfilling what she perceived to be futile tasks assigned by central office, it
came as no surprise that her frustrations further exacerbated by continually explaining
what she and her leadership team were attempting to implement. Judy had her
explanation:
But a lot of the time was spent entertaining people, because they all needed to
know the same thing, but they all couldn’t come at the same time. So we did the
show…I could have put out a “Show Playing at this time, this time, and this
time.” And it went all year long. And, so it takes energy to do that and it takes
energy away from being where I needed to be…in the ‘nitty-gritty.’ So, to satisfy
those people, the whole time was taken up with stuff that had nothing to do with
really helping kids. It was reports, and…
Not only did the Judy spend time defending the campus improvement efforts,
time was also consumed with attempting to sort through the different agencies that
wanted to be an integral part of the reform efforts. Much like central office, the goal of
these agencies was not to help implement the improvement plan established by Judy and
her team. Instead, they wanted to promote their own plan.
The biggest killer was the outside people coming in and jerking. Jerk this way,
jerk that way, jerk, jerk, jerk….Now FTF was on us, so I have to go to all these
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trainings and listen to them. And, all I could see was blah, blah, blah….They
were coming to give me advice. Not that I didn’t need any advice, but I had a
focus. And not that I knew everything. I don’t know everything, but this was our
focus.
While Judy agreed that she needed help, she was consistently frustrated because
she felt she had established a focus for the campus, and most individuals that came to
visit were not interested in becoming part of the established focus. The perception by
Judy that the outside agents, such as First-Things-First and district agents, were not
validating the locally developed campus instructional focus quickly developed into
distrust.
Absence of Trust
Data analysis revealed Judy was unsure of the school district’s actions, or if those
actions were well intended. In fact, analysis gave indications that Judy believed the
district only documented their actions in an attempt to indicate they did provide
assistance. Judy was not able to lock arms with the school district in moving forward
with the implementation of the district-led high school redesign, or the implementation
of the school district’s instructional plans. Judy perceived that they consumed her time
with events and dialogue that did not contribute to furthering the improvement focus.
The associate superintendent for high schools decided that every Friday he would
spend the whole day here. Here in the office, when I had to be out doing things in
classrooms….So here, we already knew that we were humoring central office. I
took the associate superintendent for high schools on Fridays. He knows all about
my family, and my life, not so much about instruction, but it was all pleasant. But
I was sacrificed on Fridays. The team had to be good on Fridays; they had to
work without me. The Executive High School Principal had to take that and go
with it, because I was stuck here entertaining. I guess if I was going to switch
positions and coming to support a principal in this position, I wouldn’t do it in
this room, like they did it with me, in this office. I would have done it out there in
the classrooms.
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Furthermore, Judy felt that the insistence to implement the district plan gave the
school district two options for discrediting Judy, should the campus continue to be an
Academically Unacceptable campus. First, the school district could claim that despite
their insistence, the district instructional plans were not implemented with fidelity. Next,
the school district could also claim that the district improvement instructional plans were
never implemented. Finally, if the school successfully received an Academically
Acceptable status by the Texas Education Agency (TEA), nobody would have to say
anything.
We were threatened many times about “how about if this thing does not make,
and you have First-Things-First, saviors of the universe that are here to help you
and you’re actually going to shun them away….It was bad, bad, bad. I don’t
think any of them would have had my back. Because those days came, when the
scores got back, and what are we going to do with Judy when it all goes down?
Who cares that we have, whatever kind of training invested in her, or if she did a
good job the whole time. There was going to be the big red letter. Where are we
going to hide her? What are we going to do with her?
Judy’s distrust of the school district did not begin with her assignment as the
school’s principal. Instead, her distrust was rooted while observing the district’s
treatment and lack of support for two other principals assigned to one other inner city
school.
Knowing what had happened at East Central, and having watched it happen, not
once but twice. Juanita went through it, and Margie went through it. And then
since the academy is where I was assigned, I continue to get the scoop right
away… I had the pleasure and the horror of being at East Central High School
when Margie was the principal. And, although I was there, I was not living that.
But, what I saw was exasperation of trying to say “this is our plan” and nobody
listening at the other end, and instead saying, “We are going to come in with the
plan.” What Margie needed to do over there, she was not able to, just from my
perspective, just watching, and it was so unfair.
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Finally, Judy expressed distrust over the relationship between the office of high
school redesign and the bureaucracy of First-Things-First. Judy believed that the
unprecedented expansion of the office of high school redesign and the district’s financial
investment in First-Things-First had combined to form a co-dependent relationship that
had taken precedence above more pressing needs of the campuses. Judy believed that the
only reason that she was able to keep First-Things-First “on the sidelines” was because
of the negotiating skills of the Executive Principal assigned to her campus – Michael.
When he got here, he was the negotiator with central office, and he was
successful in making sure that we were able to take control of the instructional
support that was coming our way, to that he did a lot of the meeting with FTF.
In the midst of all the distrust, Judy was able to form a strong alliance with one
of the central office agents. The alliance proved beneficial not only to Judy’s
development as an administrator, but also to the instructional development of the
teaching staff.
Positive Support
During the first three years of her principalship, Judy was able to witness a
consistent increase in student academic achievement. During her first year as principal,
the school was not able to remove the Texas Education Agency (TEA) label of
Academically Unacceptable. However, the increase in student achievement as evidenced
by the state assessment scores was widely considered as considerable improvement.
Thus, Judy was able to continue to operate the school, enabling her to celebrate that
success for the last two years, the school receiving the TEA rating of Academically
Acceptable. As Judy reflected on the success of the school during her first year, she
consistently gave credit to the high school Executive Principal who while not
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permanently assigned to the campus, spent most of his time assisting her and mentoring
her.
If there had not been two people here that first year, it just would not have
happened, because Michael, away from all of the drama, got to work with our
instructional people and started to organize that. That was a humongous job.
Michael, who to me is central office interface also, because he was the Executive
Principal… In my heart, I knew that he was comrade here, and in position, I say
that he was my boss. It was not a boss position; I don’t think it was intended to
be a boss position, but I have always respected him as if he would have been my
boss at that time. So he was the one. If I had to give credit to anyone for our
success, it would be to him, because he is the one that fended off all of that.
Because of all the time that was consumed with justifying the campus’
instructional improvement plan, meeting with external agents, and fending off potential
distractions, Judy was relieved that someone from the district office was able to
supervise and direct on her behalf all of the instructional improvement plans. Most
importantly, Michael, much like Judy, believed in developing instructional improvement
plans and implementing interventions that were arrived at through a locally developed
process.
I appreciated the mentoring because I did respect him and because he was no
nonsense, because he had fought off other initiatives from the district, even to the
point where he had unpopularity, a lot. More so than anybody that I had noticed.
Judy’s continued formation as an inner city high school principal consistently reflected
the guiding principles learned from Michael. To him she attributed the formation of the
backward instructional design model, the alliance with QTEL, and most especially the
fending off of First-Things-First.
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Case Profile Summary
Forming Judy’s case profile provided the opportunity to understand the duties
attributed to an inner city high school principal within the context of a lived experience.
Formulating this understanding will hopefully accomplish two goals: (a) prevent outside
agents from discounting distractions that prevent immediate implementation of
improvement programs and (b) develop an awareness of the skills needed of principals
to manage various aspects of their job and eventually implement improvement programs
that will bring more rigorous and relevant learning to their students.
Participant Number Two – Margie
Margie is a Mexican American middle-aged female who, at the time of this
study, was serving in her second assignment as a high school principal in a school
district separate from the district that provided the setting for this study. Margie, much
like Judy, was in her first assignment as a high school principal during the time period
that encompassed this study.
While serving as a middle school principal, Margie was recruited by the associate
superintendent for high schools for the position of principal at East Central High School,
a school that had consistently struggled to meet the Texas Education Agency’s (TEA’s)
accountability standards. In addition to not meeting state accountability standards, the
East Central High School had been plagued by considerable discipline problems.
Moreover, the school suffered from limited student participation in extracurricular
activities, little parent participation, and high teacher turnover.
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The neighborhood students at East Central High School had historically
performed below state standards. However, low-performing students’ scores had been
masked in part by the scores of the students who attended the language and liberal arts
academy housed within the school. Ten years prior to this study, the district decided to
move the language and liberal arts academy to a different school. Since that change, the
school had failed to meet state standards. Moreover, the school did not have a principal
who served for more than two consecutive years and, similar to many other inner city
schools, had the historically higher performing students transfer to high schools in the
more affluent side of the city.
The exit of the language and liberal arts academy and the “White flight”
experienced by East Central High School caused the school’s enrollment to drop
considerably. The student enrollment dropped steadily and resulted in enrollment of
about 700 students at the time of the study. The low enrollment, coupled with limited
student participation in extracurricular activities, often culminated in student groups
disqualified from participating in athletic and fine arts at state-sanctioned competitions.
At the beginning of the school year, the resulting “Friday Night Lights” scenario could
often be described as having just enough players on the football field, less than 10 band
members in the stands, and even fewer fans in attendance. Making matters worse was
the fact that after the first grading period, many students were deemed academically
ineligible to participate and the student groups could not muster enough participation to
complete the competition season.
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For two years prior to Margie’s appointment as principal, the superintendent
attempted to engage the school’s community in conversations about closing East Central
High School and enrolling the students in other district high schools. However, the
school’s alumni spoke on behalf of the east side community and garnered enough city-
wide support to discourage the superintendent from closing the school. Because of this,
the superintendent and his administrative team brainstormed school restructuring ideas
that would convince TEA to allow the school to continue operating.
In the year prior to Margie’s appointment, the associate superintendent for high
schools researched and began to implement a restructuring plan that would help improve
student achievement. The first part of the plan included the creation of an international
academy for language acquisition. A second and more elaborate part of the plan included
applying for the Texas Education Agency’s (TEA) Texas High School Initiative Grant
that would support the restructuring of the already small high school into three smaller
academies. After both plans were fully implemented, each of the three academies could
apply for and receive their own Public Education Information Management System
(PEIMS) number from the Texas Education Agency. The state-approved PEIMS number
would provide each of the three academies a means to independently oversee and
manage their own finances and academic accountability.
Under the first part of the restructuring plan, limited English proficient high
school students who had less than one year experience in a school within the United
States would be transferred to the newly established international academy housed at
East Central High School. Because the school district had a large number of high school
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students experiencing U.S. schooling for the first time, it was anticipated that the
school’s enrollment would drastically increase.
The more elaborate academy plan called for the hiring of a Campus Academic
Officer (CAO), as opposed to a high school principal, who would then hire three
academy directors, as opposed to assistant principals. According to the first CAO:
The initial plan was that I as the Campus Academic Officer, would oversee the
establishment of these three academies, and then over the course of the next three
years, these academies would essentially become three small schools with their
own individual PEIMS numbers.
Although each academy would have its own academic focus and be an autonomous
school, each of the three schools and the already established international school would
share athletics, fine arts, and the UIL academic electives. The sharing of these electives
would further consolidate the four academies into one Texas UIL competition school.
By December 2004, implementation of the international academy was well under
way. Moreover, the school was informed that they had received the Texas Education
Agency’s grant to redesign East Central High School into three smaller academies.
Unfortunately, the first year of implementation was not a successful year for the campus
serving the neighborhood students. The enrollment at the high school continued to
decrease at a higher rate than the rate of students who enrolled at the international
academy. In addition to this was the fact that the international academy was never fully
seen as part of the existing high school. Finally, the student’s discipline problems were
escalating and the principal was not able to fully energize and motivate the faculty into
working for the school’s improvement.
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The first year’s failure caused the associate superintendent for high schools to
conclude that the current principal was not the appropriate principal to lead the
implementation of the entire redesign plan. Simultaneously, the problems experienced
during the first year of redesign implementation also served to encourage the existing
principal to resign and not continue with her tenure. It was in the middle of this turmoil
that Margie was recruited. After serious consideration, she accepted the job to serve as
the principal/academic officer.
During Margie’s first few months as principal, everything seemed to be
progressing as expected. The associate superintendent encouraged Margie to take
multiple trips to Boston and visit schools that had engaged in similar restructuring
ventures. Additionally, the associate superintendent also helped Margie hire three
academy directors and encouraged them to travel to Nashville, Tennessee, to participate
in the High Schools That Work (HSTW) national conference. HSTW had come into the
East Central High School scenario because the Texas High School Initiative grant
required that schools accepting grant monies secure a Technical Assistance Provider
(TAP). Therefore, the school district secured HSTW as the TAP.
Upon returning from the HSTW national conference Margie and the three
academy directors began filling vacancies, divided the teaching staff into three
academies, and developed plans to begin the school year. Margie remembers that:
Once we hired the three academy directors, Jesse, Richard, and Virginia, we all
took that trip to the HSTW national conference. When we came in that Fall, we
divided up the teachers into three academies and each academy director took
responsibility for hiring and filling all vacancies because half of the staff had
either resigned or retired.
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Throughout the Fall 2005 semester, staff from the HSTW team visited the school
and provided staff development related to the 10 key practices encouraged by HSTW.
However, it was up to the school staff to then implement the 10 key practices into the
redesign plan. Margie and her staff were challenged by the expectancies of the HSTW
model but were at the same time encouraged by the guidance and the freedom to
implement the plan in a way that best suited the needs of the campus.
By the end of Margie’s first year (Spring 2006 semester), it appeared that
everything was progressing. Even though the school did not meet the Texas Education
Agency’s academic improvement standards, the students did make significant gains in
the state assessment. The curriculum and instruction department from central office
provided instructional coaching to the teachers, and the principal was able to make many
decisions regarding the tactical implementation of the redesign plan.
More importantly, the campus felt empowered to make decisions. The
empowerment was especially apparent in the hiring of consultants that provided staff
development. On the aforementioned point Margie recalls:
That first year it was very seamless and very smooth. Anything that I asked for, I
was able to use campus funds. You know, we had Title I funds, we had School
Improvement Funds, we had money that had come in from the district. And then
there was this massive amount of funds that came in with this TEA grant itself.
Because of this, Margie thought that the school would continue with the implementation
of the grant.
Although the campus staff perceived everything to be progressing well,
significant disagreements occurred at the central office level that would significantly
limit Margie’s ability to implement the redesign plan. At the same time that Margie was
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implementing the redesign plan during her first year, the school district had been
studying the possibility of redesigning all of the high schools within the school district.
Although these exploratory efforts were originally led by the associate superintendent
for high schools, the school district later decided to establish an office of redesign and
hire an executive director for high school redesign. The purpose of the redesign office
was to secure money from philanthropic organizations, primarily the Gates Foundation,
for the implementation of district-led high school redesign. Moreover, the change
allowed the district to easily coordinate the redesign activities throughout the district.
However, the newly created office reported directly to the superintendent and not
the associate superintendent for high schools. As corroborated by all participants, the
executive director for high school redesign immediately asserted his authority over all
district redesign efforts. By doing so, the executive director aggressively challenged the
authority of the associate superintendent for high schools. In what is retrospectively
regarded as fallout akin to a corporate takeover aftermath, the associate superintendent
for high schools quietly entered retirement that same year.
Margie believes that the resignation of the associate superintendent for high
schools had a limiting effect on the implementation of their redesign plan and eventually
led to abandonment of the initial plan. Margie elaborates on this belief by stating that:
The associate superintendent for high schools left at the end of my first year.
That’s when things became unraveled, because she left. Apparently, the
superintendent had given her this task – take care of this high school. And she
did, without really involving other people. I think that even the other high
schools were in the dark as to what was happening at East Central High
School….So I felt like that entire second year I spent the entire year justifying
my plan, and explaining it and re-explaining it, and attending meeting after
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meeting after meeting trying to explain what was happening at our school with
the redesign plan.
After the departure of the associate superintendent for high schools, the redesign efforts
at East Central High School quickly gravitated away from a reform effort led by a
campus team to a reform effort primarily led by the district’s central office.
Careful analysis indicated the emergence of categories that provide insight into
the obstacles experienced by the principals when implementing district-led reform.
Furthermore, a cursory review of the data indicates that the failed reform efforts were
directly related to the inability to remain faithful to the implementation of any single
plan for more than one year. On this point Margie provided the following summary:
So I think, that in that reform effort, I can tell you that unless you really stick
with a plan with fidelity for three to five years, you’re never going to know if it
really worked. And looking back at my experience, we changed every year. We
never stuck with one plan.
The next section will provide the findings discovered during the analysis of the
data, particularly as it relates to the decisions made by Margie regarding district-led
reform. The findings are separated into categories that emerged during the analysis. The
categories include the need to build capacity, the need for focused leadership, the need
for structure, time as a limited resource, absence of trust, and positive support.
To further support an understanding of the positive and negative effects that high
school redesign had on the campus during the high school redesign years (2004-2010), a
data table (Table 4) describing changes in the student achievement is provided. Because
the passing standards changed on the state assessment during the course of high school
redesign, a simple year-to-year passing rate comparison will not adequately describe the
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campus progressing or decreasing in their achievement levels. Therefore, the data are
presented in terms of changes in the achievement gaps between the campus achievement
level and that of the state and the campus group.
Table 4. Changes in Student Achievement Gaps Between East Central High School and
the State/Campus Group (2004-2010)
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State -43 -40 -40 -52 -41 -38 *
Campus
Group -19 -16 -12 -27 -16 -18 *
*Indicates data not reported due to school closure.
Source. TEA (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
Focused Instructional Leadership
During the first year of redesign, Margie felt that the campus had been able to
primarily focus on the instructional aspects of high school reform. With the exception of
the time spent during the first summer reorganizing students into academies, dividing the
teachers, and hiring related personnel, Margie felt confident that most of the time had
been well spent on instructional improvements. According to Margie, the associate
superintendent for high schools and the assistant superintendent for instruction made
sure that district personnel assisted in the improvement efforts:
The district instructional specialists were really working with the instructional
coaches to make sure that the curriculum was aligned and that we were really
following through with the protocols for planning and for examining data every
six weeks with the common assessments that we had in place.
The overall effort, while not sufficient to remove the school from the Texas Education
Agency’s Academically Unacceptable list, significantly improved student academic
achievement.
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However, the associate superintendent for high schools departure from the school
district facilitated a shift in district priorities, including the plans to continue with the
redesign efforts at East Central High School. Margie found herself struggling against
different entities to maintain a focus on the instructional improvements rather than the
structural improvements prescribed by other redesign efforts being emphasized
throughout the school district.
By the summer prior to the beginning of the second year, the school district had
decided to not continue with the technical assistance provided by High Schools That
Work (HSTW). As Margie understood, the Texas High School Initiative grant was about
to come to an end, and the school district was pursuing other grant opportunities. Even
though Margie was about to begin her second year of redesign implementation without
the technical assistance of HSTW, she and the staff were convinced that with continued
focus on the instructional coaching provided to the teachers and the continued academic
support provided to the students, the campus would continue to make academic
improvements.
The district leadership, however, received a $1,000,000.00 Gates Foundation
planning grant to investigate the implementation of high school redesign at all five Tier I
schools and because of that wanted to improve their chances of receiving the larger
$16,000,000 implementation grant from the Gates Foundation. Because Margie’s school
was one of the Tier I schools and because funding from the Texas High School Initiative
grant was about to end, the district leadership was pushing Margie to write a different
redesign plan that would qualify her to be part of the larger Gates grant. Margie recalled
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her reluctance to move away from the redesign plan that had been in place for the first
year:
Well, I didn’t want to upset the applecart and have to start all over again because
I had remembered the work from HSTW that very first year I came. It was really
difficult to keep up with them, and then we never really got off the ground with
all the pieces they wanted us to implement. The needs of the campus were just
too massive.
Margie’s resistance to not deviate from the initial redesign plans was met with equal
persistence by the district leadership.
The district leadership was adamant that rewriting a redesign plan would not
detract from the existing redesign plan being implemented. The district argued that the
new redesign plan would focus on having small academies, student advisories, and a
college and career curriculum. Incidentally, the plan that the district prescribed was
similar to what was currently implemented. Margie found herself using the same
argument to convince her deans that rewriting the plan would not be a distraction or
significantly shift from current practices. For example, Margie recalls telling her deans,
“Look, what they are asking us to do is pretty much what we already have in place. We
may just have to put a different coding on it or a different spin on it.”
Margie also recalls that the process of rewriting the plan detracted from the
academic focus that had been established during the first year:
I think it was a huge halt to the progress, because now the academy directors
were involved in having to rewrite and resubmit their redesign plans for each of
the academies….I can honestly tell you that that process took so much time and
effort from the academy directors that they lost ground in being able to be in
classrooms and really monitor what was going on with instruction.
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Although the rewriting of the plan was a distraction, the school district offered to each
campus, as part of the redesign initiative, the flexibility to choose a Technical Assistance
Provider (TAP).
Margie believed that the new redesign plan would allow them to continue
implementing the initial redesign plan written by the previous high school principal and
the now retired associate superintendent for high schools. Because of this, she intended
to hire a TAP with a skill set that would help them implement that initial plan. However,
the superintendent and executive director for high school redesign had already begun
informal relations with First-Things-First and intended to promote them to the principals
as a preferred TAP.
First-Things-First assisted had already assisted the school district in completing
the application for the $16,000,000 Gates Foundation implementation grant. As Margie
recalls, “First-Things-First came into the picture because the Gates Foundation required
a working proven model for redesign. First-Things-First was one of those proven
models.” Additionally, Margie recalls various conversations where she was strongly
encouraged to hire First-Things-First as their TAP:
The spring of that second year, I was in several meetings with the superintendent
and executive director for high school redesign, where I was told “Margie, you
should really look at this First-Things-First model, and really look at bringing
them in.”
In addition to being pressured by the central office organization, Margie was also
courted by representatives from First-Things-First. Margie met various times with First-
Things-First representatives, but they failed to convince her to buy into their model. As
Margie recalls:
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I met with them that spring of that second year. I had several meetings with them.
At first, we were able, not necessarily to keep them at bay, but not buy
completely into them because we had come off the first year and we had made
gains. We did not drop anywhere.
However, by the end of Margie’s second year, it was evident that the school had
not mirrored the academic gains of the first year and she was no longer able to fend off
the district’s insistence that she contract with First-Things-First. Margie recalls that:
At the end of the second year, when the scores came in and we did not come off
of the Academically Unacceptable list, I remember the executive director for
high school redesign coming into the faculty meeting and literally telling the
faculty we were going to go with First-Things-First.
The abrupt ending of Margie’s autonomy as Chief Academic Officer also ushered in a
new and separate phase of high school redesign. The next section will describe what
Margie perceived as a conflict with First-Things-First and a detraction to the campus’
academic focus.
Although it had been decided by the executive director for high school redesign
that First-Things-First would provide the guidance for the new redesign plan, Margie
was still hopeful that the academy directors could eventually assume their role as
independent principals of the three academies. Unfortunately for Margie, the Texas
Education Agency’s (TEA’s) commissioner denied the petition for the three independent
Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) numbers. Margie
remembers:
In the summer of 2007, after the school ratings had come out, the superintendent
and I met with TEA. TEA was not going to approve the application for the three
PEIMS numbers for the academies. I remember the superintendent saying
“Forget that redesign model…you are no longer Campus Academic Officer, you
are now the principal.”
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The commissioner’s decision to not grant the three PEIMS numbers provided a pathway
for First-Things-First to more fully implement their model.
However, the decision by TEA to not grant the three PEIMS numbers also served
to establish Margie’s position as the lead decision-maker on the campus. Margie stated
that “As the principal, coming in the third year, First-Things-First had to meet with me
on everything that they did on the campus.”
From the onset of the relationship, Margie and her staff did not believe in First-
Things-First’s commitment to helping them make improvements. For example, Margie
observed:
And so, that summer of that second year, the teachers had to come in for a period
of 10 days. During those 10 days, FTF was going to come in and introduce their
model….The trainers that came in through FTF were not even people that we had
associated with before. The people that we had interacted with initially and had
met face-to-face where not these people. It was almost as if they had brought in a
group of these standard trainers that come in and deliver this prepackaged
presentation. What was disappointing about that first initial meeting was that the
trainers that came in didn’t know anything about our school. They had not done
their homework about who we were as a campus, the history of its performance,
and much less understood the Texas Accountability System. It was disappointing
because that first initial meeting is so important to establish why we are taking on
this FTF model.
Having First-Things-First’s commitment questioned only served to further establish
doubt as to whether the methodologies employed by them would eventually provide for
increased academic achievement.
Since her first year, Margie had been clear that academic improvement would be
achieved only if the staff was coached on the implementation of instructional
methodologies. Furthermore, Margie was convinced that teachers needed specific
feedback regarding their own instructional deficiencies. However, Margie and her
103
academy deans believed that First-Things-First was more interested in structural
organizations (themed academies and establishing connections) rather than instructional
improvements. Margie observed that the reform, as dictated by the First-Things-First
representatives, was not a valid way to achieve academic improvement. On this point,
Margie responded to an open-ended question about the efficacy of First-Things-First
with the following commentary:
No, because unless you redesign the classroom and redesign instruction for kids
that come to you two or three years below grade level already, until you address
that initial need, then redesigning and putting kids in themed academies, and
trying to make connections between the learning so that learning is more
relevant, is all for not. You have to have a command of what is happening in that
classroom….I think what was missing was the actual credibility behind those
models. They never really addressed what teachers encountered in a classroom
and what teachers encountered with the kids that they had in their classrooms.
The disagreement between First-Things-First and the campus administration
regarding instructional improvement methodologies and overall campus academic needs,
further widened by what Margie observed to be an unwillingness to validate the
concerns of the teachers. Margie observed that:
Whenever there was an attempt to talk about the realities of what really happens
in the classroom, FTF representatives simply dismissed teacher concerns. Rather
than really trying to figure out what their concerns were and figure out a way to
help support them, teachers were made to feel that it was just an excuse for you
not being able to teach this lesson.
Although numerous attempts to resolve the differences between First-Things-
First and the campus administration were made by Margie, it had become clear to
Margie that First-Things-First was not willing to compromise at any level.
There was no flexibility with them. Everything that they asked that we do had to
be implemented the way that they said, so if I wanted to alter the schedule in any
way, it was frowned upon. And I guess that was part of my conflict with them as
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campus principal. I felt I had to check my every move with someone. So it really
affects your ability to make decisions.
By January 2007, First-Things-First had severed their ties with Margie and her
campus. Why First-Things-First made this decision is still unknown to Margie. “Maybe
they were not up to the challenge, or maybe they too were frustrated.” What is known is
that during that same timeframe, First-Things-First established themselves as the
Technical Assistance Provider in three other schools in the district.
The perceived debate over who should provide the instructional leadership and
the type of instructional leadership consistently detracted from making any type of
significant improvements. Margie perceived this unhealthy debate to be a distraction
from focusing on building the instructional capacity among the staff. This next section
discusses the perceived need to build the staff’s instructional capacity.
The Need To Build Capacity
The magnitude of the district-led reform required a campus-wide approach.
Because of this fact, the attention of everyone, especially the principal, was required to
orchestrate substantial change. Additionally, the threat of closure by the state for not
making academic gains relative to state standards was also ever present in Margie’s
mind and also required an intense focus. Margie remembered:
The only thing that we measured success with was performance in the classroom
and whether or not the students could pass a test and graduate in four years. Well,
when you are coming into a school system already one or two years behind grade
level, you have to make allowances and value the fact that it may take five years
to graduate high school. And there is nothing wrong with that.
The limited experience of many team members, both administrators and teachers, did not
allow them to fully understand the campus’ pressing academic need.
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The negative impact that a young teaching staff had on the potential for school
closure was compounded by the fact that many of the new teachers taught in the math
and science departments. For example, Margie pointed out that:
We reconstituted half of the math and science department because those were the
two low-performing areas for the campus….And the other fact that we were
dealing with is that half of our teaching staff had less than five years teaching
experience, very, very young teaching faculty. The majority of the teaching staff
that we hired had not taught very long.
Margie was responsible for ensuring a team approach towards redesign, while
simultaneously developing an instructional focus among all the staff. The next two
sections discuss the need to build the instructional capacity among the campus
administration and the teaching staff.
Throughout the discussions and interviews conducted with Margie, she
frequently referred to her role and interaction with the academy directors. Most of the
discussions gravitated toward the need to develop them in their new role. For instance:
So part of what I did was try to groom the three academy directors so that they
could be ready to take over their own schools. And also so they could be ready to
function as a quasi-board that would have to make decisions about a shared
facility, because there were so many shared programs that they had to learn to
work together in that particular situation.
As the Principal/Chief Academic Officer, Margie required herself to guide the
academy directors to conduct the duties that a principal would normally conduct. For
Margie, having control of the campus operations had to become subordinate to the
development of the academy directors. For example, Margie relays that as campus
principal she never conducted campus-wide faculty meetings:
The only time we came together is when we had professional development. That
is the only time I addressed the faculty as a whole. Each of the academies held
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weekly meetings. Each of them had a day when they would meet in the
mornings….I let them pretty much meet; I would float in and out. I would make
appearances. But I was always a member in the audience.
The work for Margie as a principal was made more complex because not only
was she responsible for developing three directors, each of the directors was responsible
for operating as an independent unit (Academy of Scientific Research and Design, the
Global Business and Technology, and the Fine Arts). Margie indicated that:
The problem came, when things got really muddy. For example, the Academy for
Fine Arts had your choir and your band. We had some orchestra there for a
while. Well, those kids fell into those academies or programs because they had
those electives. But those electives or programs should have been interwoven
along all three academies….You got into, not necessarily a tug of war, but you
did get into conflict with the kids who really wanted to be in the band, but were
also interested in being part of the Scientific Research and Design Academy that
had the math and science components.
The focus on developing the academy director’s instructional capacities was sometimes
secondary to the development of their functionality as a cohesive unit.
In addition to developing the instructional capabilities of the administrators,
Margie also prioritized among her varying tasks, the development of the teacher’s
instructional capacity. This development was made more challenging because it had to
be synchronized with the instructional focus the campus was attempting to undertake.
Margie was convinced that instructional improvements and student achievement
would occur when the learning was made “personal.” Personal for Margie meant several
things. First, personal learning meant that the students had to relate to the context of the
learning. Second, and more important, personal learning also meant that the learning had
to simultaneously address the specific deficiencies of teachers and the students. Personal
learning meant learning for the teachers about making lessons engaging and rigorous for
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students followed by instructional coaching. The instructional coaching should be based
on what was and was not observed in the implementation of the lessons previously
developed. Specifically, Margie believed: “You know it always works better when you
can sit across the table with someone, rather than having them read the feedback from a
feedback form. Because there is so much that is not said in between the lines.”
On this note, Margie was quick to praise the contributions made by the oversight
principal assigned to her as part of the Texas Education Agency’s sanctions for being an
Academically Unacceptable campus. Margie recalled that while she was engaged in
addressing all of the distractions from the outside, she was comforted with the
knowledge that the oversight principal was providing “the classroom presence and then
the feedback to the teachers.”
For the students, “personal” meant the learning had to begin at the student’s level
of comprehension and then through the lesson cycle, the teacher would scaffold the
learning up to the intended learning objective. However, the teachers again had to first
learn how to scaffold a lesson in order to sustain the student’s engagement throughout
the learning cycle. Contemplating on this point, Margie observed:
How do you actually scaffold and build a lesson when kids don’t have
foundational skills. Your objective and your curriculum is telling you that you
have to get the kids to this level, but if they are missing some foundational skills,
how do you build them in so that you get the kids to where you want them with
the learning without throwing out the whole lesson.
There were two primary reasons that personalizing the learning was consistently
made difficult. First, the teachers were just beginning to create good lessons and become
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good instructors. Second, when the teachers faced roadblocks to their lesson
implementation, representatives from First-Things-First did not validate their concerns.
It’s almost like you went into these sessions and you planned this ideal lesson,
and created this Utopia of what the lesson should be, but when you got in there
and tried to teach the lesson with the students that you had, it would all fall apart.
So that was a disconnect; whenever there was an attempt to talk about the
realities of what really happens in the classroom, teachers were made to feel that
it was just an excuse for you not being able to teach this lesson, rather than really
trying to figure out what their concerns were and figure out a way to help support
them.
What Margie believed to be the student’s academic needs was dismissed by First-
Things-First as an excuse for not complying with their model of instruction.
Compounding the reform implementation was the inability to successfully
manage and coordinate all of the resources made available to the campus. Although
financial resources secured the needed personnel and staff development consultants, the
multitude of resources oftentimes created disjointed efforts. The next section discusses
the need to coordinate the multitude of resources made available during the reform
process.
The Need for Structure
The principals participating in this study arrived at their campuses at different
stages of the district-led reform for high school redesign. Principals like Margie,
Michael, and Malcolm were in place as the reform process began. Judy and Ronald
arrived after the respective campuses had begun to implement high school redesign.
Depending on the time the principals appeared on the redesign scene, they either
benefited from previous structures that supported the redesign process or had to create
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structures to support the redesign process. Margie arrived at her school just as high
school redesign was beginning.
Margie simultaneously addressed the daily campus occurrences and the
implementation of high school redesign. Unfortunately, the time consumed with the
management of the basic operating structures consumed a lot of time, and not enough
time was allocated to the organization of high school redesign. As she recalls, “Once the
school year started, we were hit with the reality of what needed to be done with regard to
discipline and attendance and just some basic operating structures.” In retrospect Margie
sees that there existed an immediate need to create structures to manage the redesign
process and that the creation of the structures could have prevented some of the failures
that eventually occurred.
Because of the money available to Margie, the campus decisions about staffing,
staff development, and resources were made without pause or hesitation. While the
resources brought to the campus had merit, the magnitude of the reform activities did not
allow for a timely coordination of the implementation of each resource. A more
appropriate implementation of high school redesign would have included a structure that
took into account all of the short-term and long-term needs of the campus and then
dictated a sequence for redesign implementation that would not negatively affect the
academic health of the campus.
Margie indicated that the campus had Title I funds, School Improvement Funds,
money from the district, and a massive amount of money from the Texas High School
Initiative grant. According to Margie, the financial support made sure that:
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We were staffed quite nicely….Each academy director had assistants and “team
leaders” for each of their areas. There was a lead for math, science, language arts,
and social studies in each individual academy. We also hired instructional
coaches for all of the core areas.
Margie believed that the disconnect between providing resources for the more
immediate needs of the campus and providing resources for long-term solutions was not
appropriately managed. Speaking on this point, Margie stated:
I hired a math consultant that first year because the area of low performing was
African American mathematics. He brought in his own way of addressing the
issue with mathematics. That first year, things seemed to go well, we didn’t get
out of low performing, but we made some gains. But here looking back, here is
where it was the beginning of the end. He came in and actually got the math
teachers working and planning together and delivering a type of instruction based
on the professional teaching model – teaching cycle. But it wasn’t grounded in
the district curriculum. He really took the math teachers through, not necessarily
in a different curriculum but really looking at different needs, trying to fill in the
gaps. Well, in trying to fill in the gaps, we were doing a lot of foundational work,
but we were also losing ground in being able to keep track with what they were
supposed to learn for that year. So, the first year we made some great gains, but
the second year we barely maintained growth.
In addition to not prioritizing the short-term and long-term needs of the campus,
Margie believed that an extraordinary amount of time was dedicated to the physical
reorganization of the campus and not enough time allocated to the improvement of
teaching and learning. On this point, Margie concluded:
So, I think that a lot of time and energy went into physical layout, when really all
of the energy should have gone to what is happening in the classroom and
instruction. If I got 90 minutes here, how am I structuring those 90 minutes?
Because the kids were double blocked for math and language arts, but they only
saw their social studies and science teacher every other day.
Ensuring that academies were geographically defined by ensuring that classrooms within
an academy were organized by contiguous spaces was an aspect of high school redesign
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that often seemed to be a measure of success. However, according to Margie, this
measure of redesign success did little to provide for academic success.
The management of resources was certainly made difficult because of the
multitude of resources. However, adding to the resource management dilemma was the
absence of time. The next section discusses the fast-paced process of the reform
implementation timeline.
Time as a Limited Resource
If Margie failed at developing structures by which to manage the implementation
of high school redesign, she did not fail for lack of desire or skills required. She did not
have the time to process all of the redesign activities that were occurring at the school. In
addition to the fast-paced process of reform implementation, Margie and her staff also
had to use time to write an additional redesign plan in order to allow them to help
facilitate the $16,000,000 Gates Foundation grant. The units of data extracted from the
interview that depicts the fast-paced process of high school redesign are listed below:
1. We met very regularly. They brought in another consulting firm that had us
create a project management that took our campus plan and break it apart
piece-by-piece, and we met monthly to code that plan whether something was
in place or something was not in place.
2. The district instructional specialists were really working with the
instructional coaches to make sure that the curriculum was aligned and that
we were really following through with the protocols for planning and for
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examining data every six weeks with the common assessments that we had in
place.
3. Because we met in advisory quite a bit, I think we almost met every day there
for a while, so those lessons had to be modeled in order for them to be
effective, so that the teachers would know how to teach them.
4. I remember the spring of the second year; I spent a great deal of time in
meetings with people at central, with the superintendent, FTF people, people
from the Gates Foundation. We were asked to rewrite all the redesign plans
so that we could be part of the district grant that was being submitted for the
Gates money.
Besides the time consumed by the daily campus occurrences, Margie allocated
large amounts of time for personnel employed as part of the redesign venture and for
agents of the Texas Education Agency. As Margie recalls, “The problem was managing
all of the entities that had a role in helping our school. So I spent a great deal of my time
in meeting with these folks and trying to coordinate their efforts.” Furthermore, Margie
remembers that:
Every month I had meetings with Bobby, the Technical Assistance Provider
(TAP) for the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) School Improvement Program
(SIP)….I also met regularly with the Technical Assistance Provider (TAP)
required by Texas Education Agency for not meeting state standards….We
would also meet with that lady that came in from Harvard to do work with the
advisory program….There was a separate and apart consultant that was also part
of the First-Things-First package, a consultant that we hired just to work with the
teachers on advisory lessons.
The amount of time consumed in meeting with inside (teacher leaders, campus
administrators) and outside agents (district employees, state employees, consultants)
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seemed to absorb most of Margie’s time and left little time to actually supervise the
work that was being done in the classroom.
Because of the absence of time and the need to manage the large amount of
activities related to high school redesign, little time was left to fully debate the redesign
course that outside agents wanted to chart for the campus. Unfortunately, this lack of
communication facilitated the development of redesign plans that were not supported by
the campus and an eventual lack of trust for outside agents. The next section discusses
the lack of trust that Margie expressed of the outside agents.
Absence of Trust
Margie, much like Judy, dedicated a lot of time in her interview to discussing her
lack of trust with the central office leadership. Margie’s distrust of central office was
rooted in her observance of the treatment that her immediate supervisor, the associate
superintendent for high schools, received from the office of high school redesign.
I know that my close relationship with the associate superintendent for high
schools clearly affected my ability to trust the office of redesign. I can admit that
now, after being removed from it, you just could not help it, because she was the
entity, the figure head that hired me and gave me a specific task, and after a year
it was changed.
Additionally, she clearly indicated that it was the central office’s inability to
remain loyal to one single plan that prevented the campus from achieving any form of
substantial success. According to Margie’s analysis:
Part of the reason that the reform efforts failed at our school: for one, we did not
stick to one plan for any substantial length of time. And I am talking we did not
stick to one plan for more than a year. It seems like every year that we came
back, there was something different they were asking us to do.
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Additionally, Margie indicated that she was unwilling to inform teachers of plans
discussed between her and the central office because she did not trust the central office
to stay loyal to any one set of decisions. The aforementioned conclusion is reflected in
the following statement:
We tried to keep as much away as possible. I only told them what was absolutely
necessary. I never exposed them to any of the drama or informed them about any
of the plans that were about to change and then didn’t change. I tried to shield
them from all of the meetings and all of the expectations that were given to me;
just because I knew that their focus had to be in the classroom and what had to be
done with the kids.
Although Margie expressed an absence of trust for most outside agents, she did find a
true partner in the instructional reform activities the campus was engaged in. Much like
Judy, Margie found a true partner in an ex-high school principal who was serving as
oversight principal assigned by TEA. The next section explains the details of the
relation.
Positive Support
During the first year of her tenure at East Central High School, Margie was able
to witness an increase in the students’ academic achievement. However, the school was
not able to remove the TEA label of Academically Unacceptable. The increase in student
achievement, as evidenced by the state assessment scores, was widely considered
significant improvement. According to the 2005-2006 Academic Excellence Indicator
System (AEIS) report published by the Texas Education Agency; Margie’s school
posted at least a 10-point gain in the areas of Reading, Science, and Social Studies. Math
remained relatively steady–increasing two percentage points. Unfortunately, during the
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second year (2006/2007), the scores in the same areas decreased by as many points as
they had increased the previous year.
By the third year (2007/2008), however, the scores again increased by over 10
percentage points in all tested areas (Reading, Math, Science, & Social Studies). Margie
recalled that during her third year, TEA assigned an oversight principal who Margie had
tremendous trust in and from whom she found overwhelming support. The oversight
principal was a well-respected retired principal who had served as a high school
principal in the same district just two years earlier. When Margie was asked if she
developed any systems or processes that helped her manage the school and the redesign
process during the third year, Margie fondly remembered Madison:
That’s where Madison was a huge help to me, because Madison, when I had to
be at meetings with different technical assistance providers, or when I had to be
off campus with any reason, Madison was the presence there and so her task was
to work with, you know there were four instructional coaches, and someone had
to keep a tab on what was happening with instruction in the classroom. So she
worked very closely with the instructional coaches and did a lot of the campus
walks, the classroom presence, and then the feedback to the teachers.
Having Madison ensure the instructional specialist stayed focused on improving
classroom instruction, while Margie was distracted with other administrative duties, was
of tremendous help to improving the academic achievement of the campus.
Case Profile Summary
Margie’s case profile, much like Judy’s case profile, highlighted the numerous
distractions that prevented immediate implementation of improvement programs and
also highlighted the management skills needed of principals to manage various aspects
of duties. More importantly, this case profile painfully highlighted the absence of similar
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skills from central office agents who failed to manage and stay dedicated to a coherent
high school redesign plan. The inability or unwillingness to remain dedicated to a single
redesign plan quickly engendered lack of trust for central office agents and sustained the
culture of mediocrity, if not hopelessness, at East Central High School.
Participant Number Three – Ronald
Ronald is a Mexican American middle-aged male who at the completion of this
study was serving in a school district separate from the district that provided the setting
for this study. Ronald, like Judy and Margie, was in his first assignment as a high school
principal during the time period that encompassed this study.
In June 2006, while serving as a middle school principal in a suburban district,
Ronald applied for and attained the job of high school principal in the central Texas
urban district that was the setting for this study. Central High School, the school that
Ronald was about to become principal of, served a population of approximately 1500
students and had a diverse population (80% Hispanic, 14% African American, and 6%
Anglo American). Although Central High School was not rated as an Academically
Recognized campus, or known for strong academic programs, the school had enjoyed
three years of steady academic growth as measured by the state’s accountability system.
While Central High School was not among the district’s strongest campuses
academically, it distinguished itself as the strongest of all the district’s schools serving
mostly economically disadvantaged students.
When Central High School was built in the late-1950s, it was considered the
district’s flagship school in the southern part of the city. At that time, the school served
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primarily a middle-class population. By the mid-1980s, the city’s economic development
in the northwestern part of the city changed the formerly college students’ apartments
within the school’s attendance zone to low-income housing for low-income families.
Although the city’s economic development had siphoned financial resources from the
school’s attendance zone and encouraged the “White flight” typical of urban
neighborhoods, enough middle-class homes and families remained in the 1980s and
early 1990s to support the school and help redefine its purpose.
It was during the 1980s and early 1990s that Central High School became known
for the various programs offered to the students. Because of the success of the Fine Arts
and athletic programs, the school continued to boast the historic pride that it once
enjoyed as the district’s flagship school in the southern part of the city. Most notable
among the Fine Arts programs was an award-winning marching band and a Mariachi
band that was known throughout the city. In the area of athletics, various school teams
qualified for state playoff competition, thus drawing sustained support from the parents
and booster organizations.
The Career and Technology programs provided a source of pride and active
engagement for the students. Because of community partnerships, Central High School
enjoyed a state of the art Career and Technology wing that included course offerings in
culinary arts, hotel management, and film industry. The students in the culinary arts and
hotel management programs enjoyed internships with five-star hotels in the downtown
area, while the film industry students routinely participated in competitions.
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Although the school’s economically disadvantaged population had grown to
80%, various state and federal grants awarded to the school provided funding for
academic support programs. Grants such as Gear Up and Advancement Via Individual
Determination (AVID) provided funding for additional personnel whose primary focus
was to provide pathways for greater academic achievement. Other grants such as the 21st
Century Grant provided after-school tutoring as well as enrichment activities.
Most notable among these grants was the federal government’s Small Learning
Communities (SLC) grant awarded to the school in 2002. The SLC grant was provided
with the purpose of helping create a small learning environment of no more than 500
students. This smaller learning environment would be able to focus more intensely on
providing a relevant and rigorous curriculum. During the three years prior to Ronald’s
arrival, the school had implemented structures to support the full implementation of
SLC. The three most notable structures implemented under the SLC grant were:
1. Dividing the staff into three distinct smaller learning communities and
providing contiguous classrooms to teachers within each community;
2. Student advisories that provided college and career counseling;
3. Staff development designed to make the lessons more engaging.
By June 2005, the school district had begun talking about developing plans that
would restructure each existing high school. The principal at that time and the
community of Central High School saw the district’s plans as an opportunity to expand
on what was already established under the SLC project. During the 2005/2006 school
year, the school’s administration and teaching staff visited various schools throughout
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the country and attended conferences to learn more about redesigning their high school.
The school staff also worked with the district’s Career and Technology Department to
define career pathways for each Smaller Learning Community. The staff also began
considering alternate scheduling options to provide students with extended time for
learning.
Although all aspects of high school redesign were progressing as planned at the
school, the principal was making plans to resign from the district for personal reasons.
After three years of working diligently to maintain a good academic standing with the
state, managing various grants, overseeing a bond construction project, and skillfully
handling the influx of students from New Orleans, Louisiana, as a result of Hurricane
Katrina, the principal had become exhausted. Moreover, the principal had fought
numerous battles with central office on behalf of the school and felt that those struggles
only created more challenges to his progressive vision for the campus.
The previous principal resigned in May 2006 and Ronald was appointed principal
in June of the same year. During the semi-structured interview, Ronald described his
encounter with the outgoing principal.
We spent a little bit of time talking about what had been done to date and he
shared a binder with me of a significant amount of foundational work that had
been done in determining what the redesign at the high school would look like.
Primarily, it did have some facets like Smaller Learning Communities. For
instance, there was evidence of literacy and advisory work. It seems like those
were the big components that I remember.
Not only was Ronald entering into his new assignment with very limited information
about high school redesign, he was entering the district at a time when the associate
superintendent for high schools was resigning. Ronald remembered that:
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Once I began my work at Central High School, I had an opportunity to visit with
some of the district leadership. It was an interesting time because the associate
superintendent for high schools was outgoing and during that time, there was an
interim and the interim did not really come in on a full-time basis for a period of
a couple of months. During that time, the guidance was provided to me through
the executive director for high school redesign. That was primarily the main
contact that I had.
By July 2006, principals in the district had begun to formulate an opinion as to
the type of high school redesign that would be implemented. The two basic types of
redesign plans that were being implemented in the district included:
1. A plan developed in collaboration with the school community.
2. A model chosen by the school community but created by educational
consultants.
The newly created office of high school redesign favored the implementation of
the model created by educational consultants such as First-Things-First. The choice to
support redesign models created by educational consultants was primarily a financial
decision. The Gates Foundation was providing a $16,000,000 grant to support campus-
wide reform and favored redesign plans that used a model created by educational
consultants. Ronald recalled how he reached his decision to forgo the plans developed
by the previous principal in collaboration with the school community and instead opt for
a model created by educational consultants:
When I visited with district leadership and started talking about what we were
going to do at our high school, and when I considered the work that had been
done, it seemed to me that the wise thing to do politically and professionally and
for the school was to work with the First-Things-First model because it did
several of the things that had been done in the redesign model that had been done
prior to my arrival.
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However, the decision to follow the First-Things-First model for the
implementation of high school redesign was not an entirely popular decision with all of
the community members partly because of the strong advocacy for the other model set
by the previous principal.
They really wanted to do a homegrown initiative. What the selling point was, the
way I pretty much explained it to them, was that the end result, and the goals, and
the outcomes that we were going to achieve are the same as the outcomes that
were expected out of the initial research and design from the school team. We
were going to be in Smaller Learning Communities, we were going to have
advisories, have a literacy initiative, and those were the things that were the
primary components that were done by the school team.
The unpopularity of selecting a model created by educational consultants in place
of the “homegrown initiative” was heightened after the student scores on the state
assessment caused the school to be rated Academically Unacceptable by the Texas
Education Agency (TEA). Unfortunately, this came during Ronald’s first year
(2006/2007) as principal.
Lots of people were complaining about these imposed structures, this, this, and
that. My first year as a principal, academics took a dip. And that was partly
because of my inexperience or not being ready or being distracted by the
redesign. I thought the redesign was pretty distracting. I think there were some
decisions that were made curriculum wise that were not good decisions and
nobody said anything about it.
However, Ronald displayed a good deal of leadership temerity and stayed
committed to his decision to follow the First-Things-First model and believed that the
teacher buy-in, the student achievement, and overall program development eventually
improved as a result of high school redesign. On this point Ronald stated:
So we took a dip academically, and then started to come up very nicely and right
now, and I believe partly because of the redesign but not only because of the
redesign, the school has gotten out of all the “Needs Improvement.” We are the
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highest performing Title I school in the district and they have all their programs
working pretty nicely. Incredible dual credit numbers!
The next section provides the findings discovered during the analysis of the data.
The data analysis is particularly revealing as it relates to the decisions made by Ronald
regarding district-led reform. The findings are separated into categories that emerged
during the analysis of the data: (a) the need to build capacity, (b) the need for focused
leadership, (c) the need for structure, (d) time as a limited resource, and (e) absence of
trust.
To further support an understanding of the positive and negative effects that high
school redesign had on the campus during the high school redesign years (2004-2010), a
data table (Table 5) describing changes in the student achievement is provided. Because
the passing standards changed on the state assessment during the course of high school
redesign, a simple year-to-year passing rate comparison will not adequately describe the
campus progressing or decreasing in their achievement levels. Therefore, the data are
presented in terms of changes in the achievement gaps between the campus achievement
level and that of the state and the campus group.
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Table 5. Changes in Student Achievement Gaps Between Central High School and the
State/Campus Group (2004-2010)
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State -33 -30 -30 -40 -31 -22 -21
Campus Group -11 -6 -5 -13 -8 -1 -9
Source. TEA (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
Focused Instructional Leadership
Although Ronald selected the implementation of the First-Things-First model
and remained committed to district-led reform, he worried that the reform was not
focused on improving the teaching and learning process. This instructional leadership
perspective is evident in the following recollection.
Until we got our legs and our focus around instruction, we were just focused on
the redesign. And I don’t think that is a good thing. Because I think you are
focusing on the structure. You’re focused on the processes. You’re focusing on
“I don’t like that,” or “I do like this,” or “any of that.” And it’s not about what
teachers are there for. Teachers are there for teaching kids and watching kids
grow and learn.
Therefore, if Ronald believed that the recommendations from the central office or parts
of the First-Things-First model appeared counter to the instructional focus the campus
had re-established during his second year, he was quick to remold these into what the
campus staff could internalize. For example:
So we had to take what was going on from technical assistance, from high school
redesign, and make it work for us so that we were able to make our outcomes.
That was the hard thing. How do you say things like “No, we are not doing that,
we believe in it, we will do aspects of it, but we are not going to do it, just the
way you tell us.” And I think that started off really well with the idea that there
were initially four schools that were targeted with this First-Things-First
intervention. And our school and this other school said we were not going to do
this whole model.
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Ronald believed that because of his commitment to district-led reform and the
implementation of the First-Things-First Model, the district did not intervene in the daily
activities or decisions made at his school regarding high school redesign. According to
his logic: “I never got any kind of grief about what we were doing. I think that we
implemented pretty well. The things that we said we were going to do, we did them, and
we did them well.” Ronald also believed that increasing problems at other campuses
kept the central office personnel busy and away from his campus.
Honestly, there were some fires that were really starting to burn in the district.
They took a significant amount of attention from the redesign office and from the
high school office that had to be focused on those other schools. So I think that
what ended up happening was that the squeaky wheel gets the grease. I think that
is how it goes. The thing is that we were okay.
However, Ronald did recall a time when the executive director for high school
redesign tried to intervene in what Ronald and some community members, especially
parents, believed was a school matter. The following paraphrases Ronald’s comments
regarding central office intervention:
The parents were struggling a lot with the fact that the redesign theme was
pushed out politically as giving students a lot of choice. That was probably a bad
move because in reality once the kids made their choice, they had very little
choices after that. It was very structured. There were a lot of meetings about that.
Well, the executive director for high school redesign showed up to school one
day to one of the meetings and he came in to try and help. He did not mean to do
this, but he upset the parents so much that they then liked me because they hated
him.
Although it had been Ronald who ultimately decided that First-Things-First would
provide the guidance of the redesign plan, he was not prepared to hand over the
leadership of the school to First-Things-First. Ronald was especially concerned that the
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First-Things-First model placed too much emphasis into organizing the visible structure
of redesign and not a lot of emphasis on instructional improvement. For example:
The other component of the First-Things-First model was the instructional
improvement piece, and when I looked, I really did not see it. I did not
understand what that meant from their model. What exactly was it? Was it
literacy? What exactly where they going to come in and do with the science
teachers? Were they going to use cooperative learning strategies? Were they
going to help us with data-driven decision-making? It really wasn’t very clear
and I felt it was not wise to hand over the most important part of what the school
is that drives long term sustainable change…what happens in the classroom.
The analysis of the data showed that Ronald believed that in order to provide the
campus with an instructional focus, he should prevent First-Things-First from
implementing aspects of their program that would create distractions to teaching/
learning, staff development, and instructional interventions. As Ronald recalls, the major
aspects of the First-Things-First program were Smaller Learning Communities, Family
Advocacy, and Instructional Leadership. Ronald was clear and upfront in
communicating to the First-Things-First leadership that his campus would not
implement the instructional leadership component of their model. His commitment to
directing instructional leadership at the school is again displayed in the following
statement:
What I was able to negotiate was that we would receive the technical assistance
and follow the technical assistance in the development and implementation of
Smaller Learning Communities. And do the same thing with the Advisories.
However, we would not do anything with them as far as the instructional
improvement piece.
In the end, Ronald agreed to do aspects of their instructional model, but these
aspects where only structural and had very little impact on the teaching and learning
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components that Ronald wanted to develop locally for his teaching staff. Recalling this
decision, Ronald said:
Some aspects of it were like mandatory double blocking of English language arts.
Had to be on a block schedule, those sorts of things that were structural. That’s
no big deal. I mean, the structure is not what is going to make it work….A phrase
I used to say, the structures are necessary, but they are insufficient. You can put
these structures in, but if you don’t do jack with them, nothing is going to
happen. So that is the first kind of line we drew in the sand, and said we are not
going to do that. And we drew some other kinds of lines.
In the area of staff development, Ronald took proactive steps to indirectly inform
the faculty that the instructional leadership of the campus was still a primary function of
the local instructional leadership team and not the First-Things-First consultants. Ronald
rightly knew that establishing instructional leadership autonomy was important because,
“There was a bit of reluctance from the faculty and from the parents quite honestly,
regarding the use of any external providers.” Furthermore, First-Things-First had
become “the bad guy.” As Ronald recalled:
They had a lot of great ideas. A lot of good technical assistance. But what we
ended up doing was making them stay in the background. So if they had any kind
of professional development that we needed to provide, that I thought was
worthy, and again, I had to think that it was worthy, then they would come in and
they would train our folks, and then we would deliver it. We didn’t let them
come and present to us…to the faculty. Because first, I don’t think they were
very good presenters; second, even if they were, people did not like them, they
were not our people.
Another area where Ronald found it necessary to draw the line with the First-
Things-First representatives was in the use of the daily instructional time. The First-
Things-First model heavily emphasized the development of what they called Family
Advocacy. It was expected that through advisory classes, a teacher would build
academically productive relationships with a small group of students. Although Ronald
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believed in the Family Advocacy concept, he worried that the academic time consumed
by the advisory period could be better used in providing remediation time to the most
struggling learners. For example:
The advisory component is very social and emotional learning based and that’s
fantastic. But the advisory structure which was at one time 45 minutes once a
week (now it’s 45 minutes twice a week), was a great time to pull in tenth grade
English Language Learning students and tenth grade bubble kids and do some
focused targeted instruction. I thought we would make state accountability, but
we needed to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) also to get out of this
NCLB stuff....So I remember talking to the First-Things-First people. And you
know, I almost brought one of the ladies to tears because she was upset that we
were using Advisory time that way.
Further analysis of the data indicated that one reason for Ronald’s reluctance to
allow any redesign activity to take precedence over what he and his staff perceived as
core curriculum teaching, learning, and remediation was his consistent concern with
state and federal academic accountability. Ronald’s clear understanding of the nuanced
relationship between instructional leadership and exterior accountability is reflected in
the following comments:
We had the accountability! It wasn’t the high school redesign office that had the
accountability, it wasn’t the high school office that had the accountability, and it
wasn’t First-Things-First that had the accountability. The heads that were going
to roll were going to be our heads, not anybody else’s.
Ronald’s bold, not intoxicating stance on commanding the instructional reins of his
campus was tempered by his awareness of the need to develop the instructional skills of
his staff. The next section describes Ronald’s perception of the instructional deficiencies
among his staff.
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The Need To Build Capacity
High school redesign as implemented at Central High School provided for the
establishment of 5 Smaller Learning Communities (SLC), 5 Family Advocacy groups,
16 Professional Learning Communities (PLC), and an instructional coach in each of the
four content areas. All of these redesign activities required organization for
implementation as well as leadership from teachers and assistant principals. Ronald felt
confident that his administrative team and the protocols required by the First-Things-
First model could provide the organization for these activities. However, the leadership
that would be required to change existing practices and beliefs was nonexistent and as
such would have to be developed.
Because of clear goals set during his first year, Ronald’s administrative team
became accustomed to meeting and working together. However, as Ronald recalled,
“We never got to talk about instruction enough, and the assistant principals needed to
talk about instruction.” The meetings primarily addressed administrative issues and left
very little time for the discussion of instructional issues. To address this issue, Ronald
set two meetings, a Monday morning “administrative cabinet” to talk about
administrative issues and a Friday afternoon meeting to discuss instructional issues. This
clearly delineated focus of the two scheduled meetings set the tone. On this point Ronald
remembered:
We took Mondays and made them administrative cabinet day and all we did was
talk about administration: operational pieces, upcoming calendar events. Nothing
instructional, just about how the school is running….So what we did is Fridays at
2:00 or 3:00 depending on whether we had a pep rally or not, we would have an
instructional leadership team meeting. That meeting had the PLC leaders, the
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instructional coaches, and assistant principals. That whole meeting was dedicated
to instruction.
Beyond allocating sufficient time to discuss instructional issues, Ronald had
become concerned about the productivity of the Smaller Learning Community meetings.
As he understood the problem, assistant principals had a limited understanding of the
instructional concepts they were expected to develop in their teachers. It had become
apparent to Ronald that what he perceived as low levels of student engagement,
curriculum alignment, and academic rigor was perceived as acceptable to some of his
administrators. Ronald described the perceived deficits in the following paragraph:
If I said to the assistant principal, you’re in charge of the SLC, and left it at that,
there was a good chance that what his (assistant principal) expectations of what
that meant, were going to be very different from my expectations.
To address this issue, Ronald and the representatives from First-Things-First
developed what they came to call “calibration walks.” During these walks, Ronald and
an assistant principal visited classrooms within the Smaller Learning Community the
assistant principal was responsible for supervising. The following description
encapsulated the actual process:
Let’s say that one of the assistant principals was in charge of Health Science. So
I went with him and one of the instructional coaches, and we walked through
three or four classrooms real quick. Did our observations; collected our data; and
we came back and started having conversation about what we saw. What was
working? What was not working? What did we need to change? And we started
developing more consistency and had conversations about instruction.
After the visits, Ronald and his assistant principals had conversations to develop
consensus around what evidence of good instruction should exist in each classroom.
Some of the questions used to structure the conversations included:
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1. What’s the level of student engagement?
2. What are the primary learning activities being used?
3. What are the primary learning materials being used?
4. What degree of check for understanding is there?
5. What’s the alignment to the scope and sequence?
6. What’s the alignment from classroom-to-classroom?
7. What’s the alignment to the state standards? What’s the alignment to the high
stakes test?
8. Is it contextually aligned (what we are asking kids to do)?
Ronald stressed that these types of activities helped provide a common direction
in other aspects of the redesign process. Ronald believed that: “For the assistant
principals who streamlined what their work was…and the assistant principals could go
streamline with the teachers and their Professional Learning Community leaders, and
teacher leaders.”
Because the academic achievement of the students at Central High School had
consistently been sufficient enough to qualify the school as Academically Acceptable,
the teachers assumed that the instruction they provided was at least adequate. However,
the reality was that the instruction had been marginal, and the student achievement rates
could quickly slip into levels below Academically Acceptable. Ronald realized that
providing leadership to change existing practices and beliefs would not only require the
development of the assistant principal’s instructional leadership abilities, it would also
require the development of teacher leaders.
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Ronald hoped that the professional development could be provided to the
teachers via the Tuesday and Thursday Smaller Learning Community (SLC) meetings.
However, the First-Things-First model called for teachers (designated as SLC Leaders)
to lead these meetings and Ronald worried that the teachers were not prepared to lead
their own peers. Specifically, Ronald’s concerns were:
These are teachers, they are not trained to facilitate adults, they are not trained to
run meetings; they are trained to teach English or Math or whatever to kids who
are going to do what they say, not to adults who are not going to do what they
say.
This was especially true of teachers who felt their craft was being turned into
routine work with no freedom to create their own lessons. After considering the number
of teacher leaders on campus and the obstacles they had to overcome, Ronald provided
staff development that would help them lead their peers. For example:
I realized at some point that now I had Smaller Learning Community Leaders,
which were teachers. I had Family Advocacy Leaders, which were also teachers.
I had content area level teachers who were leading the Professional Learning
Communities, and I had the instructional coaches. So when I counted them, there
were over 30 teacher leaders, which was pretty good. It just ended up happening
that way….So we started trying to get them a little PD on how you facilitate
groups, because you can’t just say “do it.” So we got some PD through the
technical assistance provider.
Apart from providing professional development designed to facilitate the
numerous redesign and instructional improvement activities, Ronald also determined a
need existed to provide a structured method of coordinating these activities. The next
section describes Ronald’s methods for organizing and bringing structure to the
numerous activities.
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The Need for Structure
Promoting high school redesign to teachers at Central High School was
particularly difficult for three reasons. First, the community had finished considerable
work in developing an initial plan for high school redesign and they were concerned that
their initial work would not be validated. The community’s resistance was described by
Ronald as follows:
Quite honestly, there was some reluctance; people wanted it to be a bottom kind
of thing. I often used the phrase, “As top down as it needs to be and as bottom up
as it can be.” We wanted to give some bottom up, but it was really a top down
initiative.
Second, the magnitude of the activities associated with high school redesign
seemed too constricting for teachers who had come to believe that what they were doing
in the classroom was adequate. On this point, Ronald recalled that:
I can even remember people crying and saying “you’re making me do the same
lesson as somebody else and I am not a robot.” I get that. And some of those
teachers were very good teachers too. Some of them were very creative, and so I
can see that I was putting them in a box and that was difficult for them.
Finally, Ronald himself was not entirely sold on the concept of student advisories
mandated by the district-led reform. Nor was he convinced of the efficacy of the high
school redesign that had been previously developed by the campus team or what was
being promoted by First-Things-First. Ronald explained his position as, “It wasn’t one of
those things that when I walked into the school and I was gun-ho for Smaller Learning
Communities or gun-ho advisories, I wasn’t a champion of that.”
While attempting to reconcile the stakeholders’ differences with the impending
high school redesign, Ronald came to develop a redesign structure that helped organize
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the expression and implementation of what high school redesign would consist.
Accordingly his vision was:
The selling point, the way I pretty much explained it to them, was that the end
result, and the goals, and the outcomes, we were going to achieve are the same as
the outcomes that were expected out of the initial research and design from the
campus team. We were going to be in Smaller Learning Communities, we were
going to have advisories, have a literacy initiative, and those were the things that
were the primary components that were done by the campus team….I realized in
looking at it, that it had its merits and that it could work and like lots of things it
was going to depend on the implementation of it. If we implemented it well, if
we stayed with fidelity, we stayed focused on improving the instructional core of
what we were doing we would be okay. So that’s the way it kept getting sold.
When Ronald was asked to expand on the structure that helped organize every
aspect of the high school redesign, he responded that it was a leadership skill. According
to Ronald, the skill is highlighted by the reality of what comprises part of the work of the
principal. Ronald explained, “There is just a lot coming at you and you have to somehow
make sense of it and organize it before anyone else can make sense of it and organize it.”
Ronald took this opportunity to once again emphasize that the structure of the high
school redesign at his campus served the dual purpose of promoting the high school
redesign as a homegrown process, while simultaneously defining the entire project.
Ronald recalled stating that:
We do three things at our high school. We do Smaller Learning Communities.
We do Family Advocacy, and we do Professional Learning Communities. And
that’s what we do. So if we can do those three things well, kind of like the
hedgehog concept in Good Things to Great, you can’t be good at everything, but
you can be good at these three things.
Ronald explained that every activity the campus engaged in had to fit one of the three
general activities that they had organized redesign around. Furthermore, the emerging
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sub-activities needed to be implemented in a manner that did not frustrate other sub-
activities already being implemented.
Although Ronald was able to articulate how high school redesign should be
organized and implemented, the articulation did not control the pace of the numerous
activities that he perceived the responsibility for managing. The next section describes
the tremendous amount of time required for managing the implementation of high school
redesign, as perceived by Ronald.
Time as a Limited Resource
One of the biggest challenges to developing and sustaining the structures of the
high school redesign was the time that was required for this project. Throughout the two-
hour semi-structured interviews and subsequent conversations, Ronald provided insight
into the many activities that were related to the implementation of their redesign plan.
Many hours had to be dedicated to understanding all aspects of the high school redesign,
as well as the implementing and refining the process of redesign.
When Ronald was named principal and was just beginning to understand the
redesign process, the first thing that began to consume his time was trying to understand
what each consultant had contributed to or was attempting to contribute to the redesign
experience. For instance, according to Ronald:
When I looked at was going on in the district, with what seemed to be a vast
amount of work with outside consultants, First-Things-First, as I mentioned….
There was also Educators for Social Responsibility that were in the area. There
was also Institute for Learning out of Pittsburg in the area. I guess, I don’t even
remember, but the folks from Stanford where also in the area doing their work
with high school redesign, and then the Dana Center. It seemed like a lot of folks
where trying to get at collaborating with the district and the high schools. It was
quite a number of folks that were involved….There was also something going on
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in the district with the Parthenon group that was contracted to come in and do
some total quality processes.
Moreover, Ronald understood the tremendous amount of time that implementing
comprehensive high school reform required. The time devoted was one reason that
Ronald opted to go with First-Things-First as a model for the high school redesign. As
Ronald pointed out:
When I looked at the Smaller Learning Communities, it seemed like First-
Things-First had a way of putting the school into Smaller Learning Communities
so that we would not have to figure out what the thematic divisions would be.
We wouldn’t have to do all the research. We wouldn’t have to do all the surveys
for kids, do all the surveys for teachers. We wouldn’t have to figure out how to
do all that. They had that piece….Also, I did not want my teachers figuring out
how to write units, advisory units. I wanted them focusing on teaching their core
content areas effectively. So I’ll just buy these units because I know they are
going to be some people that like it and some people that don’t like it. We will at
least get off the ground. We will have something, and we will not have to mess
with it.
The time required to implement the process for the high school redesign was by
far the most taxing. Throughout the course of the research, Ronald mentioned activities
and meetings that required his participation. Ronald enumerated the structured meetings
expected of him. They included:
1. We had set up a schedule that on Tuesdays and Thursdays the SLC would
meet together.…I would go to the meetings, the assistant principals would go
to the meetings, but it just was not working. And I knew it was not working
and they needed a lot more structure, but I waited for a while.
2. I would meet with the Small Learning Community Leaders every Monday
afternoon.
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3. It was just an administrative cabinet….We took Mondays and made them
administrative cabinet day or time and all we did was talk about
administration.
4. So what we did is Fridays at 2:00 or 3:00 depending on whether we had a pep
rally or not, we would have an instructional leadership team….And then we
would do calibration walkthroughs during that time also.
5. We said that they would come together, those PLCs once every three weeks
for three hours after school….They were not going to have enough time to
finish it because three hours isn’t enough for three weeks, but they were
going to get a start on it….I attended the PLCs, which is another thing…the
administration has to be there.
These numerous activities associated with high school redesign heightened the need for
collaboration within the campus leadership team. The collaboration, however, often
required additional meetings among the staff.
Ronald’s ability to make sense of the redesign activities was seldom, if ever
distracted by what other respondents perceived as distractions from central office.
Although his relationship with central office was not one of mutual support, it was not
defined by conflict. The next section describes the distant, but positive relationship that
Ronald held with the central office organization.
Absence of Trust
Ronald, unlike the other participants, did not dedicate time to discussing the issue
of lack of trust with the central office. On the contrary, Ronald clearly indicated that he
137
did not have any problems with central office. The lack of problems with the central
office is described in the following statement:
I don’t know why, but at our school they really didn’t get in the way very much. I
think they were supportive. I really can’t say that they got in the way at our
school. I think they were really supportive when I asked them and when I didn’t
ask them to come by, they left us alone.
Throughout the entire interview, Ronald only once conveyed dissatisfaction with
central office personnel. Referring to one of the administrators who directly reported to
the executive director for high school redesign, Ronald indicated that:
He had a guy that worked with him who kind of rubbed the people the wrong
way. People didn’t put a lot of value in his expertise because he was young and
did not have a very strong resume. So people didn’t listen too much to that guy
either. So they just kind of stayed away.
The limited distractions, however, did not necessarily translate into direct
positive support from central office. While other participants provided examples of
positive support they received from outside agents, Ronald highlighted occurrences
within the immediate campus that he perceived as encouraging. The next section
describes these occurrences.
Positive Support
Ronald thought that a winning athletic program and strong academic kids
facilitated the implementation of the high school redesign. While describing these two
factors, Ronald chuckled and added that these had nothing to do with redesign itself but
occurred parallel to the implementation. While discussing the athletic programs, Ronald
praised his athletic director as having contributed a great deal to the campus climate.
Specifically Ronald emphasized that:
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High schools have all the extracurricular activities. When the athletic programs
are healthy, and when the fine arts are healthy, and when all the extracurricular
programs are healthy, it just feeds the school. So at the same time that all the
redesign was occurring, we had a really good head football coach and athletic
director come in. He really organized that entire piece, so the athletes who also
coincidentally had to be in one of two SLC, they were all together with the same
teachers and we had a lot of coaches in those classrooms. They were really
making sure everyone was behaving. All the kids were focused, and we started
winning, more teams started winning.
Ronald was also quick to recognize that as the athletic teams experienced success
the parents of the students became more involved within the athletic booster
organizations. The participation in the booster organizations extended into support for
the school programs including the high school redesign. According to Ronald:
More teams started being successful and the boosters started being more
organized. There was a number of things that came together to make the school
have more pride. I don’t really want to say have more pride, but it just started
coming together. The athletics were coming together; the boosters were coming
together, the boosters were more organized, or organized in a different way.
Ronald also mentioned the high school class of 2011. This group came onto the
campus with a lot of students who were academically strong. These strong students had
not become academically strong as a result of the high school redesign but instead
provided an enriched academic face to the redesign process. The impact is explained by
Ronald in the following paragraph:
The class of 2011 came in maybe a year ago or maybe two years ago and all their
heavy hitter kids, all the academically talented kids came in and met with me,
and they said, that we had an athletic face and they wanted it to have an academic
face. I kind of chuckled because I didn’t know we had an athletic face. So I said,
“Tell me more about that?” They really pushed us and we ended up going to, I
believe last year we had two sections of AP Calculus AB, one section of AP
Calculus BC, and one section of AP Statistics which was really good, and they
were all full. One sections of AP Physics B, and one section of Physics C, so we
ended up having 68 pass AP exams last year, which was really good for us.
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The support for redesign that Ronald identified as existing with in his campus
provided validation to what Judy alluded to as a campus being “operational in its most
basic sense.” Ronald’s campus had healthy participation from parents, faculty members
who saw the opportunity to build strong student groups, and most importantly, it had
students who were openly demanding opportunities for increased rigor.
Case Profile Summary
Ronald’s case profile was significant in that it presented a campus whose student
population, while strikingly similar to the other two campuses previously profiled,
appeared to be academically ready and almost demanding of high school redesign
activities. Additionally, the teacher’s ability to instruct, although considered marginal by
Ronald, had enjoyed earning Academically Acceptable state ratings. Finally, the campus
leadership had been consistent and began to develop an appreciation for redesign
activities.
Although Ronald’s dialogue during the interview highlighted similar perceived
distractions and concerns for the immediate success of the campus, he was able to
implement his management and instructional skills without fear or distrust of outside
agents. Furthermore, he was also able to maintain relations with First-Things-First
agents in support of the campus redesign activities.
Participant Number Four – Michael
Michael is a Mexican American middle-aged male who at the completion of this
study was serving as the associate superintendent for high schools in the urban school
district that was the setting for this study. Prior to his appointment as the associate
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superintendent for high schools, Michael served the district as an Executive Principal for
two years and as Director of High School Operations for one year. In these roles Michael
supervised three of the principals who were participants in this study. Before his
promotion to the central office, Michael served four years as principal at an inner city
high school located in the north part of the district. This high school that served as the
setting for this case profile will be referred to as North Side High School.
Prior to working in this central Texas urban district, Michael had served as a high
school social studies teacher for five years, a middle school assistant principal for two
years, a middle school principal for three years, and a high school principal for four
years. The aforementioned experience occurred in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas.
In May 2004, while serving as high school principal in a suburban district located
in the Rio Grande Valley, Michael received a call from the associate superintendent for
high schools asking him if he would be interested in serving as a high school principal in
the central Texas urban district that provided the setting for this study. The associate
superintendent for high schools informed Michael that he was being recruited as part of
an initiative designed to recruit principals with experience leading schools with
predominantly economically disadvantaged students to Academically Recognized status
from the Texas Education Agency (TEA).
Michael accepted the invitation to apply for the job of high school principal and
was appointed the principal of North Side High School. Michael’s new school served a
population of approximately 1600 students. Over a 20-year period, North Side High
School had become absorbed into the inner city circle and ultimately came to serve a
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limited diverse population. Of all the inner city schools in this urban district, North Side
High School was the only school that had a visible Asian American student population.
The Asian American population had decreased from 18% to 3% at North Side High
School by the time of Michael’s appointment as principal. The decrease in the Asian
American population at North Side High School was the latest example of academically
enriched groups moving out of the school’s attendance zone.
North Side High School opened in 1961 with the purpose of serving a middle-
class population that was then expanding to the northern part of the city. However, by
the mid-1980s, the city’s economic development shifted to the northwestern part of the
city creating the need for an additional high school. The new school was built just to the
west of North Side High School and served almost exclusively an upper income Anglo
American neighborhood. The building of the new school caused the school districts’
attendance boundaries to be reconfigured and siphoned many of the economically
advantaged and Anglo American students from North Side High School. By the early
1990s, North Side High School served a quickly diminishing 50% Anglo American
middle-class population and an almost majority of Hispanic, Black, and Asian American
students.
In an attempt to limit the “White flight” typical of suburban neighborhoods,
North Side High School established various Career and Technology programs (CATE)
and included a Head, Hands, Heart, and Health (4-H) program. The development of the
4-H program led to the lease and development of nearby land to facilitate the housing of
various livestock. The large investment into the 4-H program was a direct attempt to
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encourage the Anglo American families, who historically participated heavily in the
county’s 4-H program, to continue enrolling their children in the school.
By 1999 numerous families from an affluent feeder elementary school no longer
wanted their children to attend North Side High School and applied sufficient political
pressure causing the school board and the superintendent to once again reconfigure the
attendance zones. The new attendance zones and the building of an additional school, in
a school district just north of North Side High School, helped to further diminish the
ethnically diverse population. At the time Michael became principal of North Side High
School, the school’s diversity was barely visible: 73% Hispanic, 15% African American,
9% Anglo-American, and 79% economically disadvantaged.
In June 2005, after Michael’s first year as the principal at North Side High
School, the associate superintendent for high schools started talking to Michael and the
other district high school principals about developing plans to restructure their existing
high schools into schools that would more effectively serve and support the academic
development of the district’s most academically underdeveloped student population –
ethnic and economically disadvantaged students. Michael recalled the first discussion he
had with the associate superintendent for high schools that centered on high school
redesign:
She said, “You know, we really need to do something different in our high
schools.” I liked the line of questioning because I realized we weren’t doing
everything we needed to be doing. And it seemed like the way she was bringing
it about, that it was going to be campus based, you know a community-based
plan. You were going to be able to develop a plan with your community, work
with it, and then implement that plan.
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Although at the onset, Michael felt the district-led redesign efforts lacked focus
on achieving academic improvement, his excitement for improving student outcomes
quickly turned into action.
When the associate superintendent for high schools first started down that path of
high school reform, it got a little misdirected for a while. I still remember the
time when she brought over a public relations firm that was going to help rename
the campuses; and it even had the signs up there. They were going to redo the
signage, and do all those things that really didn’t change anything instructionally.
And I think they were kind of going all over the map. But I have to give her
credit. She had the vision to understand that we were not where we needed to be.
I took the message back to our campus and gave it focus. I said “You know what,
let’s grab this, and let’s run with it. Let’s try to develop a plan that we can
implement here.” So we began having meetings.
By May 2006 (the end of Michael’s second year as principal of North Side High
School), the campuses’ instructional leadership teams developed some definite high
school redesign plans and were preparing for full-scale implementation. However,
changes in central office leadership and the availability of $16,000,000 from the Gates
Foundation, had raised doubts as to who was going to lead high school redesign at the
campuses and the direction that high school redesign as a district-led reform would
follow. For example:
At the end of that year when we developed our plan, we quickly realized that
central office had a different plan in mind. A lot of things started to change. First,
the associate superintendent for high schools resigned. Then, we started to
receive the Gates stuff that we were applying for. We were switching at the end
of the year. It just wasn’t going to be a campus-based plan, a home-grown plan,
but it was going to be a plan that was going to be dictated from central office. So
we grappled from the district and the campus asking, “Who was actually going to
lead the redesign effort on your campus? Was it going to be a central office
dictated redesign? Or was it going to be a community-based, campus-based plan
that we would develop to go through?”
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The struggle to determine who was going to lead high school redesign increased
after the district received the Gates grant. This struggle further increased when the
superintendent used some of the Gates grant money to establish an office of high school
redesign. The office of high school redesign was supposed to ensure that a district plan
for high school redesign was implemented. As Michael recalled, the district plan for
redesign had some non-negotiable components:
You were going to have to go into Small Learning Communities. You were
going to have to implement an advisory plan that the students would have to go
through; and you were going to have to somehow mysteriously get your teaching
ratios to a level that you needed to be at. Basically, they wanted us to take every
existing professional staff and put them in some form or fashion into a teaching
staff to really lower the teacher student ratios. In concept, it was a real good idea,
but in practicality it was very difficult idea to do.
Michael could not envision transitioning every profession staff into a classroom and,
therefore, considered reducing class sizes and teacher loads as an unfunded mandate.
To ensure redesign consistency within the district’s five high schools undergoing
redesign and to meet with the Gates grant requirements, the school district encouraged
the district-wide use of a tried and proven redesign model. From the initial stages of the
Gates grant application process, the school district had developed a relationship with the
Institute for Research and Reform in Education (IRRE). Because of this relationship, the
district strongly encouraged the adoption of IRRE’s redesign framework known as First-
Things-First (FTF).
Although Michael believed in high school redesign, he was determined to
implement a high school redesign plan that was developed and driven by the local
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community efforts and not one that was driven by an outside consultant hired by the
district. His determination to lead his own plan is observed in the following statement:
I remember very clearly when they wanted to bring in First-Things-First. They
wanted to bring in First-Things-First, specifically at North East High, at Eastside
High, and at Central High, and then the superintendent wanted me to put it in at
North Side High School. And I said “No. I am not going to put in the First-
Things-First at North Side High School. It is not part of our plan.”
When simple instance to implement FTF did not prevail, the central office staff escalated
their efforts for persuasion by reminding Michael of the financial incentives associated
with implementing FTF. However, Michael remained equally adamant that he would not
coalesce with FTF. Michael clearly recalled:
The superintendent and the executive director for high school redesign were both
very, very adamant that I do this. The superintendent told me, “You’re going to
throw away a couple of million dollars a year because you don’t want to
implement their plan?” And I said, “That’s not what I thought redesign was
about. I thought redesign was about looking at where our problem areas are, and
coming up with a creative way of solving those problems, that it was campus
based.”
While other principals were visiting schools across the country and beginning the
first stages of implementation from what they learned visiting other schools, Michael
and his leadership team remained focus on developing the teachers’ ability to instruct.
So there was a lot of fanfare, a lot of play, a lot of the support from the office of
redesign was going to North East High, East Side High, and Central High as they
were implementing First-Things-First. I know several of my counterparts, my
colleagues, they went to Florida, and they went all over the country. They visited
all these schools all over. We didn’t. North Side High didn’t take a single trip. I
didn’t go, nor did my teachers go anywhere – nowhere.
In the end, Michael was relieved that the superintendent allowed him the
flexibility to implement the redesign plan that had been developed by his campus
leadership team. However, he recalls that because of his unwillingness to implement the
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district-driven model the central office leadership team consistently harassed him. He
also believes that the school’s efforts lacked central office support and money because of
his recalcitrance.
I was lucky that the superintendent gave me the flexibility to not implement the
First-Things-First project. But that was always a constant fight, a constant fight
with the office of redesign when it was created after the grant and with the
superintendent, of not doing our own thing. We were accused of not following
the district curriculum, accused of not following the district protocols, not
following the district because of the way we wanted to do redesign.
Subsequently, we were left out of a lot of money that other campuses were given
but at least we were given the freedom to do things our way. I thought that was
much more important than just getting financial resources and support. So I got
very little support from office of redesign. To implement the North Side High’s
plan, we absolutely didn’t get anything.
To further support an understanding of the positive and negative effects that high
school redesign had on the campus during the high school redesign years (2004-2010), a
data table (Table 6) describing changes in the student achievement is provided. Because
the passing standards changed on the state assessment during the course of high school
redesign, a simple year-to-year passing rate comparison will not adequately describe the
campus progressing or decreasing in their achievement levels. Therefore, the data are
presented in terms of changes in the achievement gaps between the campus achievement
level and that of the state and the campus group.
Table 6. Changes in Student Achievement Gaps Between North Side High School and
the State/Campus Group (2004-2010)
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State -36 -28 -32 -30 -31 -25 -24
Campus Group -12 -3 -8 -3 -6 -6 -8
Source. TEA (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
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Focused Instructional Leadership
During the several years prior to Michael’s arrival, student achievement at North
Side High School declined. The staff attributed the declining student scores on the
state’s mandated assessment to the exodus of the high-achieving students and the influx
of a large at-risk Limited English Proficient (LEP) population. However, Michael knew
that the declining scores could also be attributed to lessons that lacked rigor and lacked
methods for engaging the students. For Michael the solution was clear. Teachers were
either going to improve their instructional delivery methods or they would be coached
into finding another job.
It wasn’t easy. I ended up changing out the staff at North Side High School. By
the end of my second year, we had changed out 65% of the teaching staff, half of
the administrative staff, and half of the counselors were gone. We said to these
teachers, “You know what, you don’t belong here. You are not fitting in to what
we want to do.” So it wasn’t easy. It wasn’t like everyone woke up and said
“This is a great plan.”
The staff that opted to stay and buy into the high school redesign plan that
Michael and his staff promoted were challenged to work harder and longer than what
they worked before. Additionally, they were moving forward without the support from
central office. According to Michael, not only had his staff not participated in the
district’s redesign plan, they also moved forward without the help of the district’s
instructional support staff.
Everyone just stayed out of our way. I got special permission from the chief
academic officer at the time to not follow the district’s curriculum. I had to
present our plan to her curriculum people and explain why I did not want to
follow the district’s Instructional Planning Guides (IPGs) or participate in the
district’s benchmarks. We also did not have to participate in learning walks.
None of that, none of that went through North Side High.
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Michael recalled the tremendous amount of work involved in developing their
own redesign plan, developing their own curriculum, and developing their own
assessments. However, Michael also proudly recalled the feeling of success and the
winning culture that was being developed at North Side High School:
At first it was tough because the teachers are doing the heavy lifting. So at first, it
was like “wow, this is a lot of work.” But then teachers started saying things like,
“wow, we are empowered to create our own curriculum, we are empowered to
create our own assessments.” So they really bought into that and it created this
culture, a little arrogant culture, that we were not going to do what the district
wanted us to do, we were doing our own thing, and as long as we continued to
provide success we were going to be able to do that.
When Michael was asked why he insisted on not following the district’s redesign
process, he responded that the district leadership was overly focused on implementing
visible structures of redesign that would be very difficult to sustain once the Gates grant
was exhausted. More importantly, Michael felt the district’s plan neglected improved
instruction. For instance:
The focus was all on the structures, on the “sexiness” of Small Learning
Communities, advisory programs, and what not. It was all just built on what
provider we could bring in. Well, that money dries up. And when that money
dries up, there is no sustainability for it. There was no discussion of core
instruction. What constitutes rigorous, highly engaging core instruction? And that
was the problem with redesign. There was no talk about what constitutes quality
instruction in the classroom and how do we do that. So I think that is one of the
main problems that they had and data does not move that way.
In summary, Michael believed the district redesign plan only showed an attempt to
improve student outcomes, but was doomed to fall short of actually improving them.
The high school redesign plan that Michael and his leadership team developed
and implemented did have two of the three redesign elements directed by the central
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office. These included providing advisories for students and reducing teacher loads by
double blocking classes.
We did the student advisory program four days a week. We did four days a week
of advisories and we did reduce the teacher load by double blocking in Math and
English Language Arts. We did do that. So we double blocked and every kid was
double blocked in Math and Language Arts. Ninety minutes every single day.
Although Michael did not believe in most aspects of redesign, he did see a benefit in
reducing class sizes and teacher loads.
Michael emphasized that he could only reduce class size by double blocking two
core areas (Math and Reading) and not the four core areas the district initially asked
promoted. Michael extended that even though teachers had more manageable class sizes,
they still needed to improve their ability to create more engaging and rigorous lessons.
The next section discusses the efforts that Michael and his leadership staff employed to
build the instructional capacity on their campus.
The Need To Build Capacity
Throughout the interview, Michael seized every opportunity to emphasize that
what North Side High School’s redesign efforts lacked in flashiness and headline
making news it made up in teacher development and student improvement.
So our big effort was put towards people. I mean, it was really focused on
building teacher capacity, building the capacity at North Side High. It wasn’t
anything fancy, it wasn’t anything sexy. I told the superintendent at the time,
“This isn’t sexy; it isn’t something you can go to the papers and sell. But this is
going to move data.” And that’s what you saw. The results were four years of
sustained growth from our students.
From Michael’s vantage point, much more could be gained by ensuring that all
available resources were directly dedicated to ensuring that the teaching staff improved
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their instructional delivery. To this end, Michael directed his team’s time and effort into
the development of good units and lessons. Michael recalled:
We created our own protocol for developing units and lessons. The process was
something that I and an academy director had created. It’s a classic Backwards
Design model that we used. The Backwards Design model guided the
development of the common assessments, reviewing student work, going through
all instructional components.
Michael’s commitment to developing the instructional capacity necessitated
building similar capacity in his young administrative staff. To facilitate the instructional
development of his assistant principals, Michael restructured the administrative staff
whereby two seasoned assistant principals were elevated to the position of academy
director. The academy directors supervised the instructional development of the assistant
principals as well as the implementation of all instructional improvement efforts in the
classroom. Michael described the focus of the academy directors in the following
statement:
They focused in on instruction. One academy director was put in charge of the
ninth grade and I actually had two assistant principals that reported to her. They
focused on the 9th grade. And then the other academy director was put in charge
of the 10th, 11th, and 12th grade and had two assistant principals report to her as
well. They were completely instructionally focused and made all decisions:
hiring decisions, programmatic changes, curriculum changes, anything that had
to do with instruction had to go through them.
Before elaborating on the instructional duties of each of the academy directors,
Michael explained that “academy director” was a misnomer. As Michael described it
each academy director was actually an academic dean.
We called them academy directors because that was the title that was on the
books. They really were not in charge of an academy. The term is a misnomer
because the office of human resources did not want to reinvent a new position. I
wanted an academic dean, that’s really what I wanted. And so we ended up
151
calling them academy directors. They are still called academy directors to this
day. But they are really academic deans.
Michael emphasized that his academy directors were actually academic deans because
he wanted to emphatically describe their academic focus versus the district’s focus for
developing “academies,” or Smaller Learning Communities, as visible structures of
redesign.
The academy directors ensured that each assistant principal learned to lead the
teaching staff through conversations about instruction. The assistant principals learned
from Michael and the academy directors what a classroom walkthrough should consist
of and how to dialogue with the teacher about what was observed during the classroom
walkthrough. Michael notes that the efforts to develop his administrative team helped
bring about consistency throughout the school.
To help develop the capacity of the teachers, Michael and his staff primarily used
job-embedded staff development. For example, the teachers were led by the academy
directors and assistant principals to identify the students’ curricular needs and then plan
assessment and instruction to support those needs. Therefore, the teachers were
simultaneously being challenged and assisted (according to best practices based on
research) in developing rigorous and engaging lessons as a regular part of their job.
When Michael felt confident that his staff had begun to master the Backwards
Design model, he became open to receiving assistance from the central office.
Specifically, Michael was interested in receiving the type of help that would provide for
the needs of his English Language Learners (ELL). It was during this time that the
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Assistant Superintendent for Instruction introduced Michael to Quality Teaching for
English Learners (QTEL).
Michael was clear with the Assistant Superintendent for Instruction that they
would only receive the type of help that focused on developing the teachers’ capacity to
instruct. Michael and his leadership staff were not interested in working with a vendor
who would seek to impose their system in place of the school’s system. The following
statement describes Michael’s pleasure with their new-found instructional partner
(QTEL).
I sat down with the representative from QTEL and it was all about what we were
doing at North Side High School. It wasn’t about what she was about. It was
about what we were doing in the school. She really wanted to spend a whole day
finding out what we were doing in the school. I saw easily what this could merge
into because it was all about quality teaching. That’s all it was, it was all about
pedagogy, that’s it.
Finally, Michael insisted that any help afforded to North Side High School’s
redesign efforts should be unconditional and not cause the school administration to be
supervised by the office of high school redesign. The following statement summarizes
Michael’s passion for autonomy.
I would accept help from QTEL as long as I maintained control in dealing with
them, and it was not going to be a redesign thing where they (office of high
school redesign) were going to dictate. If I could maintain control, then I would
be willing to negotiate.
Throughout the entire redesign process, Michael remained emphatic about keeping his
distance from the office of high school redesign.
Michael maintained a similar stance regarding the structure that should be
provided for the management of the improvement activities at his campus. The next
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section describes Michael’s perceptions about the need to provide structure to the
redesign activities.
The Need for Structure
Organizing the redesign process for North Side High School was a task that
Michael gave special attention to because he understood that the redesign activities his
teachers engaged in would be time intensive and complex. In order to be successful,
Michael would have to eliminate confusion and ensure his teachers sensed a lot of
support from his administrative staff. To eliminate the potential for any confusion,
Michael decided to not use any of the central office’s instructional support staff and
instead directed all aspects of redesign through his campus level administration.
I had six administrators who assisted me. Two of these were the academy
directors and four were assistant principals. We didn’t use any of the district’s
instructional coaches; we didn’t use any of the district protocols. We did
everything ourselves and everything was led by our administrators.
Each academy director supervised two assistant principals. One academy director
was in charge of the freshman class and the other academy director was in charge of the
upperclassman. However, Michael quickly explained that this administrative structure
only defined who directed the administrative services (discipline, special education,
bilingual, etc.) provided to students. The administrative structure did not define or limit
the instructional leadership provided to teachers across grade levels. Michael feels that
the true structure behind high school redesign at North Side High School was the
organization of Professional Learning Communities (PLCs).
We put all our efforts into Professional Learning Communities (PLCs). Each of
the assistant principals was assigned a core content area: Language Arts, Math,
Science, or Social Studies. The assistant principal, under the supervision of the
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academy director, led PLCs comprised of content area teachers. For example, the
assistant principal in charge of the Math Department led the PLCs for Algebra I,
Geometry, and Algebra II. The PLCs were charged with developing the
curriculum, common assessments, and the designing of rigorous and engaging
lessons.
In describing the structure used to manage redesign, Michael remained committed to
organizing all aspects of redesign into instructional organizations that fostered core area
collaboration.
To further emphasize that collaboration among content area teams was the most
important work, Michael implemented a master schedule that provided common
planning time to content area teachers. “Having the teachers who taught the same subject
off during the same planning time was one of the best things we did.”
Similar to other respondents, Michael spent time discussing the vast amounts of
time dedicated to implementing reform. The next section describes the time-consuming
activities that engaged the North Side High School faculty.
Time as a Limited Resource
According to Michael, “the first year of high school redesign at North Side High
School was by far the most time intensive.” Redesigning the organizational structure
took time and consideration. However, according to Michael, these structures were still
“just visible structures of high school redesign. The real work was redesigning the
curriculum, assessment, and lessons.” During the interview, Michael recalled the lesson
redesign process in which his teachers were engaged:
First, academy directors, assistant principals, and teachers developed a scope and
sequence based on the state’s student expectations. Of course, we heavily
emphasized the student expectations that we knew would be tested and provided
little time to the student expectations that would not be tested in the state’s
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assessment. Next, we broke down the scope and sequence by units and began to
develop common assessments for these units. We had launched common
assessments across the board. The expectation for rigorous learning was defined
by the rigorous questions we developed. Finally, once we knew exactly what we
wanted the students to learn we began to develop the engaging lessons. This was
a lot of work.
During the first year of high school redesign, teachers were barely able to develop
assessments and engaging lessons one or two weeks ahead of the scope and sequence
they themselves had developed.
After the first year, time during the PLCs meetings was mainly dedicated to
reviewing the data from the common assessments, improving the richness of the lessons,
and moving the most difficult student expectations into the established units. Although
Michael was proud when he recalled, “Having the teachers who taught the same subject
off during the same planning time was one of the best things we did,” he admitted that
the common planning time was not “enough time to get everything done.”
To alleviate the anxiety and frustration teachers were beginning to feel, Michael
provided teachers with one planning day per month. It was during this time of the
interview that Michael recalled having to use different funding sources to pay for the
substitutes that covered the teachers’ classrooms during the planning days.
We paid for the subs with different monies we had coming to us. There was
nothing we got paid from the office of high school redesign. It was all done using
Title money. We got some other school improvement money that we were able to
use, and we got High School Allotment money.
When Michael explained that his teachers did not receive any “extra duty”
compensation for the redesign work they were completing, he was asked how he kept his
teachers engaged and motivated. Michael astutely responded:
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You know, what actually was nice and reassuring was that the teaching staff
viewed and commented on all this work as, “We are forging our own way, and
we are creating our own stuff.” So the buy-in was tremendous.
The level of collaboration enjoyed at North Side High School facilitated the autonomous
implementation of high school redesign.
Unfortunately, the trust enjoyed by Michael and his teaching staff was not
experienced between Michael and outside agents, especially central office. The
following section describes Michael’s lack of trust for central office.
Absence of Trust
Michael dedicated some time to discussing lack of trust with the central office
leadership. First, his distrust focused around the actions of the office of high school
redesign. When Michael asked about his skepticism with the newly created office of
high school redesign, he explained:
The autonomy of high school redesign rested with the redesign office. And that
was one of the other problems. In retrospect, looking back, the high school
redesign office, which was in charge of the money, not just in charge of the Gates
money, the $16,000,000; they were in charge of the $6 or $8,000,000 of high
school allotment money as well. That all rested there. And that office did not
report to the associate superintendent for high schools, that office reported
directly to the superintendent.
Michael extended that the unchecked and largely unbalanced power of the office of high
school redesign created bureaucracies that absorbed power and did little to affect campus
improvements.
So because they held the money, the principals felt they were pulled, like you
had two bosses. You had your boss that supervised you, the associate
superintendent for high schools, but he had no money because all the money
rested with the office of high school redesign. If you were good with them, then
you were going to get whatever program or money you needed. So, it was the
whole “kiss the ring” philosophy. Whoever had the ring, you were going to kiss
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the ring and get the resources. So that office ended up building. They went from
a two office shop where they had two little cubicles to an entire decked out
building. They wanted for nothing. I think they got up to 12 staff members.
Next, Michael expressed his distrust of central office by presenting his
knowledge of the historical mistakes central office had made when they attempted to
provide leadership to campus reform efforts. In particular, Michael recalled the influence
of central office over the repeatedly failed reform efforts at East Central High School.
If you go back and look in historical data that we have on them during that first
year, I think they had at one time, only one African American kid passed Math
for the entire year. So it was bad, it was really, really bad. At this time is when
office of redesign started to be created. Redesign now says “We want to own this
school to do this.” So, at that point the principal, Margie, is caught in crossfire.
Her supervisor, who created this school with her, is gone and she is trying to
implement to the best of her ability what she believed the core mission of the
school was. Redesign is pressing on her, why don’t we get FTF in here? She is
losing the support of the superintendent. Office of redesign wants to redesign the
school under their control. They don’t agree with the way she has her school set
up. So now, she is fighting at all fronts, and she is fighting the data situation.
Michael’s independent account of the failed redesign efforts at East Central High School
were validated by Margie’s own account. Additionally, the knowledge of these central
office interventions contributed to his lack of trust for central office.
Finally, his actions throughout the redesign process clearly indicated that he did
not trust the direction of the district-led redesign. When he was asked why he disagreed
with and opted to not follow the district’s redesign process, Michael provided the
following response.
I think that we as a district tried to redesign in isolation. You can’t change the
high school without changing the vertical team. Your data will be very short
lived. You can do some painting of the school, you can tweak it a little bit, but if
you want it long term, you need to do it vertically, elementary, middle school, all
the way to high school. We never engaged in those conversations when we were
going down this path. It was all a high school thing. And then we didn’t engage
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our communities, we engaged our teaching staff, but we didn’t engage our
communities as much.
Michael’s sentiments about central office consistently emphasized his perception that
central office merely directed reform efforts for the sake of appearances rather than for
the sake of effecting true change.
Michael’s absence of trust for outside agents, especially central office, was in
part due to the absence of support provided to Michael’s independent ideas for redesign.
In this final section, Michael’s perceptions are described.
Positive Support
Michael consistently pointed out that central office did not provide any type of
support, including financial support, during the redesign process. However, he later
acknowledged that the greatest support provided by the superintendent and the associate
superintendent for high schools was that they gave him the freedom to implement his
own plan.
Case Profile Summary
Michael’s case profile depicts a principal who viewed district-initiated reform as
an opportunity to affect locally developed instructional improvements. Although the
reform was originally initiated by the district’s central office, with some district-driven
parameters, Michael took decisive steps to ensure that the reform framework at North
Side High School was defined through a campus process.
The district’s leadership consistently encouraged a redesign model that
incorporated the use of a proven framework for redesign, such as First-Things-First.
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Michael, however, shirked the district guidance and opted for a redesign framework that
centered primarily on instruction. To this end, Michael organized his administrative and
instructional personnel in a manner conducive to collaboration and used his master
schedule to structure all reform activities around professional learning communities.
Michael’s bold stance on defending the campus autonomy disqualified North
Side High School from the financial support given to other campuses that incorporated
tenets of the districts reform agenda. However, Michael emphatically insisted that his
campus-implemented improvements could be sustained long after the existence of the
grant money.
Participant Number Five - Malcolm
Malcolm is a middle-aged African American male. During the time frame that
this study encompassed, he was in his last six years as an in-service principal. Prior to
his assignment as principal of Eastside High School (the setting for this case profile),
Malcolm possessed 14 years of combined administrative experience. Malcolm served
two years as an elementary school assistant principal, four years as an elementary
principal, three years as a middle school principal, and five years as a high school
principal. All of Malcolm’s administrative experience occurred within the district that
was the setting for this study.
In April 2004 as Malcolm was completing his fifth year as principal of North
Side High School, the associate superintendent for high schools informed him that the
school district was organizing a “Blueprint Program.” According to the information
given to Malcolm, North Central High School and Eastside High School would be
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provided the autonomy and resources necessary to research and create a learning
environment conducive to successful student achievement. The aforementioned support
would help define the “Blueprint” for academic success to use with students from
poverty at the district. The resources were going to sustain a director who would oversee
both campuses and additional compensation for a principal with a proven track record of
success. The principal chosen would assume the school’s chief leadership role. In the
following quote, Malcolm recalls how he made his decision to apply for the job.
The high school associate superintendent actually encouraged me to go for that
opportunity over there. And then the director, after he was hired, actually called
me and asked me to apply for the job as well. I had been at my previous high
school for five years and it had been kind of my modus operandi to change
schools after four or five years, so I was ready to make a change anyway. I was
under the impression that going under the guise of the Blueprint initiative that I
would be given more autonomy.
Eastside High School, where Malcolm began his final assignment as a high
school principal, served two very distinct student groups. First, Eastside High School
served the neighborhood students who were predominantly children of color and mostly
economically disadvantaged. Second, Eastside High School housed the district’s
Language Arts and Science Academy (LASA) that served students who primarily lived
outside of the school’s immediate attendance zone. These students were primarily White
with adequate financial resources. The neighborhood student population at Eastside High
was approximately 49% African American, 49% Hispanic, 2% White, and 80%
economically disadvantaged overall. The student population at the Language Arts and
Science Academy was approximately 6% African American, 22% Hispanic, 57% White,
15% Asian, and 22% economically disadvantaged overall.
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The dual track system at Eastside High School was a result of the community’s
efforts to fight the “White flight” syndrome experienced by most large city expanding
communities. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Eastside High School, much like the
other high schools in the school district, enjoyed a well-balanced student population.
However, as the city was developing to the northwest side of town, many of the
neighborhood residents with financial resources fled to the newer residential
developments.
During the late 1970s, a group of businessmen known as the International
Business Machine (IBM) collaborated with the Chamber of Commerce and a few
prominent businesses to urge the school district to create a science magnet school at
Eastside High School and a Liberal Arts Academy at East Central High School. In 1985
the Science Magnet was established at Eastside High School and in 1989 the school
district created the Liberal Arts Academy at East Central High School. After a few years
of independent coexistence (mainly because the Science Magnet and the Liberal Arts
Academy were within five miles of each other), the school district suggested that both
magnets merge at one campus. The district’s recommendation to merge the units
coincided with the East Central High School principal’s wishes to oust the Liberal Arts
Academy from his campus. Therefore, in 2002 it was decided that the two academies
merge under the name of Liberal Arts and Science Academy (LASA) and be housed at
Eastside High School.
Malcolm arrived at Eastside High School in June 2004 and immediately began
reviewing the preliminary reports completed by the Southern Regional Education Board
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(SREB). According to Malcolm’s review, the reports indicated that a huge disparity
existed between the services afforded to the students who attended the magnet school
and the neighborhood students in general. According to Malcolm:
I called it a Tale of Two Cities because the magnet program that served upper
and middle class families, mostly White, had a plethora of elective courses. And
it appeared that any kid on that campus could have access to these great magnet
elective courses, and such, and these allegedly outstanding pre-AP and AP
programs. From the outside looking in, it appeared that Eastside High School
was a fully integrated school; about a third African American; about a third
Latino; and about a third White. But upon closer inspection I found that one non-
magnet student had attempted an AP course and just fewer than 400 magnet
students were taking those opportunities.
Although Malcolm was dumbfounded by the limited opportunities afforded to
the neighborhood students, he was also well aware of the co-dependency that existed
between the magnet and neighborhood factions at Eastside High School. First, the scores
on the mandated state assessment, reported as a whole, allowed the school to
consistently be rated as Academically Acceptable by the state’s accountability system.
Many feared that without the high rate of passing scores from the magnet students,
Eastside High School would have consistently received the Academically Unacceptable
rating that neighboring East Central High School and North Central High School had
received for consecutive years. In addition, Eastside High School enjoyed the largest and
most celebrated band program in the central Texas area. The band program was one of
the few fully integrated programs at Eastside High School. However, the band program
depended on participation from both the magnet students and the neighborhood students.
Finally, there was a financial dependency. The magnet school had benefited from federal
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funds (Title I) provided to Eastside High School. Malcolm summarized the magnet
school’s financial dependency on Eastside High School in the following quote:
The magnet school was a school that on its own would not qualify for Title I
federal funds. I think the percentage of economically disadvantaged students that
attended the magnet, if I recall, was 22%. Eastside High School was 80%
economically disadvantaged. Together, we were right at about 50% economically
disadvantaged.
The combined high percentage of low-income students qualified the school as a Title I
campus and, thereby, qualified them for Title I financial support.
During the 2004/2005 school year, Malcolm worked with his new supervisor (the
Blueprint Director), the associate superintendent for high schools, and the Liberal Arts
and Science Academy Director to begin addressing discrepancies outlined in the SREB
report. Malcolm was excited about the opportunity to work directly with his new
supervisor and particularly proud of the increased enrollment in the Advanced Placement
courses by the neighborhood students. On these two points, Malcolm recalled the
following:
The high school associate superintendent was not our supervisor anymore. When
I was hired as principal, the magnet school program also received a magnet
school director. For the first time in history, the magnet school director did not
report to the school principal; instead he reported to the Blueprint Director.
However, in reality, he would attend all of the magnet parent meetings and take
care of that side of the house, and then report to me in the cabinet meetings
which had all of the administrators and counselors. We held that on a weekly
basis. It was a great set up.
The administrative structure that Eastside High School was operating under was
conducive to the operational autonomy that Malcolm had envisioned.
However, as the 2005/2006 school year was getting underway, the Blueprint
Director submitted his resignation to accept a promotion in another school district. Upon
164
his resignation, the superintendent made the decision to once again place Eastside High
School and North Central High School under the direction of the associate
superintendent for high schools. Although Malcolm had previously been placed under
the direct supervision of the Blueprint Director, he and the principal at East Central High
School had continued to participate in all of the activities directed by the associate
superintendent for high schools. These activities included the monthly meetings and the
summer staff development provided to the other high school principals. During the
summer staff development held in June 2005, the associate superintendent for high
schools started talking to the high school principals about developing plans to restructure
their existing high schools into schools that would more aggressively address the
deficiencies outlined in the SREB report.
In order to further engage the principals in the redesign process, the central office
arranged for all 11 high school principals to attend the School Redesign Network’s
(SRN) Summer Institute at Stanford University. During the weeklong conference, the
principals heard proponents of high school redesign (such as Linda Darling-Hammond)
promote the need to redesign existing large high schools into smaller schools. Malcolm
recalled how he processed his decision to fully implement high school redesign:
I thought that this would be an exciting opportunity at the turn of the millennium,
because I thought this was going to be the future of high schools. And I thought
we should kind of get away from traditional high schools, which in my opinion
had become obsolete.
Malcolm extended that redesign activities should be limited to the non-magnet
component of the school. On this pointed, he stated:
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So when it came to redesign, I thought it was prudent to do redesign. Not
necessarily for the magnet program, but for the non-magnet program to try to
create a situation where no matter what student you were, you were going to have
access to outstanding teachers and outstanding course work.
Malcolm also elaborated on why he thought redesign at Eastside High School
should focus on creating programs for the neighborhood students only and leave the
magnet students out of the redesign equation.
My original plan was to basically leave the magnet alone. Basically for political
reasons – my predecessors became ex-principals trying to mess with that magnet
program. Because of the politics, and really because it was a successful program
in terms of numbers, and course offerings, and such, it was a program to be left
alone. So my strategy was to try to not make their mistakes and try to enhance
the non-magnet situation at the school.
As the 2005/2006 school year started, Malcolm made immediate plans to begin
the process to redesign the school. To help principals develop a full redesign process, the
superintendent had secured the consulting services of the School Redesign Network
(SRN). The SRN consultants encouraged Malcolm to form a redesign committee that
included teachers, parents, and students. Once the committee was formed, the SRN
consultants facilitated a series of visits to various small schools across the country.
Malcolm summarized the trips in the following paragraph:
I remember traveling to different parts of the country (California, Kansas City,
Kansas, New York City) specifically to look at high schools across the country
that had different redesign initiatives. I took a team of 12 people: a couple of
parents, a couple of students, seven staff members, and myself. We went on these
trips. As we went on these trips, we were trying to look at schools that were
similar to our demographics. And the demographics I am speaking to is our non-
magnet demographics.
The central office leadership team was encouraged by Malcolm’s willingness to
engage the redesign process and believed that his leadership style would be a perfect
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component for a partnership with a high school reform consultant. The central office
leadership team was aware that the Gates Foundation, whose money they were hoping to
secure, would fund the implementation of proven redesign plans. Because of this, the
superintendent encouraged Malcolm to consider a high school reform model called First-
Things-First (FTF). The First-Things-First reform model was created by the Institute for
Research and Reform in Education (IRRE).
The superintendent of the school district had a private meeting with me at one of
the high school principals’ meetings and encouraged me strongly, he did not
demand it or make it mandatory, but encouraged me strongly to take a deep look
at an initiative from the Institute of Research and Reform in Education, otherwise
known as FTF or First-Things-First. At the time I said we would take a deep look
at it and give it strong consideration since I felt it was something he really
wanted. And his reasoning was that Gates Foundation always funds FTF. From
that, I gathered that the research on the program was strong, and that the
implementation was strong. FTF had been around for about a decade at that time.
I was left with the impression that this was something that the superintendent
really wanted for Eastside High School.
Although he was skeptical of the superintendent’s suggestion, Malcolm
researched the model and visited schools that had successfully implemented First-
Things-First. Throughout an entire year of studying redesigned schools, Malcolm
continued to be impressed with the results obtained by First-Things-First. Eventually,
Malcolm led his redesign team to select First-Things-First as the redesign model for
Eastside High School. Malcolm remembered:
It just so happened that when we went to these trips to determine what redesign
organization we would work with, the presentations by the Institute of Research
and Reform in Education folks (IRRE), or FTF folks, their presentations were
strong. We went into the schools. It appeared that the school people were really
inspired and encouraged and fully supporting FTF. This was in Kansas City,
Kansas, and Houston that I am talking about….At the end of the process, it was
decided unanimously that FTF was the way we were going to go as a school.
167
The following sections present the findings discovered during the analysis of the
data. The data analysis focused particularly on the decisions made by Malcolm regarding
district-led reform.
To further support an understanding of the positive and negative effects that high
school redesign had on the campus during the high school redesign years (2004-2010), a
data table (Table 7) describing changes in the student achievement is provided. Because
the passing standards changed on the state assessment during the course of high school
redesign, a simple year-to-year passing rate comparison will not adequately describe the
campus progressing or decreasing in their achievement levels. Therefore, the data are
presented in terms of changes in the achievement gaps between the campus achievement
level and that of the state and the campus group.
Table 7. Changes in Student Achievement Gaps Between Eastside Central High School
and the State/Campus Group (2004-2010)
District 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
State * * * * -36 -46 -31
Campus Group * * * * -8 -20 -13
*Indicates data reported was constituted by a different student group.
Source. TEA (2008, 2009, 2010).
Focused Instructional Leadership
Of the five Tier I high school principals who were directed to immediately begin
to develop and implement high school redesign, only Malcolm made an immediate
commitment. Malcolm was embracing a spirit of interdependence with the district
leadership and its systems while the other four Tier I principals were working to assert
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their autonomy. All five principals understood that implementing Smaller Learning
Communities and providing advisories were mandatory. Deciding what model, if any,
would be used for redesign was left to the principal to decide.
Malcolm’s redesign process was not made simpler for having chosen to follow
the district’s plan of implementing redesign through First-Things-First. As Malcolm
recalled, the district leadership and the First-Things-First leadership were attempting to
pursue interdependence not only in an East Central High School to central office
relationship but also interdependence within all five Tier I high schools and the central
office. Having interdependence among high schools was particularly difficult for
Malcolm to embrace because each school had an entirely different situation and engaged
in a separate process to determine the redesign model implemented. Malcolm described
his frustration with the following statements:
Now, we were out in front of the other schools, somehow. And we had to wait
because North Central High School had not decided what they were going to do.
And then at some point, Central High School had somehow become part of the
FTF conversation. But they had not gone through the process that we had gone
through because they were not a Blueprint School. We basically had to wait a
year. At that point, people in the school, in terms of teachers and also people in
the community, were beginning to think aloud, “Oh, this was just another
political scam. We had all this time, we did all this research, we went to all these
places, we made a decision, and now we are being told we can’t do it.”
Malcolm’s primary reason for not wanting to wait for the other campuses to
decide if they were going to follow the First-Things-First model was his eagerness to
provide for his school the continued focus on teaching and learning established during
his first year as principal. The following statement summarized Malcolm’s first year
success stories.
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We had put together some things that the principal would just do to let folks
know that the school was on the right track. Better discipline, the climate was
better. You know, there was a perception. We had put some programs in place.
We had made some agreements with the fire department to have the fire
academy. We had won a grant to get Project Lead the Way…Pre Engineering
specifically for Eastside High School. We had put together a robotics program.
We had put together a science Olympiad. So we had done some things that
people wanted.
To ensure the continued focus on teaching and learning was maintained,
Malcolm decided that East Central High School would follow the entire redesign plans
of First-Things-First including the plans for instructional leadership and staff
development. His decision, although consistent with the wishes of the superintendent,
did not guarantee coordination with the other central office personnel. As Malcolm
recalled:
At Eastside High School, we went totally FTF for a period of two years,
including professional development training. Sometimes that would get me in
trouble with the high school associate superintendent. However, my retort was
always, “Look, we signed a contract with these people and said we were going to
do it, so we are going to do it.” So that caused more frustration because then I
had, for example, the district Director of Social Studies and the Director of Math,
constantly calling me to tell me that my math teachers were not at these required
district trainings. So for those two years, I just held my ground and said we were
going to do this FTF stuff.
The First-Things-First model of high school redesign called for the
implementation of a block schedule. The plan further encouraged principals to ensure
that students sat in a Math and Language Arts for 90 daily consecutive minutes. The
block scheduling plan, with double blocking in Math and Language Arts, provided
heavy emphasis in the core instructional areas. However, by design this schedule only
allowed for elective classes to meet every other day. Malcolm again embraced the
components set forth in the First-Things-First model but recalled having to re-align his
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block scheduling implementation plans because of interventions from central office.
Malcolm explained:
We had a very complicated schedule. We had a block schedule but we also had
“skinnies”…we called them, which were really 45-minute classes within the 90
minute block of some of the classes. The principals that were going to go through
this redesign process first, the FTF principals, had to sit down with the Athletic
Director and head football coaches because they didn’t want whatever it was that
we were going to do to interfere with athletics in any sense, shape, or form.
Malcolm perceived the directive to accommodate athletics as a de-emphasis of
teaching and learning and an intrusion on his instructional leadership role. Malcolm
expressed frustration by comparing the setting he found himself in to the setting he
experienced as a teenage athlete in inner city Chicago.
In Texas, it appeared that in order to do redesign, you had to schedule it around
football, which was another level of frustration for me. And I say that because
my personal experience as a college athlete was that the schools in Chicago did
not have an athletic period. We had practices afterschool, and we felt that
athletics was given a little too much priority in scheduling the school and
everything else down here. We came up with a schedule that appeased the high
school coaches because they wanted to see their athletes every day.
The directive to implement high school redesign around athletics, indicated to Malcolm
that the autonomy he had expected was quickly diminishing.
Malcolm soon found that the biggest challenge to redesign was navigating
through the bureaucracies of the central office in order to decide a timeline for redesign
implementation, create a staff development plan conducive to the campus needs, and
setting a class schedule that supported campus needs. Although he expected most of the
challenges he faced, the increased level of frustration with the central office bureaucracy
was unexpected. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the administration of First-
Things-First was complicating the school’s normal bureaucratic challenges with the
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central office. Malcolm shared his perception about the “collaboration” of the
bureaucracies in the following recollection:
The creator and founder of the Institute for Research and Reform in Education
gave us a bombshell. And I am thinking it was a bomb shell to the superintendent,
but I don’t know if they were in on it together. The superintendent comes to me
and says “Malcolm, we have decided that the only way to make this work with
FTF is for us to have separate PEIMS numbers for Eastside and the magnet. We
want you to work with Eastside because you have done this work with FTF.”
At the onset of the process Malcolm made a conscientious decision not to include
the magnet program as part of the redesign. However, through the redesign discussions
held during campus advisory council, which had parents from the community and
parents from the magnet program, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the magnet
community was not pleased with the large amounts of redesign money allocated to
Eastside High School. As Malcolm recalled, the concerns made their way to the
superintendent:
Things were coming to a head and the superintendent really became nervous and
concerned about what was going on. I guess people were coming to him…
unbeknownst to me, or any administrator that I know of in the building…that
board members were getting pressure by the magnet community, that they felt
that we were not paying enough attention to them at the administrative level.
The fact that his two predecessors were removed as principal of Eastside High
School, primarily for not getting along with the magnet side of the school, caused
Malcolm to worry. Additionally, he worried because the current redesign plan was built
on a premise of interdependency between the side of the school that served the
neighborhood community and the magnet side of the school. This interdependency
included the use of common spaces and some course offerings and extended to the
state’s academic accountability system. The following statement described Malcolm’s
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frustrations after witnessing the collaboration of the superintendent and the president of
the Institute for Research and Reform in Education.
So I remember saying, “Look, you have asked me before about this redesign
thing and you have asked me before about options. And I said that the worst
option was for us to split this campus and keep the magnet on this campus. Not
only do I lose students that can test well but I also lose space to really be flexible
in what we want to do in creating this FTF program.” So I felt that was the worst
option. I said “the best option is to keep the school as it is. We are making gains
as a school. We redesign the part that’s broke, the part that has pain. The second
option would be, if there must be a split, that the magnet should go somewhere
else…find its own campus and let this become a comprehensive FTF school.”
By the end of that day’s debate, Malcolm was extremely frustrated and hurt. He did,
however, realize that the decision to split the two schools had been made.
As a career principal, Malcolm felt that his only good option was to publicly
support the superintendent. In the following statement, Malcolm expressed his
acceptance on the reality that surrounded him:
So at this point when the superintendent determines that it’s going to be a split
school, he determines that there is going to be two principals. And again, if I had
been a younger guy, I would have left at this point because I did not believe in
having two captains running the ship. But I wanted to see this redesign thing
through and I didn’t want to run out, because at this point the Blueprint Director
had left already.
Malcolm’s commitment to the community provided him the emotional fortitude needed
to endure what he perceived to be a betrayal from his supervisors.
Because of the increased academic needs of the campus, Malcolm was not able
to dwell upon his soured relationship with central office. Instead, he needed to focus on
developing the instructional capacity of his administrators and teachers. The next section
discusses the capacity building activities as described by Malcolm.
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The Need to Build Capacity
For state accountability purposes, Eastside High School and the magnet campus
were formally reported as two separate campuses during the 2007/2008 school year. The
2007/2008 school year was Malcolm’s fourth year as principal at the school. The larger
district community believed that Eastside High School, without the magnet students,
would not be able to meet the state assessment standards. In the following passage,
Malcolm described the feeling of insecurity that permeated some district circles because
of the aforementioned perspective:
The perception was that because East Central and North Central were multiyear
unacceptable…and we had the same demographics…we were going to be
unacceptable as well. So it was pretty tense that first year because we had lost the
magnet kids, we had lost the magnet scores, and I actually had supervisors
informing me that based on our benchmark data, there was no way our kids were
going to be successful on our TAKS.
However, because of the collaboration and development that Malcolm had seen
among his staff, he believed differently. Although Malcolm worried because the magnet
scores were gone, he felt confident that his students would be successful. Malcolm
noted:
The staff was really coming together as a staff in those smaller learning
communities. They knew who the kids were. Through surveys…we had
gathered…the kids felt connected to the communities. They knew what
communities they were in and who the teachers were in there.
At the end of the school year, the campus was informed that with some
exceptions they had met the state standards and would receive an overall rating of
Academically Acceptable. Although there was reason to celebrate, Malcolm ended the
year on a sour note. Malcolm believed that it had become increasingly clear that what
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mattered most to the central office were the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills
(TAKS) scores and the school rating derived from these scores. It was also becoming
clearer that the TAKS scores would be difficult to maintain. On this point Malcolm
recalled:
Come testing time we all knew what the bottom line was. Regardless of how well
you qualitatively perceived this initiative to be going, you better do this TAKS
thing. Long story short, we did pass the TAKS with some allowances. And then
all of the sudden, I’m a hero again and we are hot. I learned again that it really
didn’t matter what we were trying to do for kids and the community. The bottom
line was the test scores. It was disheartening. I kept this to myself. I didn’t tell the
staff. I didn’t tell the cabinet about it.
One of the first indications that the scores on the state’s assessment would be
difficult to maintain was the weakness in the commitment demonstrated by the faculty.
Although the staff had come together and committed to the structures of redesign, they
were not necessarily committed to providing increased rigor to the students. For
example, Malcolm remembered:
The reality was that our kids did not take benchmarks seriously, probably
because some adults in the building didn’t either. FTF had an English curriculum
that I almost forced people to do. It was just a battle, which made things worse in
the building because I was making teachers do something that we had said we
were going to do, but when it came down to it, all of them didn’t want to do it.
Malcolm had discovered that implementing First-Things-First as a campus structure
would cause a strain in the non-combative relationships he had thus far enjoyed with his
staff.
At the end of the 2008/2009 school year (Malcolm’s fifth year as principal of
Eastside High School), the student scores on the state assessment decreased
dramatically. In an effort to determine causal effects for the school becoming an
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Academically Unacceptable campus, Malcolm began to explore the need to develop his
administrators and teachers.
So scores come back, it was Science and Math the reason we tanked. Politically,
FTF was being blamed from the board level and the central office level. And I
was saying, “No, it was not FTF, it was people in my building, it was me because
I was not more hands on like I had normally been.”
In discussing the shortcomings of his administrative staff, Malcolm shared that
his administrative team lacked experience and the ability to provide instructional
leadership. The following statement described the lack of instructional leadership
provided by Malcolm’s assistant principals.
I had at this point an academic director and four assistant principals. My
academic director that I had hired early on as principal of Eastside High had
taken a job with TEA. I was in the midst of terminating another assistant
principal. My other assistant principal, I promoted to academic director because
he was a great facilities manager, great assistant principal.
What also made the situation at Eastside untenable was Malcolm’s reality. In his
fifth year as principal, the wear and tear of the political battles fought with the central
office had taken their toll on Malcolm’s spirit. According to Malcolm:
By 2009 my energy level was very negative. I was given advice to delegate more
responsibility to my administrative team, since I had extra administrators. I
became involved in a lot of committee meetings again. Basically became more of
a CEO than a principal, took my hand off of the pulse, and believed what people
were telling me in meetings instead of really digging into the data myself.
After reflecting on the reason that Eastside High School failed to sustain even the
minimal required academic growth during the 2008/2009 school year, Malcolm shared
the following analysis:
Test scores come in later. Kids bomb! Kids bomb! I am angry! People are
beginning to blame FTF for this dip in test scores. And it wasn’t FTF. It was the
fact that people were not taking care of their business, including me, in terms of
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looking at data, examining data, making sure teachers were doing what they were
supposed to do. And my fault was that I thought I had people in place who were
taking care of business and the bottom line is that they weren’t.
The objective information which Malcolm thought he was receiving from his
administrative staff had clearly failed to depict the campus’ academic reality.
Malcolm shared that during his previous three assignments as a campus
principal, he self-induced his exit after five years. In the same manner, he initially
planned to only be principal at Eastside High School for five years. However, as
Malcolm recalled, the campuses’ TEA designation as Academically Unacceptable
changed his plans.
That was the year I had planned to leave Eastside High School but personally I
felt that I couldn’t leave because I didn’t want to go out low performing. And I
didn’t want people to blame FTF for that failure because it wasn’t FTF. We did
struggle with some things.
Malcolm’s decision to remain principal at Eastside High School was primarily based on
improving the state’s accountability rating.
Therefore, Malcolm decided to dedicate most of his time and energy to
improving the teachers’ capacity to engage the students in a rigorous curriculum. In
order to address the state of academic affairs at Eastside High School, Malcolm
organized a Science and Math Instructional Improvement Plan that included the direct
help of FTF and the central office. Because of the three-year relationship, Malcolm had
already established the cooperation of First-Things-First. The incorporation of the
central office personnel into the improvement plan was facilitated by a central office
administrator named Michael. Michael had previously earned the job as principal at
Malcolm’s earlier campus (North Side High School) and was now an Executive
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Principal. In his current position, Michael was responsible for supporting principals and
established a record of success as an Executive Principal at North Central High School.
Malcolm summarized the Science and Math Instructional Improvement Plan
development with Michael in the following statement.
Michael was willing to come in and help. I give him credit for that. He wanted to
take over the Science. I gave him the academic director, and I took the FTF
people. We got a Math specialist that I paired with my Math Department Chair. I
took her out of the classroom, I didn’t have her teaching.
After recruiting the needed personnel, Malcolm was able to move forward with the
implementation of his Math and Science Instructional Improvement Plan.
The first part of the plan consisted of providing staff development to the math
and science teachers. From the onset of the Science and Math Instructional Improvement
Plan, Malcolm noticed resistance from some of the teachers. This resistance was
disappointing and eventually resulted in severing contractual agreements between those
teachers and the district.
I brought my science and math teachers back for two weeks in the summer,
which they didn’t like, which really angered me at that because I felt they
weren’t really soldiers. They were not in it for the right reasons. I felt we were in
a desperate situation and we had to do something extra to get out of that
situation. And some attitudes…a few attitudes disappointed me. Long story short,
teachers were gone by Christmas: about half of my Math teachers and three of
my Science teachers.
The severing of contractual agreements with some of the Math and Science teachers
provided Malcolm the opportunity to hire teachers who were willing to implement the
improvement plans as designed.
The implementation of the Science and Math Instructional Improvement Plan
consisted of providing teachers an almost scripted curriculum in math and science.
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Throughout a job-embedded staff development model, the teachers were learning how to
be more engaging and more rigorous in what they expected from their students. In
discussing the math component of the improvement plan, Malcolm recalled:
This is where life became less fun because I knew that a prescriptive program
would be frowned upon by the teachers and the students. We put in position a
thematic Math curriculum that was based on total mastery and the impossibility
to fail. The Math person from FTF helped us rewrite the curriculum and helped
us learn how to study the objectives.
The Science Improvement Plan was developed by Michael who put together a
Backwards Design Model that he had used at North Side and North Central High School.
The collaboration between the principal, the personnel from First-Things-First, and the
central office personnel (coupled with the teachers’ efforts) resulted in dramatic
increases in student achievement scores. At the end of the 2009/2010 school year,
Malcolm’s sixth and final year as principal, the student scores on the state assessment
led to a TEA designation of Academically Acceptable. Malcolm proudly recalled that
achievement:
I basically became a principal again. I wasn’t the middle manager. I did what we
thought was best for kids. It wasn’t what was best for the adults in the building.
So even though the kids complained all year about not being able to move on,
unless they mastered something, by the end of the year with the help of FTF and
the high school office on the science side, test scores jumped up, flew up by
miraculous numbers.
The gains that were accomplished during the redesign phase were direct results
of the collaboration between all stakeholders. However, these improvements mainly
occurred during the final year of Malcolm’s tenure. Analysis of the data indicates that
the earlier years of Malcolm’s tenure where primarily dedicated to building systems that
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would sustain the developed high school redesign framework. The following section
describes the importance that Malcolm placed on these structures.
The Need for Structure
As an experienced principal, Malcolm felt confident in his ability to manage a
campus and was not overly concerned with campus management structures such as
operations, budget, safety and security. Instead, Malcolm thought mostly about the
tremendous amount of time and effort dedicated to high school redesign and worried that
without establishing related structures, all the redesign practices would be discarded
after his departure. For example:
Because of my experience…having principaled multiple campuses…I felt that
the school needed a system in place upon my leaving Eastside High School.
Because this would have been my third year, and I only like to work five years in
a joint, I wanted a system in place because at that time I was pretty hot as a
principal. I was getting job offers in other parts of the state and parts of the
country and I wasn’t sure how long I was going to stay at Eastside High School. I
wanted a system in place that no matter who the principal was it was a system
that the adults had bought into and it was going to be able to go on for a number
of years after my departure.
With establishing structures to sustain redesign in mind, Malcolm moved to implement a
redesign program that would ensure longevity of the redesign practices.
First-Things-First provided the structures that Malcolm was seeking in a redesign
program. He recalled the structure and process that First-Things-First provided to the
development and implementation of their redesign process:
The process of naming the Smaller Learning Communities…having the students
rank which ones they wanted to go to…and having the teachers decide which
ones they were going to belong to was great. Then the process of actually
reconfiguring the building so that the SLCs were contiguous to each other really
brought the energy of the building to a positive strong energy. People were
saying things like “Okay, this is really going to happen.” Energy soared!
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Malcolm also appreciated the ongoing support provided by First-Things-First
representatives to the Small Learning Community Directors. In his opinion, the
continued presence of the First-Things-First representatives ensured that the campus
developed all redesign practices in a manner conducive to establishing longevity.
Time as a Limited Resource
Instead of spending a tremendous amount of time developing a high school
redesign plan, Malcolm and his redesign team dedicated time to researching proven
models of redesign throughout the country. As part of this effort, his redesign team
visited schools in New York City, Kansas City, Boston, and Houston. Malcolm
expressed an affinity to the work that was done in Houston, primarily because he
observed that the student demographics were high at-risk. Malcolm described the time-
intensive process that he and his redesign team invested in selecting a proven model:
We were very impressed with what we saw in Kansas City, but we wanted to see
something that applied in the state of Texas. So that is how we were led to the
school in Houston. It was the only school in Houston doing FTF. The principal
had been there about seven years, and I think he is still there, this is five years
later. So we saw that the climate of the school was excellent, the teaching, the
professional learning communities appeared strong. We went announced one
time and we went unannounced one time. We wanted to make sure we were not
seeing a “dog and pony show.” The second time around, things were going on
just like the first, in terms of people working together, and collaborating, kids
being good kids, and all that sort of thing.
The visit to the Houston area school that was implementing First-Things-First solidified
Malcolm’s decision to move forward with implementing First-Things-First at Eastside
High school.
Malcolm described the process of sharing information with the greater Eastside
High School community.
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The 12 people who went on these trips and me held a series of forums to the
larger community. We gave three forums if I remember correctly. We also gave
presentations to and kept the Campus Advisory Council (CAC) apprised of the
different trips we were going on. We would bring back information on what we
felt and thought.
Throughout the interview process, Malcolm never expressed dissatisfaction or
frustration with the time he and his administrative staff dedicated to selecting and
implementing a redesign plan. However, Malcolm consistently expressed dissatisfaction
at the time required to successfully work through what he perceived as “central office
red tape.” In his opinion, “the district does what central office does; it created even more
bureaucracy. It’s what ultimately happened.”
Malcolm believed that the central office started creating obstacles to redesign
from the very beginning when they “forced Eastside High School to wait for East
Central, North Central, and Central High School to select First-Things-First,” before
allowing them to implement their plans.
The obstacles posed by the central office continued to tax the limited time
because the central office was overly focused on creating different levels of
bureaucracies. Malcolm summarized his frustration when describing the rearranged role
of one of his redesign personnel: the School Improvement Facilitator (SIF).
The SLCs were supposed to be able to create learning environments and
activities. Now, it’s the job of the SIF to look at the guidelines of the money to
see how the money can be used. And if the SIF could document what area that
activity satisfied, we should have been able to go with it. Now, of course, the SIF
would come to me with it. We would have cabinet meetings about it and decide
yeah or nay or go back and modify. But it was supposed to be all about the
campus doing right by its kids. Well, it got to the point that after we would have
that processed, it would still have to go to the high school office to see if it fit
their interpretation of fitting within the rules. And sometimes it did and
sometimes it didn’t. Then we would have to start that same process again.
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Malcolm perceived that the bureaucratic red tape at central office increased during the
high school redesign process and became an impediment to implement change.
The frustration created during the time that Northeast High School had to wait to
implement the First-Things-First model and the perception of increased bureaucracies at
central office combined to increase Malcolm’s distrust for central office. The next
section describes the absence of trust that Malcolm felt for central office.
Absence of Trust
Data analysis revealed that Malcolm had a deep distrust of the central office and
the superintendent’s politics. Beginning with the decision to separate the magnet school
from Eastside High School and culminating with the decision to discontinue the services
of First-Things-First, Malcolm felt the central office as a whole lacked the conviction to
do what was right for kids. Malcolm used a common phrase within the district to
describe the actions by the central office: “central office is more concerned about
appearing to make improvements than actually making the improvements.”
Malcolm expressed concern that the decision to separate the magnet from the
campus was processed in isolation of the campuses leadership and was done primarily
for political reasons. Malcolm further expressed distrust of the central office bureaucracy
as he recalled the power that the office of high school redesign had amassed and the
confusion that it created:
From the principal’s perspective, it was a fight over territory. Roles should have
been clarified from the superintendent to the various offices. That did not
happen, so it became a territorial tug-of-war between the office of the associate
superintendent for high schools and the office of high school redesign. Since the
office of high school redesign had garnered so many staff positions and was in
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charge of a significant amount of funds, much more so than the associate
superintendent, it appeared that they were running the district.
At the end of Malcolm’s tenure as principal of Eastside High School, he felt that
once again that he had reason to distrust the central office. The last unsettling experience
with the central office involved the decision to discontinue the services of First-Things-
First. Malcolm felt that the decision to dismiss First-Things-First as the technical
assistance provider was based on personal choices and not what was best for students.
Malcolm explained that Michael, who was about to be elevated to the position of
associate superintendent for high schools “never gave First-Things-First a chance.”
Malcolm explained that Michael, as principal of North Side High School and as
Executive Principal, favored establishing Professional Learning Communities (PLC)
under the direction of the campus principal. Malcolm further emphasized that Michael
was selectively blaming First-Things-First for the students’ low performance on the state
assessment during the 2008/2009 school year. The following account described
Malcolm’s perception of the politically driven decisions at central office:
So we were able to not be low performing. But even with that, Michael
determined that the contract with FTF was not going to be renewed. Which I was
against but I did not have any more power because I was retiring. FTF was
dumbfounded because they could not understand why they were not being
renewed when they were an integral part of our Math scores being turned around
and the fact that the teachers had really bought into SLCs. So I learned again, that
despite all of one’s best efforts to try to put a system in place, it all depends on
what the leadership wants. Whether the data showed some promise or not, in this
case, it was all based on what somebody wanted to do or did not want to do.
Malcolm believed that despite all of their efforts to try to implement a system, it would
be central office that would once again make decisions in isolation of the primary
stakeholders.
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Finally, Malcolm shared that the only individuals hurt by the rash decisions from
the central office were the students.
In my opinion, we were just experimenting with kids. And the kids that need us
the most are going to be left behind because the kids that don’t need us are going
to learn anyway. The middle class kids and upper class are going to be all right
anyway.
Malcolm rightfully believed that the poor kids who need something sustainable over a
long period of time were the ones who were being manipulated the most.
Throughout the high school redesign process, Malcolm was able to set aside his
frustrations and distrust of central office in order to garner resources for his campus. His
emotional fortitude provided for him and Northeast High School a pathway to the central
office resources when they were most needed. The next section describes the central
office resources that Malcolm was able to make available to his teaching staff during the
school year following the Academically Unacceptable rating by TEA.
Positive Support
Although Malcolm consistently and extensively elaborated on the distrust of the
central office, he also acknowledged that Michael, as an agent of the central office, had
been one of the driving forces that helped North Side High School improve the Science
scores. In this instance, and if only for one school year, the central office and the campus
principal collaborated in a fashion that directly provided for the improved services of the
students.
Michael’s assistance with the development and implementation of the science
portion of the Science and Math Instructional Improvement Plan allowed time for
Malcolm to dedicate himself not only to the math portion of the instructional
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improvement plan but to the overall health of the campus. Although teachers expressed
concern and in some cases outright insubordination when directed to implement the
instructional improvement plans, Malcolm had the support and freedom to address each
situation.
Because of their collaborative efforts and the hard work of the teachers who
chose to remain on staff, the students of Eastside High School enjoyed increased passing
rates in their math and science state assessments. In the area of Math, the Eastside High
School students posted a 22 percentage point increase. In the area of Science, the
students posted a 21 percentage point increase.
It is important to note that the collaboration between Malcolm and Michael, in
this instance, was directly related to improving the instructional process and not
immediately related to sustaining the high school redesign elements. During the time that
Michael was collaborating with Malcolm, the associate superintendent for high schools,
the executive director for high school redesign, as well as the superintendent had retired
from the school district. It should further be noted that Michael had been named the
apparent replacement for the associate superintendent for high schools, and the district
had opted to dissolve the office of high school redesign.
Case Profile Summary
Malcolm’s case profile, unlike the other four profiles, presented a principal who
was willing and able to implement the district-led high school redesign initiatives as
prescribed by the district’s central office. Malcolm extended his cooperation to include
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the selection of a high school redesign consultant preferred and partially selected by the
school district.
The initial cooperation may have resulted in high levels of student engagement
and student achievement and may have potentially arrived at a redesign model to serve
as a guide for other struggling campuses. However, the success was not fully realized
due to unanticipated pitfalls and leadership changes. The unanticipated pitfalls primarily
consisted of an instructional staff who was willing to engage in the structural and
immediately visible aspects of high school redesign, but unwilling to redesign the
instructional process.
The short-lived era of high school redesign at Eastside High School was in part
due to the retirement of Malcolm, as well as the change in leadership at the central
office. The absence of the initiating principal, the superintendent, and even the executive
director for high school redesign made the transition away from high school redesign
more possible.
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CHAPTER V
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS
This chapter reports the themes and findings derived from the analysis of the five
case studies. The discussion supports the emergence of the themes and provides clear
responses to the research questions. After transcribing and conducting an extensive
review of the data through intra-case and cross-case analysis, six themes emerged. The
themes discovered were: (a) focused instructional leadership, (b) the need to build
capacity, (c) the need for structure, (d) time as a limited resource, (e) absence of trust,
and (f) positive support. The careful analysis of the themes provided actionable answers
to the research questions.
Focused Instructional Leadership
Review and analysis of the data showed that each of the five high school
principals observed a correlation between the entity that provided instructional
leadership to the campus and the academic success or failure of the campus. Moreover,
the data indicated that providing focused instructional leadership fell into the following
subcategories: (a) defining effective instructional improvements, (b) protecting
instruction from outside distractions, and (c) asserting territorial control over instruction.
Defining Effective Instructional Improvements
An awareness of the need to provide instructional improvements was consistently
reiterated by all campus principals. Another consistent view among the high school
principals was the awareness of the absence of a defined instructional improvement
process linking all agents (the central office, campus personnel, and private consultants)
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who sought to influence the instructional improvement efforts at the respective high
schools.
The interviews revealed that the principals believed and articulated that
instructional improvements should not simply consist of improving the teaching and
learning process. The principals indicated that the teaching process should be improved
by developing engaging methodologies in order to sustain the students’ attention in
rigorous lessons. Moreover, the principals indicated that the development of engaging
methodologies needed to occur with an infusion of remediation activities to scaffold the
students’ learning to the required content level. However, according to the principals, the
central office and other outside agents were not able to strengthen the teaching and
learning process. Instead, they created confusion by focusing on a multitude of strategies
that included elaborate reports, rewritten redesign plans, nebulous literacy initiatives,
and curriculums that were not aligned with the state’s assessed curriculum.
Protecting Instructional Focus from Outside Distractions
Each of the five participants clearly and consistently emphasized throughout their
interviews they perceived that one of their duties as instructional leader was to protect
the instructional focus on their campus from outside distractions. One of the reoccurring
distractions perceived by the principals consisted of the involvement of central office
personnel whose instructional improvement strategies were not consistent with those
already being developed on the campus.
The principals also perceived as disturbing the imposition of instructional
improvement strategies by the consultants hired by the school district. The instructional
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improvement strategies of the consultants were not consistent with the strategies being
promoted by the campus instructional leadership teams or even other central office
agents. The instructional improvement strategies from the district and the outside
consultants were not necessarily poor strategies. However, the strategies did not have the
same focus and could not possibly synergize the teachers’ efforts. For example, the
district’s instructional improvement agents focused their learning strategies on the
sequence of the instructional program guides (IPGs); the consultants focused their
learning strategies on a selected initiative such as reading; and the campus principals
focused their learning strategies on prioritizing student learning expectations via
backwards design models. What made the process untenable was the fact that all three
strategies occurred simultaneously. Finally, judging by their actions, the principals chose
to serve as protectors of the campuses through their establishment of instructional focus.
The principals preferred to rely on establishing campus-based instructional focus rather
than mediate between their campuses, the central office, and the outside consultants.
Asserting Territorial Control Over Instruction
The principals scrutinized the improvement strategies provided by the school
district and outside consultants to determine several legitimate points. Their scrutiny
sought to determine if the strategies validated localized efforts, focused on
teaching/learning, and provided a clear means to meet the state’s accountability
standards. Data desegregation showed that the principals displayed territorial protection
behaviors as a primary means to protect their teaching staff from outside agents who
routinely frustrated and confused the campus-based efforts. All of the principals
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indicated that they did this because the prepackaged instructional practices promoted by
outside agents omitted the current academic level of students involved and failed to
tailor practices to meet those students’ academic needs. The principals also displayed
territorial protection behaviors as a means to develop teaching capacity on their campus.
All of the principals interviewed felt it was important to provide teachers improved
instructional methodologies and feedback on the implementation of emerging
methodologies. However, according to all of the principals, the redesign consultants
favored the establishment of visible structures of high school redesign at the expense of
methodology improvement and instructional coaching.
Finally, the principals consistently displayed territorial protection behaviors as a
means to ensure that their campuses met the required state accountability measures.
Beyond the implementation of Smaller Learning Communities and advisories the
principals worried that the curriculum being promoted by the redesign consultants over-
emphasized learning that existed outside the state’s mandated curriculum. Because of
this lack of curriculum-assessment alignment, the principals feared that unless the state’s
curriculum was emphasized, students would not develop the skills required to perform
adequately on the state’s mandated assessment.
The Need to Build Capacity
In this study each of the five high school principals revealed an intense
concentration on the professional development needs for their teaching and
administrative staff. After reviewing the data, The Need to Build Capacity was identified
and organized into subcategories. The subcategories are: (a) overwhelming presence of
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underdeveloped teachers, (b) instructional development of assistant principals, and (c)
accepting help from the outside.
Overwhelming Presence of Underdeveloped Teachers
The task of repurposing existing high schools was made acutely difficult partly
because of the overwhelming presence of underdeveloped teachers in the district’s
lowest performing campuses. The overwhelming existence of underdeveloped teachers
was manifested in two ways. The two ways included teachers who were either novice
teachers to the profession or experienced teachers who had erroneously understood their
instructional skills to be adequate. In either case, the teachers had to willingly develop
new instructional skills, while simultaneously developing the academic deficiencies of
their students. The combination of underdeveloped teachers and academically deficient
students created a greater need for high school redesign but simultaneously made the
attainment of redesign goals extremely difficult.
The principals at North Side, North Central, and East Side High School discussed
at length the time engaged in documenting teachers in order to improve or force them
out of teaching assignments. The principal at each high school described various cases
where teachers were terminated, transferred to other campuses as part of the state’s
requirements to reconstitute, or responded to the principal’s encouragement to leave the
profession altogether. The removal of mediocre teachers unfortunately coincided with
the already disproportionate existence of novice teachers. This increased the overall rate
of teacher turnover and the number of teachers with less than five years’ teaching
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experience. Table 8 represents the increased concentration of teachers with one to five
years’ teaching experience over two years of high school redesign implementation.
Table 8. Increased Concentration of Teachers With One to Five Years of Teaching
Experience
District Percentage 2005/2006 Percentage 2007/2008
Central 34.7 33.2
East Central 26.0 46.5
East Side 33.0 39.5
North Central 33.9 41.2
North Side 27.8 41.1
District Total 30.3 31.1
Source. TEA (2006, 2008).
An additional teacher-related obstacle to high school redesign was the high rate
of turnover among teachers in the critical core areas (mainly math and science). The
principals at North Side, North Central, East Central, and Eastside high schools each
indicated that they had reconstituted, terminated, or encouraged to leave the profession
teachers from their math and science department at a rate disproportionate to teachers of
other subjects. The final teacher-related obstacle to high school redesign, particularly for
campuses that had attempted to implement a proven high school reform model, was the
increased need for teacher leaders. According to all of the principals, many of the
teachers were struggling to teach engaging lessons and the few that were not struggling
193
did not necessarily have the adequate skill set to provide instructional leadership to their
peers.
Instructional Development of Assistant Principals
Each of the five Tier I high schools that were directed to implement high school
redesign had two or more assistant principals hired within the redesign period. The new
assistant principals only had teacher experience prior to their elevation to administrative
status. These same new assistant principals were now expected to provide instructional
leadership to teachers in at-risk settings.
The principals provided job-embedded professional development for the assistant
principals. For example, during a training where the teachers were learning how to make
the lessons more engaging and rigorous, the assistant principals were also learning how
to lead the teachers in the same process. Additionally, principals found it necessary to
have extensive dialogue with the assistant principals about instructional leadership. The
discussions usually centered on explaining and modeling what constituted rigorous
engaging instruction. The principals also gave regular examples of the coaching that the
assistant principals should provide for the teachers. Consistent with what occurred
concerning teachers who were unable or unwilling to develop, some underperforming
assistant principals were terminated, transferred to other jobs, and in some cases
marginalized within the organization.
Accepting Assistance from the Outside
The last finding in this subcategory is of particular interest because the principals
had knowingly built barriers to protect against the central office and outside consultants
194
in their role as campus instructional leader. The principals clearly indicated that they did
not accept direction regarding the curriculum, the particular strategies for sequencing the
curriculum into engaging lessons, or instructions regarding how to incorporate strategies
to develop the students’ academic deficiencies. However, it is interesting to note that
each principal felt comfortable and welcomed financial or other assistance from the
central office and/or outside consultants when developing the instructional capability of
their teachers and assistant principals. For example, staff development was welcomed by
principals as long as it consisted of understanding the importance of scaffolding lessons,
developing rigorous engaging lessons, or valuing students. The conditioning of the mind
was also welcomed so as long as it did not specify a particular strategy or program.
Further analysis of the data on this point qualified that the acceptance of help from the
central office and outside consultants was related logically to the principals’ fear of the
campus not meeting the state accountability measures and being deemed as
Academically Unacceptable.
The Need for Structure
The tasks inherent in the principals’ position considerably increased as they
became involved in the redesign process. When the principals reflected upon the
increasing number of tasks associated with redesign, each responded by evaluating the
existence or absence of structures to manage those additional tasks. This theme, The
Need for Structure, is presented in three subcategories: (a) adherence to policy and
procedures, (b) instructional management structures, and (c) visible high school redesign
structures.
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Adherence to Policy and Procedures
The routine organization of the campus was discussed by one participant as the
existence and practice of organizational processes, such as bookkeeping, enrollment
procedures, and student data management. The same principal stated that although she
felt her priority should have been to lead campus-wide reform efforts, the absence of a
structured campus hindered her focus on these efforts. For example, the knowledge of
overdrawn budgets, unsupervised students, graduating students who had not met
graduation requirements, and willfully insubordinate para-professional employees
absorbed that principal’s limited time and energy. Heightening the principal’s level of
concern were potential state and federal audits that would determine mismanagement of
funds and the thwarting of legal guidelines related to student academic requirements.
Discussions with the principal determined that her efforts aimed at establishing more
order and greater discipline at the campus were directly related to her desire to establish
a culture of standards.
Instructional Management Structures
The five principals discussed the need for structure as a means of managing the
large numbers of activities related to high school redesign. The instructional
management structures, if present, assisted the principals in sequencing and managing
high school redesign activities. When the instructional management structures were
nonexistent, the redesign activities led to confusion and eventual failure.
The principal of North Central High School discussed the absence of these
management structures and related that because of the large amounts of money available
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to the campus redesign efforts items were purchased and school trips were held without
regard to any learning or campus reform objective. The principal of East Central High
School elaborated on the topic and added that because of the absence of management
structures she was not able to balance campus improvement efforts that provided for the
immediate and long-term needs of the students. As a result, the campus did not provide
for the immediate learning needs and failed to meet state accountability standards.
The principals of Central, East Side, and North Side high schools described the
management structures they implemented to direct their high school redesign activities.
For these principals, the redesign activities at their campuses had to directly relate to one
of the high school redesign components. If the redesign activities were deemed directly
related to one of these components, they found that the staff would actively participate
and support these activities even if the activity placed the teachers outside of their
comfort zone. On the contrary, any activity that did not relate to a redesign component
was discarded without regard to who was proposing or endorsing the activity.
The principal of North Side High School structured all high school redesign
activities around Professional Learning Communities and did not participate in any
district-led activities for fear of losing focus. The principal of Central High School
developed a redesign structure that helped organize the expression and implementation
of what high school redesign would consist of at his school. All activities related to high
school redesign at Central High School had to relate to Smaller Learning Communities
(SLCs), Family Advocacy, and Professional Learning Communities. At East Side High
School, the principal specifically adopted a proven model and accepted the direction of
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the consultants to ensure that the systems implemented would help sustain the high
school reform during the coming years.
Visible High School Redesign Structures
Although the principals were given the freedom to select if their respective
campuses would implement a proven model for redesign or implement instead a locally
developed plan, each campus had to ensure their models included Smaller Learning
Communities (SLC) and advisories. The implementation of SLC required the
development of instructional themes, managing the student choices for an SLC,
reorganizing the teaching staff into SLCs, and providing contiguous spaces for the SLC
classrooms. Although these reorganizing activities were part of the SLC implementation,
the principals expressed dissatisfaction with the time consumed organizing and
implementing the SLC component of high school redesign. The principals also
expressed concern that the teachers began recognizing the reorganization of the high
school into SLC as the primary component of high school redesign rather than focusing
on the need for the changed instructional behavior necessary for demonstrable and
sustainable student learning improvement.
Time as a Limited Resource
Each of the five high school principals perceived an inability to balance the
allocation of available time between completing daily tasks and the time required to
complete high school redesign tasks. The theme Time as a Limited Resource fell into
three subcategories: (a) coaching time, (b) absence of coordination, and (c) managing
outside assistance.
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Coaching Time
All of the principals believed that improving the teaching and learning process
was the most important component of high school redesign. Because of this belief, a lot
of the staff’s time was dedicated to planning instructional improvements designed to
create more engaging and rigorous lessons. Moreover, the principals perceived that
effective implementation of instructional improvements would only be complete when
teachers were provided adequate feedback. Many assistant principals were not able to
provide adequate feedback to the teachers or deliver immediate instructional leadership.
Therefore, in order to provide for continued instructional improvements, the principals
first had to spend considerable time developing an instructional leadership skill set
within their assistant principal ranks.
Four of the principals discussed the importance of developing within their
assistant principals a consistent method for measuring sound instructional practices. Judy
used in-service and retired principals to coach her assistant principals. She also used the
Executive Principal to help develop her assistant principals’ instructional leadership skill
set. Margie indicated that she spent time developing her assistant principals as well as
facilitating the Oversight Principal’s coaching of her staff. Michael used the academy
directors to train the assistant principals on the backwards design instructional model.
Ronald held meetings specially designed for instructional dialogue and held calibration
walkthroughs to ensure that all assistant principals had a consistent understanding of
instructional standards at the campus.
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Absence of Coordination
Judy, Margie, and Malcolm indicated that implementing high school redesign
was consistently and almost systematically diminished due to the absence of
coordination between the campuses vision of redesign and that of the outside agents
(state, federal, district, and First-Things-First units) who exercised oversight of the
improvement plans. The absence of coordination manifested in two ways. One way was
in the purpose and role of outside agents working to implement concurrent improvement
plans. The second way was the insistence by outside agents regarding the type of
redesign activities that should be implemented.
East Central and North Central high schools were operating under sanctions from
the state and federal government for not meeting accountability standards. Because of
this, each campus was required to develop and implement improvement plans that
addressed campus academic deficiencies as related to each system. Simultaneously, each
campus was required to deal with agents from each governmental agency that had
oversight of the respective improvement plans. In addition to dealing with instructional
agents from the state and federal government, the principal also had to coordinate the
instructional improvement efforts being promoted by district personnel and the First-
Things-First (FTF) personnel hired to implement a proven model for redesign. The
principals agreed that the contributions of each entity had the potential to improve the
academic achievement of the students. The activities of each entity, however, presented
a different approach to improving teaching and learning. Therefore, the activities were
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not able to be simultaneously implemented and only served to further frustrate the
parties involved.
Managing Outside Assistance
Additional delays and frustration occurred because of the disagreements between
the outside agents and the campus leaders regarding the high school redesign activities.
The disagreements between the central office and the campuses centered around the type
of redesign model that should be implemented and the type of activities that would be
approved or disapproved by the combined bureaucracies of the executive director for
high school redesign and First-Things-First. Because the disagreements were occurring
after the redesign process had begun, the terse dialogue combined to delay the
implementation of redesign activities as well and create disjointed redesign efforts. The
principals expressed concern that a lot of time was spent defending the originally
approved campus redesign plans and defending their position on the specific redesign
models chosen for implementation at their campus. In the worst case scenarios, the entire
high school redesign plans changed from one year to the next after extensive work
conducted and resources expended. In other less dramatic scenarios, the improvement
activities at various campuses were altered abruptly. Nevertheless, in all cases, the
capricious changes caused disjointed redesign efforts.
Absence of Trust
Review and analysis of the data revealed that four of the five high school
principals held or developed a deep distrust of the central office. The fifth principal did
not distrust the central office. However, he did not have full confidence in the central
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office’s ability to lead campus reform. As a result of this lack of trust, the principals did
not accept the leadership from the central office during the implementation of high
school redesign. The Absence of Trust theme derives from various factors. The factors
of the theme were divided in three subcategories: (a) perceived prior treatment of
colleagues, (b) bureaucratic tendencies of the central office, and (c) organizational
politics.
Perceived Prior Treatment of Colleagues
Ronald was the one principal who did not express distrust of the central office.
Ronald, however, was a new employee to the school district, while the four other
principals who did express distrust of the central office had been employed with the
school district prior to the inception of high school redesign. These principals had
firsthand knowledge of the district’s immediate and past failures. The past failures of the
central office included repeated failed attempts to reform other schools as well as failed
relationships with prior campus-level colleagues. The failed relationships with prior
campus-level colleagues caused the principals to empathize with their colleagues and
provided cause to perceive the central office as disloyal to dedicated employees.
Although the principals believed that some of these failures could be attributed to a
limited skill set among the central office personnel, most of the principals felt that the
failures were more likely rooted in the inherent bureaucratic tendencies and the political
nature of the central office.
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Bureaucratic Tendencies of the Central Office
According to all of the principals, the bureaucratic tendencies of the central
office perpetuated increased inefficiencies by creating larger self-serving bureaucracies.
Specifically, the principals consistently alluded to the tremendous growth of the office of
high school redesign. According to most accounts, the redesign office grew from an
executive director and a secretary working out of two cubicles to as many as 12
employees taking charge of an entire floor of a building. The expansion of the redesign
office was not limited to personnel. The redesign office also expanded its control over
budgets that were traditionally expected to rest within the purview of the associate
superintendent for high schools. The principals came to distrust a system that expected
them to respond to the disjointed direction they were receiving from the high school
office and the redesign office. Additionally, the principals expressed frustrations
regarding having to deal with an additional and separate management level.
Organizational Politics
The principals felt that the central office was more committed to responding to
political pressure than they were to their employees or to providing for the needs of
students. In expressing this perception, the principals cited personnel appointments that
had more to do with “politics” than with leadership and to the pressures that were
exerted on principals to accept and eventually discard consultants. Four principals
explained that individuals with little to no leadership skills were elevated to positions as
part of a “good old boy” network. These decisions, according to the principals, were
made without regard to the inefficiencies and dysfunction that would eventually be
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caused. Two principals elaborated extensively on this notion and added that these poor
decisions caused frustrations among principals and eventually brought an abrupt ending
to some mid-management careers in the district. The same four principals perceived that
the central office obligated them to participate in certain activities with the sole purpose
of bringing national notoriety to the redesign efforts of the district. According to the
principals, these efforts had little to do with improving the educational progress of the
students at the high schools.
Positive Support
The principals at East Central, East Side, and North Side high schools willingly
accepted support from certain outside agents. The Positive Support theme was derived
from the entrusted confidence the principals placed in individuals who had previously
served as principals and were now ex-principals serving as Executive Principals or
Oversight Principals.
The principals explained that the confidence entrusted to these outside agents
was primarily due to the respect they earned from previous assignments. Michael, the
previous principal at North Side High School, was placed at East Side and North Central
High School as an Executive Principal overseeing the instructional improvement plans.
Madison, a retired high school principal, served as the Oversight Principal at East
Central High School. In three cases, the principals expressed trust for these outside
agents and believed that they were providing significant contributions to the instructional
improvement efforts at the campus.
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The confidence the principals expressed for the aforementioned ex-principals
was attributed to various reasons. First, the ex-principals offered their help
unconditionally in carrying out the improvement plans designed by the campus
principals and never sought to impose their own beliefs, methodologies, or curriculum.
Secondly, the ex-principals continuously reassured the principals that they (the campus
principals) continued to be in-charge of the campus and that their role as Executive or
Oversight Principal was only to support the principal in whatever way the principal
desired. Finally, the ex-principals immersed themselves in the improvement efforts
(spending many hours on the campus) and afforded the principals the time to address
other pressing issues. For all intents and purposes, these ex-principals became an equal,
but complimentary, extension of the principal.
Summary
This chapter presented the findings from the cross-case analysis and provided
detailed descriptions of the emerging themes that organized the study’s findings. In the
humble opinion of this novice researcher, the findings are original and add to the
existing body of knowledge in the fields of educational leadership and organizational
change. The emerging themes included: (a) focused instructional leadership, (b) the need
to build capacity, (c) the need for structure, (d) time as a limited resource, (e) absence of
trust, and (f) positive support.
The analysis of focused instructional leadership relayed the principals’ belief that
in order for instructional leadership and organizational change to be successful, the
initiative should be defined in terms of what the instructional improvements will consist
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of from the beginning. The principals perceived that the instructional staff should be
protected from those individuals who (because of their own agenda) may provide
distractions to the established instructional focus of the campus. The analysis established
that the principals believed that asserting territorial control over instructional
improvements was absolutely necessary.
The principals described the need to build capacity as a necessary antecedent to
successful high school redesign. According to the principals, the overwhelming presence
of novice teachers regenerated itself especially as principals detected a sense of
discomfort among the entrenched experienced teachers. Also necessary was the need to
build capacity among assistant principals. The assistant principals were able to
successfully maneuver through the daily routines of discipline management, bus duty,
and inventories. However, most were limited in their ability to extend the principal’s
instructional leadership. Finally, the principals showed an isolated willingness to accept
help from outside agents in developing the capacity of their teachers and assistant
principals. However, the principals limited the help to developing the skill set of each
and not to accepting a specific instructional strategies or programs.
The principals described two distinct types of needed structures in order to
successfully carry out high school redesign. First, the need for structure was described as
the need to create a culture that was conducive to following policies and procedures. The
structured procedures provided for the safety and security of students, while the
structured policies ensured the campus’ compliance with district policies, state laws, and
federal laws. The second needed structure included a method by which to organize and
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prioritize the overwhelming number of instructional improvements related to high school
redesign. Finally, the principals felt that overemphasis on the visible high school
redesign structures provided minimal impetus toward the students’ academic
achievement and detracted from the urgency to develop instructional improvements.
The principals considered time to be a limited resource and described what they
considered as time well invested and what they considered frustrated time. Time well
invested consisted of coaching time dedicated to the establishment of essential
instructional routines including curriculum alignment and lesson design. Frustrated time
included time dedicated to explaining or defending their instructional programs to the
central office agents who in actuality only sought to impose their own programs.
Frustrated time also included the time dedicated to managing the well-intentioned
outside assistance from consultants that often did not compliment sound existing campus
practices.
The absence of trust consisted of the principals’ preconceived notion that the
central office officials could not be trusted. This notion prevented the principals from
maximizing the benefits of district-led high school reform. The absence of trust was
created by the principals’ perception of the negative treatment some of their colleagues
received from the district. Additionally, the principals perceived that the central office
was more concerned with defending and growing bureaucracies than establishing
efficient procedures conducive to campus success. Finally, the principals did not trust
the politics of the central office, particularly the machinations of the superintendent. The
principals believed that the superintendent and the central office were more apt to make
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decisions that obtained for the central office a self-serving benefit that was not even
remotely related to campus improvements or student learning.
Finally, this study found that the principals understood the need for support
during the high school redesign enterprise. One principal found and was able to
capitalize on internal support, while three others expressed value for the support
provided by certain outside agents when the support providers understood the
established campus instructional norms and acted in such a way as to be nonthreatening
to the principals’ established authority and limited time.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter provides a comprehensive summary and an explanation of the
purpose for the research. By expanding on the researcher’s personal interests and hopes
for improved practices in instructional leadership, a case is made for the urgency of
improved relationships between the central office and the school principal. The last
component of the chapter presents the conclusions reached along with recommendations
for improved practices and future research.
Summary of the Research
The need for educational reform found in the central Texas urban district that
provided the setting for this research project was consistent with the descriptions of
urban educational settings described by Woolworth (2007), Anagnostopoulos and
Rutledge (2007), and Cuban (2010). Similar to the descriptions indicated in the
aforementioned research, this central Texas urban district primarily served low-
performing economically disadvantaged children of color, whose families had been
drawn to these neighborhoods because of affordable housing.
Researchers who have studied reform movements in this type of school setting
have yet to find evidence of a district that has achieved successful and substantial
district-wide reform (Cuban, 2010; Barber & Mourshed, 2007). Researchers who
espouse the same beliefs of Cuban (2010) and Barber and Mourshed (2007) will find
supporting evidence in the lived experiences and particularly the obstacles faced by this
urban district attempting to implement reform. Specifically, research by Nelson et al.
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(2009) indicated that the continual shifting of district priorities, the turnover in
leadership, the inability to collaborate, and fear of reprisals would frustrate the system.
Unfortunately, each of these factors was clearly evident in the themes and findings
derived from this research.
Research by Raynor (2006) indicated that an additional obstacle to implementing
school reform was the unhealthy emphasis on state and federal school accountability
measures. The findings in this research complemented Raynor’s findings by concluding
that principals measured the worth of each of their activities in relation to the effect each
would have on improving student achievement on state-mandated assessments.
Finally, researchers such as Rorrer et al. (2008) and Honig et al. (2010) discussed
practices for improving relationships between central office leadership and campus
leadership. For example, Rorrer et al. (2008) concluded that the district level leadership
should build capacity by coordinating and aligning the work of others through
communication and collaboration. Next, Honig et al. (2010) advised that teaching and
learning were improved when direct, intentional support to the central office (principal
partnerships) was evident. These improved relationships are particularly beneficial when
attempting to implement school reform. However, principals’ perceptions in this study
indicated that the district level leadership did not heed the advice of these researchers.
A summative evaluation of the reform movement in this school district provides
evidence for proponents wishing to advocate for or against the success of district-led
high school reform. Those who are proponents for the successes achieved through high
school redesign in the school district researched can rely on the state assessment results
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and present evidence of increased student achievement over the course of the district-led
high school reform period.
Table 9 describes (by school) the change in the percentage of students who met
the state’s mandated assessment standards between the 2003/2004 school year and the
2009/2010 school year (TEA, 2004, 2010). It should be noted that East Central High
School was divided into two schools after the fourth year of redesign, and as such, is
reported as two separate campuses. It should also be noted that the scores reported for
Eastside High School in 2004 reflect the inclusion of the magnet students. However, the
scores reported in 2010 only include the neighborhood students. Therefore, a true
comparison is not available for Eastside High School.
Table 9. The Change by School in the Percentage of Students Who Met the State’s
Mandated Assessment Standards Between the 2003/2004 School Year and the
2009/2010 School Year
District 2004 2010 Difference
Central 35 56 21
East Central (A) 25 40 15
East Central (B) 25 44 19
Eastside * * *
North Central 27 54 27
North Side 32 53 21
*Data not available.
Source: TEA (2004, 2010).
The proponents who wish to argue against high school redesign can point out that
district-led reform in this school district is little or no different than the limited and
unsustainable success of other reform movements throughout the country. According to
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Michael, who at the conclusion of this study was serving as the associate superintendent
for high schools, by the 2010/2011 school year, very little evidence of the high school
redesign initiatives remained. The six-year high school redesign reform period was
summarized by Michael with this statement:
From my position, it looks like a lot of learned lessons. We blew through sixteen
million dollars! What’s left of redesign? I look back and see that we don’t have
First-Things-First in any of our three schools anymore; that was a high dollar
initiative. We don’t have advisories in every one of our schools, which was
another huge investment. We don’t have SLCs in all of our high schools. I mean
the Office of Redesign doesn’t even exist anymore. Period! I mean, all the people
are gone. So, when you look back and you ask, “What did we really do in
redesign?” I mean, what is different in high schools? You can’t really find a
whole lot of those elements there anymore.
Because of the aforementioned quote, it should be re-emphasized that the
purpose of this research was not to determine if the reform efforts in this district were a
success or a failure. The purpose of this research was to understand the intricacies in the
central office to campus relationship that prevent school districts from sustaining
academic growth and reform. Moreover, this research project was undertaken with the
hope of expanding in a significant way on the research of others who have advocated for
a changed district leadership model. In the next part of the chapter, I have outlined
several conclusions, which if addressed properly, can provide for a significantly
improved campus-central office relationship.
Conclusions
In an effort to explain the conclusions outlined below, I have compared the
organization of school districts I have been part of and have studied to the organization I
experienced as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy. A comparison of these
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organizations has led to an overarching conclusion that “defined autonomy,” as
described by Marzano and Waters (2009), is incomplete. Marzano and Waters explained
that the “superintendent expects building principals and all other administrators in the
district to lead within the boundaries defined by the district goals” (p. 8). However, the
real world organizational realities inherent in large public bureaucracies like school
districts prevent principals from leading within these boundaries.
The U.S. Navy, for example, has an admiral and his/her executive staff who
command a fleet, much like a school district has a superintendent and his/her cabinet
who lead the schools. Each ship in the admiral’s fleet has different capabilities and
seldom operates in close proximity to other ships. Some ships have the capability to
defend themselves against aerial attacks, others have the capability to launch surface-to-
surface strikes, others hunt submarines, and some support the fleet by carrying supplies,
weapons, or spare parts. Support ships, however, do not possess the capability to defend
against a direct attack. Nevertheless, each ship in the fleet exists solely to support the
same mission.
School districts appear to operate within a similar organizational framework. For
example, different schools in the same district seldom serve students with similar
backgrounds and capabilities. The schools are usually located in different
neighborhoods. Some schools serve affluent neighborhoods with students who are able
to meet most academic challenges, while other schools operate as magnet schools
serving students with particular interests such as music or science. Finally, some schools
serve primarily low socio-economic students who are struggling to learn. However, each
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school exists to support the same district’s mission. However, there are structural
differences that affect the autonomy when one more closely compares school districts to
the U.S. Navy.
In the Navy, the captain of each ship is delegated the authority by the admiral to
use his/her personnel in the manner necessary to achieve the fleet’s mission. There is an
understanding that decisions made on the ship will be made independently, but not in
isolation of the fleet’s mission. This philosophy is referred to as command by delegation
and decentralization.
The principal of a campus, much like the captain of a ship, is delegated the
authority to hire personnel, develop a campus improvement plan, and implement
strategies that will ensure the academic success of each student. Schools usually refer to
this practice as site-based decision-making.
Although the U.S. Navy and a school district have similarities in their
organizational framework, each organization has varying degrees of success as measured
against their stated mission. The ability to make decisions that will be carried out is an
immediate difference. The Navy uses phrases such as “command by delegation and
decentralization,” while school districts use phrases like “site-based decision-making.”
Each phrase has a clear, yet different connotation. One can expect that decisions made in
the Navy clearly support the top command’s directives. However, decisions made by a
central office leadership team may not be implemented by campus principals with the
same degree of steadfastness. In fact, the school’s site-based decision culture creates
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room for principals to dilute the impact of decisions made by central office mainly
because of the school’s existence within the surrounding community.
Another difference can be made by comparing the most vulnerable naval ship to
the most vulnerable school in a district. Supply ships enjoy disproportional success
compared to inner city schools because in the Navy, supply ships are not required to
launch the same weaponry as Fast Attack Frigates or Destroyers. Moreover, they are
protected from having to defend against a direct attack by the enemy. In contrast, inner
city schools are required to have their students pass the same state assessments and meet
the same accountability standards as any other school in the system, regardless of their
inherent deficits and structural vulnerability.
Marzano and Waters’ (2009) “defined autonomy” concept is incomplete because
it assumes that the organization of a school system operates much like other more
traditional organizations where directives are followed and goals and missions define
daily operations to a much higher degree. However, in this Navy-to-school organization
comparison, we can determine that while both organizations employ a similar
framework, they operate under different rules of engagement and exist within very
different organizational cultures.
This study has concluded that the district goals and mission do not define the
daily operations of a campus. Because of this, the district goals and mission are often
reprioritized because principals are insecure, believe they have a better understanding of
the local context than does the central office, and are oftentimes frustrated by the central
office’s political machinations. The following section discusses these conclusions.
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First Conclusion – Principal Insecurity
Throughout the interviews and the processing of the data, it became evident that
the principals were consistently concerned with the state academic ratings and as such, a
sense of insecurity was created. This insecurity, caused by the incessant concern over
state ratings, manifested itself as an influence in each of the findings articulated in
Chapter V: (a) focused instructional leadership, (b) the need to build capacity, (c) the
need for structure, and (d) time as a limited resource.
The principals’ insecurity was further exacerbated by the presence of a
combination of a high at-risk student population, inexperienced teachers, and the
prescriptive redesign activities on the campus. Furthermore, the principals felt that the
campus leadership team was the sole owner of the state ratings, especially if the campus
was ultimately rated as Academically Unacceptable (AU).
Every major activity throughout the redesign process that was suggested to the
principals was perceived as an imposition and a distraction that might cause them to lose
ground in meeting the state standards. Whether the activity was implementing an
advisory or providing staff development on reading fluency, the principals always
measured the activity against the immediate outcomes relative to the accountability
systems.
The principals consistently talked about their refusal to give up the reins of
instructional leadership. However, a question that needed to be answered was: “What
exactly is instructional leadership?” Is instructional leadership the curriculum, the
pedagogy, or the ancillary materials? It appears that for the principals, the instructional
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leadership was anything that directly dealt with being able to move the academic
achievement as measured by the state assessments. Therefore, the question: “Will this
practice move data?” was a common one posed by principals when they were asked to
implement a new redesign practice.
When the principals elaborated on the conflicts between them and the outside
agents (the central office and First-Things-First consultants) regarding who was going to
provide the instructional direction of the campus, they consistently clarified that the
activities promoted by First-Things-First or the central office leadership team were not
necessarily unrelated or inadequate ideas. For the most part the principals believed in the
value of the suggested activities. However, they also believed that each of those
activities detracted, rather than supported, the immediate focus of meeting the state
standards.
The amount of time dedicated by the campus staff to implementing high school
redesign was tremendous. The quantified time dedicated to activities such as designing,
balancing, and implementing Smaller Learning Communities would have otherwise been
directed to focusing on meeting state academic standards. However, the principals
perceived that the energy dedicated to these activities created for teachers a purpose
other than improving upon their teaching craft. Incidentally, the teaching skill that the
principals perceived as most important was the teachers’ ability to develop engaging and
rigorous lessons that supported student outcomes within the state-assessed curriculum.
Finally, the principals described a lack of trust toward any outside agents who
sought to mandate campus activities under the label of high school redesign. The lack of
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trust was not founded upon a belief that the central office or First-Things-First personnel
were sure of the inevitable failure of the principals. The lack of trust derived mainly
from the principals’ belief that the central office was detached from any punitive action
related to the state and federal accountability system. Moreover, as it concerns the trust
issue, the principals perceived that outside agents treated their teachers with limited
regard. For example, Margie felt that the First-Things-First consultants did not validate
their teachers’ concerns. Ronald openly stated he did not let them (First-Things-First)
present staff development because the teachers just did not like them.
The principals were convinced that in the event the campus received an AU
rating or failed to meet Adequate Yearly Progress, the shame, responsibility, and burden
of implementing sanctions would only be theirs to carry. The absence of a sense for
shared responsibility served to reinforce the existence of a traditional leadership model
and created a barrier to the development of a single leadership team as described by
Rorrer et al. (2008).
The principals’ insecurity was to some extent a reflection of what the principals
believed to be their reality, as defined by the setting or context. The next section
describes how the principals perceived their local context and specifically how they
described the central office’s disregard for the immediate needs of their local context.
Second Conclusion – The Importance of Context
The importance of context was an awareness found in each of the principals
throughout the review of the data and eventual development of the following themes:
focused instructional leadership; the need to build capacity; the need for structure; and
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absence of trust. The five principals who served as the participants in this study fell into
two broad categories: principals who bought into the district-led redesign process and
those who did not. What was apparent to the researcher was that there were no
immediate commonalities, such as years of experience in administration or years of
experience with the district, between the high school principals who bought into the
district-led redesign process and those who did not. Instead, the acceptance and eventual
implementation was dependent on what Tony Alvarado (as cited in Cuban, 2010),
referred to as the “right combination of situation and individuals” (p.16).
In this case, the “situation” was that which was enjoyed by Michael, Ronald, and
Malcolm. All three principals worked in schools that were stable and were ready to
implement high school redesign. In the case of Central High School and Northside High
School, each school had enjoyed stability in leadership and small but sustained academic
growth over the previous three years. Although there had been changes in leadership, the
changes were not dramatic and for the most part, perceived by the faculty as a natural
occurrence. In the case of Eastside High School, the Liberal Arts and Science Academy
had systematically helped produce an Academically Acceptable rated school. Although
the school had also experienced changes in leadership, the school appeared to be
progressing well.
In terms of individuals, high school reform was found in Ronald, Michael, and
Malcolm, three principals with varying but high degrees of experience. Each considered
themselves as cutting edge company men eager to establish a record of achievement. For
their efforts, each was in some way rewarded. Ronald was given a lateral position at
219
central office, Malcolm received the coveted Principal of the Year award, and Michael
was promoted and eventually named the associate superintendent for high schools.
The broad categorization of principals who did not buy into the district-led
redesign process, when studied closer, also determined that there were no immediate
commonalities within these principals. Instead, the decision to not buy into the district-
led redesign process was more directly linked to a response to the local context. Two
schools (East Central and North Central) simply needed “Intensive Care Unit”
interventions as described by Judy. Each school was plagued with years of not meeting
state and federal accountability standards, consistent turnover in leadership, and a faculty
that lacked a sense of unity and structure.
Although the district did divide the 11 comprehensive high schools into a tier
system and determined that the lowest performing tier would immediately implement
high school reform, the district made this decision solely based on data and in isolation
from the principals. Furthermore, this decision escalated into the district attempting to
impose consultants and implement similar strategies at all five campuses. These
decisions were perceived by the principals as being made with the purpose of increasing
an already large central office bureaucracy without regard to the individual campus
needs, the respective principal’s situation (local context), and the district’s capability to
implement reform. This perception further reinforced the existence of a traditional
leadership model and created a barrier to the development of a single leadership team as
described by Rorrer et al. (2008).
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Beyond the principals’ insecurity and concerns for the immediate needs of their
community, the inconsistency and confusion caused by varying redesign plans further
alienated principals from the central office leadership. The next section describes how
the inconsistencies of the central office confused and frustrated the principals.
Third Conclusion – Inconsistency and Confusion
Throughout the interviews and the processing of the data, it became clear that the
entire high school redesign process was plagued by inconsistencies that increasingly
frustrated the principals and escalated the lack of trust for outside agents. The
inconsistencies and confusion were underscored by apparent shifts in improvement focus
each time the district engaged additional outside agents. This was compounded by a high
turnover in central office leadership positions. The inconsistency and confusion
expressed by the principals was observed in the development of the following themes:
(a) focused instructional leadership, (b) the need for structure, (c) time as a limited
resource, and (d) absence of trust.
The initial discussions for high school reform began during the 2003/2004 school
year when the superintendent announced that the Southern Regional Education Board
(SREB) would conduct audits of the district’s 11 comprehensive high schools. After
reviewing the SREB audit reports, the principals began working with the associate
superintendent for high schools and their local communities to implement the
recommendations noted in the reports. However, as the principal of Northside High
School noted during his interview, the academic reform focus under the leadership of the
associate superintendent began to shift from instructional improvement to a public
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relations focus. By the summer prior to the 2004/2005 school year, the principals were
being led to develop infomercials that promoted their school and to consider ways of
renaming their schools.
During the 2004/2005 school year, the principals were introduced to the School
Redesign Network (SRN) from Stanford University and to the focused concept of high
school redesign. Agents from the SRN initially indicated to the principals and their local
community that they favored a customized high school redesign process, which would
be developed through a research-based approach and would not promote a “one size fits
all” strategy to developing their high school redesign plans.
However, the SRN consultants began to place a large emphasis on the inclusion
of the “ten features of small schools” (Darling-Hammond et al., 2002) into the redesign
plans. The coaching provided by the SRN consultants increasingly focused on Darling-
Hammond’s 10 features of small schools and frustrated the principals who had been
working to implement the recommendations made in the SREB reports.
The confusion among the principals and the community further increased when
they were introduced to agents from the consulting group First-Things-First (FTF). The
agents from First-Things-First were unwilling to deviate from their “canned program”
and clearly promoted a “one size fits all” approach as they attempted to engage multiple
schools in a similar redesign framework.
The confusion resulting from the shifting of improvement plans was made more
difficult to overcome by the turnover among top ranking leaders (principals, central
office staff, and the district’s superintendent) involved in the reform process. Between
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the 2003 and 2009 school years, three of the five high schools involved in this study
(Northside, North Central, and East Central) had three different principals each. The two
other high schools (Central and Eastside) had two different principals each during the
same time frame.
In most cases, the shifting of principals caused a shift and sometimes total
departure from the current redesign plans. In some cases, the district leadership
capitalized on the shifting of principals to facilitate a larger shift in the high school
redesign plans. However, in other cases, the incoming principal encouraged the change
of redesign plans. For example, Judy entirely removed the First-Things-First consulting
group when she arrived at North Central. However, Ronald was highly encouraged by
the office of high school redesign to move from a locally developed redesign plan to a
plan developed by the First-Things-First group. In the most extreme case, East Central
High School was directed by the central office and the office of high school redesign to
shift their redesign plans three different times. Each shift in the high school redesign
plans coincided with the transition to new campus leadership.
Among the central office staff, three different individuals served as the associate
superintendent for high schools and one additional management layer was created – the
office of high school redesign. The newly created office of high school redesign
significantly shifted the authority for high school redesign away from the associate
superintendent for high schools and facilitated other shifts in reform focus. The shifts in
focus included a departure from the SREB recommendations, a complete shift from the
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SRN consultants, and the promotion of the First-Things-First high school redesign
framework.
The retirement of the district’s superintendent and the executive director for high
school redesign signified the “beginning of the end” for the high school redesign era.
Finalizing the end of the high school redesign era was Michael’s (former North Side
Principal) appointment as the associate superintendent for high schools. Michael brought
an end to the district’s relationship with the First-Things-First consulting group and
formalized the end of high school redesign.
The next section offers suggestions for improving the central office-campus
relationship by directly addressing the findings and conclusions reached by this study.
The implementation of these recommendations may potentially promote a different
organizational framework that more closely fits Marzano and Waters (2009) concept of
“defined autonomy.”
Recommendations for Practice
The plight of the urban school as described in Chapter II has created a national
sense of urgency among reform researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. This
heightened concern resulted in an effort to implement a reform movement of significant
intensity such as the one described by Neild and Balfanz (2006). However, the sense of
urgency that triggered the reform movement and degree of intensity with which the
district leaders attempted to implement the reform caused a sense of frustration among
the campus principals.
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The principals’ sense of frustration, articulated in more detail in Chapter IV,
included concern over instructional programs, limited capacity among the campuses
instructional leadership team, and the need for time to implement the prescribed reforms.
Because the reform was being implemented at the most vulnerable campuses in the
district, the principals were also concerned about absence of structures to support reform
initiatives while simultaneously harboring suspicions that the central office cared little
about a population of students that lacked powerful benefactors.
Throughout the remainder of this section, recommendations for improved
implementation of district-led reform are discussed. Furthermore, these
recommendations seek a district leadership team as outlined by Rorrer et al. (2008) that
is constituted by everyone from the school board down to the campus principal. Finally,
the recommendations address the findings and conclusions of this study.
The solicited best practices from the Southern Regional Education Board, First-
Things-First, and those espoused by the central office should guide candid
conversations, among district agents and campus principals. In order to better guide
these conversations the district leadership should seek help from individuals who are
able to keep conversations focused on the needs of the district rather than prescribe
solutions. Unfortunately, the outside agents (i.e., SREB and FTF) contracted by the
district prescribed solutions and were not willing to reframe these solutions in a local
context.
The focused conversations should produce a menu of sequential improvement
operations that define the district-led high school redesign initiative clearly for each
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identified school. According to this researcher, the list should include, in a district
prescribed order, the following redesign activities:
1. Defined instructional improvements,
2. Implementation steps for emerging methodologies,
3. Development plans for local instructional leadership,
4. Implementation of more rigorous courses,
5. Implementation of student advisories,
6. Implementation of Smaller Learning Communities,
7. Implementation of career and technical courses.
The redesign activities should be viewed as a framework for high school redesign rather
than a specific high school redesign plan. Although the campuses should be expected to
operate within this redesign framework, the development and implementation of a
specific high school redesign plan should be left to the individual campus.
Although the principals and campuses would not be allowed to omit aspects of
the redesign framework, each would be expected to operate within certain degrees of
autonomy. For example, each of the five high schools, through a local effort, should
assess their ability to undertake each activity, define improvement steps that will prepare
them to undertake each activity, and then propose a timeline for implementation of each
activity. This practice will lessen the principals’ perception of encroachment and allow
the latitude to prioritize local needs that they believe make their campus more vulnerable
to state and federal accountability systems.
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All principals should be encouraged to associate themselves with a critical ally of
their choosing that will support them in all reform efforts. The superintendent and other
central office agents should not seek to impose any group or organization to lead
localized efforts. However, the critical ally should be able and willing to support the
principal in implementing activities within the district’s redesign framework. It should
be understood that one campus may associate themselves with a group such as First-
Things-First, while another campus may align themselves with a retired principal who
serves as an administrative partner.
The high school redesign activities as well as each campus’ timeline for
implementation of the activities should be published and often discussed with the local
school board and through community forums. This practice will develop shared
accountability for the implementation of the high school redesign as well as work to
create and articulate a shared culture.
Finally, the school district (principals and central office agents) should propose
to the local school board an assessment instrument for evaluating the success of high
school redesign implementation. The assessment instrument should have corresponding
rewards and sanctions for successful and limited implementation of high school redesign
activities. A committee composed of district staff (central office and principals) should
study causal factors of a campus that is not progressing and make recommendations for
improvement. This practice will prevent the dictating of improvement actions guided by
the individual hubris of any agent (internal or external).
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This section’s discussion would not be complete if the role of financial support
for high school redesign activities was not mentioned. This district should only accept
money from philanthropic organizations that allow districts to operate within locally
developed plans and who do not prescribe consultant groups or specific activities.
Accordingly, the district should assess their ability to repurpose available local, state,
and federal funds in support of reform activities rather than accept money which results
in increased bureaucracies.
Recommendations for Future Studies
Because I served as a principal at one of the high schools within the district, I had
a preconceived notion of the experiences each principal would describe. Listening to
each of the participants describe the time-intensive events that kept them away from
their families helped me recall my own experiences within the district. The juggling of
multiple managerial activities coupled with situations involving uncooperative teachers
was all too familiar. However, what I had not anticipated and was surprised by was the
intensity of the conversations between the principals and the central office regarding the
activities associated with implementing district-led reform. The experiences of each
captivated my attention and opened possibilities for additional research.
The development of an improved relationship between campus principals and
central office personnel necessitates additional research by interested parties. It is
recommended that interested parties conduct additional research in this central Texas
urban district or other urban districts in the following areas:
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1. What factors do principals believe must be in place at a chronically low-
performing campus prior to implementing district-wide high school reform
and what collaborative actions do they believe the central office team and the
campus leadership can take to achieve these factors?
2. How do principals perceive the continued existence of an executive principal
acting as the extension of the principal and as an agent of the central office
when implementing high school reform at chronically low-performing
campuses?
3. What perceptions do key central office personnel have regarding the
development of a shared accountability model for chronically low-
performing campuses who engage their staff in district-led reform efforts and
what factors should constitute a shared accountability model?
4. What key central office personnel and campus principal actions should be
undertaken in order to establish a shared sense of leadership and what
obstacles do principals and key central office personnel believe exist?
Final Thoughts
Tony Alvarado’s “by-chance” description of successful school reform should not
be the determining factor for successful school reform. District leadership, through
continuous dialogue, should spend ample time assessing individual campus needs, the
respective principal’s situation (local context) and their capability and willingness to
implement district-led reform.
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The principals and the central office administrators should establish a shared
responsibility for the state ratings. Shared responsibility should be based on the premise
that principals should not be allowed to excuse themselves from taking calculated risks
while implementing district-led reform. Conversely, central office personnel should also
articulate an understanding of the potential drawbacks during the implementation of
district-led reform. Candid acknowledgment of the potential obstacles should be coupled
with realistic actions to create a working environment safe from undue accountability
and potential harm to careers.
In closing, I am reminded of my first year coaching basketball. When I reported
to Coach Tim Martin and presented myself as his new freshman basketball assistant, he
quickly explained the high-paced practices and modeled the type of drills he wanted the
players to run. Next, he explained, over long conversations, that in previous years, the
team had won district championships because they had been able to capitalize on certain
situations, but had failed to advance in the state playoffs. His new philosophy was not
only to exploit situations, but to create game-time situations that would allow our players
to outperform the opponent. In opposition to Tony Alvarado’s “by chance” description
of successful school reform, district leadership and campus principals should work to
create situations where improvement can be achieved and sustained by analyzing past
performance and constantly using “closing the loop” methods and “deliberate practice”
techniques similar to those described by Coach Tim Martin.
230
REFERENCES
Allen, L., & Steinberg, A. (2004, December). Big buildings, small schools: Using a
small schools strategy for high school reform. Boston, MA: Jobs for the Future,
New York, NY: Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Providence, RI:
Northeast and Islands Regional Educational Laboratory at Brown University.
Retrieved from http://eric.ed.gov
Anagnostopoulos, D. (2003). The new accountability, student failure, and teachers’ work
in urban high schools. Educational Policy, 17(3), 291-316.
Anagnostopoulos, D., & Rutledge, S. (2007). Making sense of school sanctioning
policies in urban high schools. Teachers College Record, 109(5), 1261-1302.
Antrop-Gonzalez, R. (2006). Toward the school of sanctuary concept in multicultural
urban education: Implications for small high school reform. Curriculum Inquiry,
36(3), 273-301.
Barber, M., & Mourshed, M. (2007). How the world’s best-performing school systems
come out on top. McKinsey & Company. Retrieved from
http:/mckensey.com/App-Medical/Reports/sso/worlds_school_systems_find.pdf
Blase, J., & Blase, J. (2000). Effective instructional leadership: Teachers’ perspectives
on how principals promote teaching and learning in schools. Journal of
Educational Administration, 38(2), 130-142.
Bloom, S. L. (1995). Creating sanctuary in the school. Journal for a Just and Caring
Education, 1(4), 403-433. Retrieved from http:/www.sanctuaryweb.com
231
Carnoy, M. (2005). Have state accountability and high-stakes tests influenced student
progression rates in high school? Educational Measurement, Issues, and
Practice, 24(4), 19-31.
Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., Vigdor, J., & Diaz, R. (2004). Do school accountability systems
make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-
quality teachers? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23(2), 251-271.
Cohen, M. (2001). Transforming the American high school: New directions for state and
local policy. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute & Jobs for the Future.
Retrieved from http:/www.earlycolleges.org/ Downloads/transforminghs.pdf
Crow, G., Hausman, C., & Scribner, J. (2002). Reshaping the role of the school
principal. In J. Murphy (Ed.), The educational leadership challenge: Redefining
leadership for the 21st century. The one hundred and first yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (pp. 189-210). Chicago, IL:
National Society for the Study of Education.
Cuban, L. (2005). The blackboard and the bottomline: Why schools can’t be businesses.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cuban, L. (2007). Hugging the middle: Teaching in an era of testing and accountability.
Education Policy Analysis Archives, 15(1). Retrieved from
http:/www.epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v15n1/
Cuban, L. (2010). As good as it gets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Darling-Hammond, L. (1997). The right to learn. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
232
Darling-Hammond, L. (2007). Race, inequality and educational accountability: The
irony of “No Child Left Behind.” Race Ethnicity and Education, 10(3), 245-260.
Darling-Hammond, L., Alexander, M., & Price, D. (2002). Ten features of small schools.
Redesigning high schools. What matters and what works. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University, The School Redesign Network. Retrieved from
http://SRNLEADS.org
Darling-Hammond, L., & Friedlaender, D. (2008). Creating excellent and equitable
schools. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, The School Redesign Network.
Retrieved from http://SRNLEADS.org
Duncan, L. (2006). Case studies of low socioeconomic Mexican American graduates in
the Austin Independent School District: Why they didn’t drop out (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). Texas A&M University, College Station.
Elmore, R. F. (1993). The role of local districts in instructional improvement. In S.
Fuhrman (Ed.), Designing coherent education policy: Improving the system (pp.
96-124). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Elmore, R. F., & Burney, D. (1997). Investing in teacher learning: Staff development
and instructional improvement in Community School District #2, New York City.
New York, NY: National Commission on Teaching & America’s Future.
Erlandson, D. A., Harris, E. L., Skipper, B. L., & Allen, S. D. (1993). Doing naturalistic
inquiry: A guide to methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Feldman, J., Lopez, M. L., & Simon, K. G. (2006). Choosing small: The essential guide
to successful high school conversion. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
233
Fine, M., & Powell, L. (2001). Small schools: An anti-racist intervention in urban
America. In T. Johnson, J. Boyden, & W. Pittz (Eds.), Racial profiling and
punishment in U.S. public schools (pp. 45-52). Oakland, CA: ERASE Initiative.
Firestone, W., & Shipps, D. (2003). How do educational leaders interpret the multiple
accountabilities they face? Paper presented to the annual meeting of American
Research Association, Chicago, IL.
Folly, L. (2007). Making high school reform work: Any plan to reshape high schools
needs time, resources, and purpose to be successful. American School Board
Journal, 194(10), 32-34.
Fullan, M. (1993). Change forces: Probing the depths of educational reform. London,
England: Falmer Press.
Gray, C., Fry, B., Bottoms, G., & O’Neil, K. (2007). Good principals aren’t born –
They’re mentored: Are we investing enough to get the school leaders we need?
Southern Regional Education Board, 7(5), 3-92.
Hardoin, L. (2009). The relationship of principal leadership to organizational learning
and sustained academic achievement (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Texas
A&M University, College Station.
Hochreiter, J. (2007). One size does not fit all: High school reform must be customized
by the school and the community. American School Board Journal, 194(10), 35-
36.
234
Honig, M., Copland, M., Rainey, L., Lorton, J., & Newton, M. (2010). Central office
transformation for district-wide teaching and learning improvement. The
Wallace Foundation. Retrieved from http//www.wallacefoundation.org
Howes, A. J. (2002). Sputnik: Fellow traveler takes America for a ride: How a Russian
satellite placed American education reform in the spotlight. Journal of Young
Investigators. Retrieved from http//www.jyi.org
Kilby, E. (2006). Smaller learning communities: It’s not homeroom anymore. Library
Media Connection, 25(1), 18-20.
Lawrence, B., Bingler, S., Diamond, B., Hill, B., Hoffman, J. L., Howley, C. B. et al.
(2002). Dollars and sense: The cost effectiveness of small schools. Cincinnati,
OH: Knowledge Works Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.kwfdn.org/Program areas/Facilities/dollars_sense.pdf
Lee, V. E., & Smith, J. (1994). High school restructuring and student achievement.
Issues in Restructuring Schools, 7, 1-5, 16.
Lopez, G. (2003). The racially neutral politics of education: A critical race theory
perspective. Educational Administration Quarterly, 39(1), 68-94.
Lutz, F. W. (1990). Reforming education American style. In W. E. Eaton (Ed.), Shaping
the superintendency: A reexamination of Callahan and the cult of efficiency (pp.
110-134). New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
Marks, H. M., & Nance, J. P. (2007). Contexts of accountability under systemic reform:
Implications for principal influence on instruction and supervision. Educational
Administration Quarterly, 43(1), 3-37.
235
Marks, H. M., & Printy, J. P. (2003). Principal leadership and school performance: An
integration of transformational and instructional leadership. Educational
Administration Quarterly, 39(3), 370-397.
Marzano, R. J., & Waters, T. (2009). District leadership that works: Striking the right
balance. Bloomington, IN: Solution Tree Press.
McKenzie, K. B., & Scheurich, J. J. (2004). The corporatizing and privatizing of
schooling: A call for grounded critical praxis (practice as distinguished from
theory). Educational Theory, 54(4), 431-443.
McLaughlin, M., & Talbert, J. (2003). Reforming districts: How districts support school
reform (A Research Report). Seattle, WA: University of Washington, Center for
the Study of Teaching and Policy.
McNeil, L. (2005). Faking equity: High-stakes testing and the education of Latino youth.
In A. Valenzuela (Ed.), Leaving children behind: How “Texas-style”
accountability fails Latino youth (pp. 57-111). New York, NY: State University
of New York Press.
Meier, D. (1995, July). Small schools, big results. The American School Board Journal.
Retrieved from http://www.deborahmeier.com/Articles/1995_SmallSchools.pdf
Merriam, S. B. (2002). Qualitative research in practice. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass.
Neild, R. C., & Balfanz, R. (2006). An extreme degree of difficulty: The educational
demographics of urban neighborhood high schools. Journal of Education for
Students Placed at Risk, 11(2) 123-141.
236
Nelson, S. R., Leffler, J. C., & Hansen, B. A. (2009). Toward a research agenda for
understanding and improving the use of research evidence. Portland, OR:
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. Retrieved from
www.nwrel.org/researchuse/report.pdf
Oakes, J. (2005). Keeping track: How schools structure inequality (2nd ed.). New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Oxley, D., & Kassissieh, J. (2008). From comprehensive high schools to small learning
communities: Accomplishments and challenges. Forum, 50(2), 199-206.
Retrieved from www.wwwords.co.uk/Forum
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA. Sage Publications.
Pecheone, R., Tytler, P., & Ross, P. (2006). Austin Independent School District and the
School Redesign Network at Stanford University: A partnership for successful
school redesign. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, The School Redesign
Network. Retrieved from http://www.srnleads.org/data/pdfs/austin.pdf
Phelps, J., & Addonizio, M. (2006). How much do schools and districts matter. A
production function approach to school accountability. Educational
Considerations, 3(2), 51-62.
Poplin, M., & Weeres, J. (1992). Voices from the inside: A report on schooling from
inside the classroom. Claremont, CA: The Institute for Education in
Transformation at the Claremont Graduate School.
237
Raynor, A. (2006). Save the last chance for me: Quality education in high schools for
young people who need it most. The High School Journal, 90(2), 51-58.
Raywid, M. (1998, December). Small schools: A reform that works. Educational
Leadership. Retrieved from http://www.people.westminstercollege.edu
Raywid, M. (1999). Current literature on small schools. ERIC Digest. Retrieved from
http://www.eriddigests.org
Robelen, E. W. (2002). An ESEA primer. Educational Week, 21(16), 28-29.
Rorrer, A. K., Skrla, L., & Scheurich, J. J. (2008). Districts as institutional actors in
educational reform. Educational Administration Quarterly, 44(3), 307-358.
Retrieved from http://www.eaq.sagepub.com
Ross, P. (2008). Moving from “one best system” to a portfolio: A study of the district
wide high school redesign initiative in the Austin Independent School District
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
Salinas, C., & Reidel, M. (2007). The cultural politics of the Texas education reform
agenda: Examining who gets what, when, and how. Anthropology & Education
Quarterly, 38(1), 42-56.
Sizer, T. R. (1997). Horace’s school: Redesigning the American high school. New York,
NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Spillane, J. P. (1994). How districts mediate between state policy and teachers’ practice.
In R. F. Elmore & S. H. Fuhrman (Eds.), The governance of curriculum (pp. 167-
185). Washington, DC: Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development.
238
Spillane, J. P. (1998). A cognitive perspective on the LEA’s role in implementing
instructional policy: Accounting for local variability. Education Administration
Quarterly, 43(1), 31-57.
Spillane, J. P. (2000). Cognition and policy implementation: District policymakers and
the reform of mathematics education. Cognition and Instruction, 18(2), 141-179.
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2004). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2003-
04/index.html
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2005). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2004-
05/index.html
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2006). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2005-
06/index.html
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2007). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2006-
07/index.html
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2008). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2007-
08/index.html
239
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2009). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2008-
09/index.html
Texas Education Agency (TEA). (2010). Academic Excellence Indicator System. Austin,
TX: Author. Retrieved from http://www.ritter.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2009-
10/index.html
Tirrozzi, G., & Uro, G. (1997). Education reform in the United States: National policy in
support of local efforts for school improvement. American Psychologist, 52(3),
241-249.
Tyack, D. (1974). The one best system: History of American urban education.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Vander Ark, T. (2002). The case for small high schools. Educational Leadership, 59(5),
55-59.
Verdugo, R. R. (2010). The heavens may fall: School dropouts, the achievement gap,
and statistical bias. Education and Urban Society, 43(2), 184-204.
Wasley, P., Fine, M., Gladden, M., Holland, N., King, S., Mosak, E. et al. (2000). Small
schools: Great strides. A study of new small schools in Chicago. Retrieved from
http://www.bnkst.edu/html/news/SmallSchools.pdf
Wasley, P., & Lear, R. (2001). Small schools, real gains. Educational Leadership
Magazine, 58(6). Retrieved from http://www.txechs.com
Weiner, R., & Hall, D. (2004). Accountability under No Child Left Behind. The
Clearing House, 78(1), 17-21.
240
Whitman, D. (2008). An appeal to authority: The new paternalism in urban schools.
Education Next. Retrieved from www.educationnext.org
Wolk, R. (2002). Less is more. Teacher Magazine, 13(4), 3.
Woolworth, S. (2007). Book review. Urban Education, 42(3), 284-291.
241
VITA
Carlos Humberto Rios
1702 Houston St.
Laredo, Texas 78040
EDUCATION
2012 Doctor of Education, Educational Administration
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas
1995 Master of Science, Educational Administration
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas
1990 Bachelor of Arts, History/Political Science
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas
EXPERIENCE
11/09 – Present Executive Director – Academic Compliance and Accountability
Laredo Independent School District, Laredo, Texas
7/06 – 10/09 Middle School Principal
San Felipe Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District
Del Rio, Texas
7/03 – 6/06 High School Principal
Austin Independent School District, Austin, Texas
7/01 – 6/03 Middle School Principal
Seguin Independent School District, Seguin, Texas
7/99 – 6/01 Assistant High School Principal
San Felipe Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District
Del Rio, Texas
7/98 – 6/99 Assistant High School Principal
Seguin Independent School District, Seguin, Texas
7/96 – 6/98 Assistant Middle School Principal
Bryan Independent School District, Bryan, Texas
This dissertation was typed and edited by Marilyn M. Oliva at Action Ink, Inc.
